Month: May 2020

No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 18: The Boycott

  By
“A boycott is an attempt to persuade other people to have nothing to do with some particular person or firm,” Rothbard begins this chapter. And he finds that boycotts are universally legitimate. 「ボイコットはある会社、又はある人のことに関わらないようの説得です」とロスバードがこの章を始める。そして、ボイコットが正当と説明する。
There is a problem with picketing as we know it, however, because picketers generally don’t assemble on their own property. The property owner can demand they leave, and since the favored picketing locations are the protested location and the street in front of it, they likely would, and continuing the picket would then become a crime. だが、ピケットが一般に参加者の所有地に起きないから問題になる。ピケットラインの場所の所有者が散らばることを要求できる。好まれたところがピケットされた者の所有地とその前の通りだから要求が出ることが多いと思われる。となると、ピケットを続けるのが犯罪になる。
The street owner is only presumptively on the protested party’s side, though. It could happen that he favors the picketers, but cannot deny access to the property due to contractual obligations. He could, in that case, allow picketing on his street (without blocking access). だが、通りの所有者がピケットされた者の見方じゃない可能性もある。契約の義務で通りを防げなくても通りに防がないようにピケットを許せる。
In the free society, the boycott would be the only outlet for moral busybodies. One wonders if they would really have the drive to mount them effectively, though. So many of them are armchair activists or bureaucrats. Once the armchair activist must employ his own time and resources instead of simply voting for his favorite flavor of tyranny and the bureaucrats don’t receive a salary for enforcing the tyranny anymore, we may find that they were never so committed to their principles as they claimed. 自由社会ではボイコットがお節介の唯一の捌け口でござる。効果的にできるのを疑えるけど。青白き運動家と背広組が多くて自分の努力と資源にしか頼れなくなったら本当に今言ってるように打ち込んでいないと見えるかも知らない。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 17: Bribery

  By
This short chapter merely establishes the right to offer and pay bribes. It asserts that taking a bribe, however, is a contract violation, and that’s the only sense in which a bribe is a bad thing. この短い章はただ賄賂を払う権利を主張する。だが、賄賂を受け取るのが契約違反で倫理の違反になる。
That this chapter, too, comes before the contracts chapter makes me think that Rothbard might have been well advised to rearrange his chapters. For instance, placing theory description before theory application. この章も契約の章の前に出されたからロスバードが違う整理にするべきだったと思える。例えば、原則の応用する前に原則を明確する。
On the other hand, since all the examples in the chapter are of private-sector bribes and not public-sector bribes, might he have been holding discussion of government until after introducing government? But no. He has condemned government any number of times already. その一方、政府への賄賂がこの章にないとなった理由は政府をまだ明確してないのでは？いやいや、もう幾つかの非難をしてきた。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 16: Knowledge, True and False

  By
In this chapter, Rothbard discusses how a man can exercise his property rights to disseminate information or refrain from disseminating information. This includes telling the truth, telling lies, keeping secrets, and protecting copyright. The general rule is, all men have the right to say or not say anything they like, except when they have already agreed otherwise by contract. この章でロスバードが人の所有権で情報のことを語る。真実を言うことも偽りを言うことも秘密にすることも著作権のことも。一般に人は望むように何でも言う権利も何も言わない権利も持つ。事前に契約でその権利を譲ったことが唯一の例外でござる。
All men have the right to tell any truth they wish. They also have the right to tell any lie they wish. Furthermore, they have the right to say nothing on any topic. 人には何の真実でも言う権利がある。何の偽りでも言う権利がある。そしてどんな状況でも何も言わない権利がある。
The exceptions are contractual agreements: a man might contractually agree to say some truth or lie, or not to say some truth or lie. For example, he might accept payment to keep a secret, or to testify at trial. 例外は契約の賛成でござる。人は契約で何かの真実か偽りかを言うことに賛成できる。何かの真実か偽りかを言わないことに賛成できる。例えば支払金を受け取って秘密を守ることも法廷に証言することもある。
Rothbard attempts to justify common law copyright, but oversteps somewhat. He is correct that a copyright owner can share knowledge on condition of secrecy, or sell items on condition of not reproducing them. But he cannot obligate anyone else- it is not binding upon society as a whole- and in the event of breach of contract, the guilty party is only liable for what they’ve received: the compensation that a confidante accepted to agree to secrecy, or the copyrighted goods a buyer purchased. ロスバードがコモン・ローの著作権を正当化しようとするが、少々度を超える。著作者は内緒の条件で知識を伝えるか物を売るかが権利であるのは正解だけど、他の人が自由に逆らえる。そして、契約違反の場合に有罪者が受け取った分だけ責任になる、支払金だったり著作物だったり。
This would benefit from a contract theory, which Rothbard introduces later. この話題が契約理論で分かりやすくなるが、ロスバードの契約理論はまだ先にある。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 15: “Human Rights” As Property Rights

  By
This chapter attacks the idea some hold that property rights should be curtailed, but yet human rights should be protected. Rothbard asserts that this is unworkable: “the concept of rights only makes sense as property rights. For not only are there no human rights which are not also property rights, but the former rights lose their absoluteness and clarity and become fuzzy and vulnerable when property rights are not used as the standard” (p. 113). Two examples he gives are: “A person does not have a “right to freedom of speech”; what he does have is the right to hire a hall and address the people who enter the premises. He does not have a “right to freedom of the press”; what he does have is the right to write or publish a pamphlet” (p. 113, emphasis in original), and try to distribute it. この章が所有権を切り詰めても人権を守る意見を責める。これが不可能だ、とロスバードが述べる。「権利の概念は所有権でしか筋が通りません。所有権ではない人権はないの他にも所有権を基いてない人権は絶対性と明瞭さを失いはっきりしなくて傷つきやすくなる」（ｐ．１１３）。二例として「人には“表現の自由”を持ちません。持つのはホールを借りて入る人に演説する権利です。“報道の自由”を持ちません。持つのはパンフレットを書く・出版する権利です」（ｐ．１１３）。
He’s right; these rights are basically moot without a property right through which to exercise them. Soapbox oration in public may be a cultural image, but their actual prevalence is less than that of beggars. Without a place to assemble an audience, “freedom of speech” is nearly useless. Without a press to print with you’ll print nothing at all, “freedom of the press” notwithstanding. ロスバードが正しい。こんな人権は所有に通じて使用しないと無力になる。文化には街頭演説の心像があるが実際に乞食より少ない。聴衆を集める場所がないと表現の自由は不用に近い。印刷機を所有しないと出版することはない、報道の自由など言われても。
These right arose in response to government edicts that, “You can’t say that,” “You can’t write that,” “You can’t assemble unless we approve it.” Governments were attempting to stifle dissent and impose conformity, and these right were expressions of opposition. この権利は政府の「それは言えない」「それは書けない」「許可なしで集めれない」のような政令に反して表した。政府は反対を押えて社会を支配しようとした、そして反抗の表現はこの人権でござった。
But they were strictly secondary. The original proponents of these rights would never consider giving up property rights for these. だが二次的だった。この権利の発案者達は所有権を引き渡してそんな人権を得るなんて考えていなかった。
Yet some now think that keeping these secondary rights while losing the more primary right to property would somehow be acceptable. Rothbard is spot on in reframing human rights in this way, both logically and strategically. けれども今では一次的な所有権を失いこの二次的な権利を持ち続けることが結構と思う人がある。この人権を所有権の派生物に変えたロスバードが理論的にも戦略的にも明哲でござった。