Month: May 2020

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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 26: Utilitarian Free-Market Economics, Part C

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In this sub-chapter, Rothbard addresses the utilitarian philosophy of his teacher and friend, Ludwig von Mises. Mises had two approaches. In his first, he asserted that even a value-free economist can label a policy as “bad” if he can show its advocates that the consequences would be unfavorable in their own eyes. Rothbard points out that this must be unanimous – if even a single advocate continues to support the policy, the economist can say nothing, and is rendered moot. This occurs with some frequency, as the advocates are looking at short-term benefits and the economist points out long-term detriments (a common pattern of government policies); almost always someone amongst the supporters has time preference high enough to maintain his support. Often, many if not most of the supporters remain unswayed. Mises claims that people’s “rightly understood interests” (by which he means long-term interests) work in opposition to such policies, but Rothbard points out that the economist thereby overrides the time preferences that the people actually possess. この章節でロスバードはルートヴィヒ・ヴォン・ミーゼスの功利主義を語る。ミーゼスには方角が二つあった。片方に、政策の擁護者に自分の意見でも政策の成績が不利と示せればその政策が悪い、と無色な経済学者でも言える。でも全会一致じゃないと言えない、とロスバードが述べる。擁護者の中の一人でも擁護し続ける者があれば、悪いと言うのは無色ではない。経済学が無力だ。短期しか見ぬ擁護者には経済学者の説明した長期の不利が無意味だという結果がよくある。悪い政策の擁護者には擁護を維持する高い時間選好を持つ者がよくあるから。頻繁に擁護者の大部分が姿勢を変わらない。人々の「正しく考えた（長期の）利」が政策と反対に立つとミーゼスが主張するが、そうして経済学者が人々の時間選好を無視するとロスバードが述べる。
Mises’s other argument comes as a citizen rather than an economist, so he can make value judgments. However, Mises only advance one value judgment: Support the majority in preferring life to death, abundance to poverty, etc. Rothbard criticizes this for being dependent on popular opinion. If the public chooses to pursue the self-destructive ends of envy and instant gratification, then Mises’s own method requires that he support them. ミーゼスの他方は経済学者ではなく市民として価値判断が許される。だが、価値判断の一つだけ主張する。「死より生、貧困より賦存量などの多数判断を支持せよ」と。これが世論に依存する、とロスバードは責める。多数が嫉妬とインスタント喜びみたいな自己破壊的な目的を選べばミーゼスの方法論が支持を要する。
I must say that last point is truly the downfall of utilitarianism. If enough people embrace vice rather than virtue, the utilitarian must relent to them, and recommend gratifying it, be the outcome anywhere between impoverishment and genocide. その最後の点は功利主義の真の欠点でござる、と拙者が言わなきゃならない。足りる人数が徳より不徳を抱くと、功利主義者が折れるべきでござる。不徳と満たすべき、結果が貧窮化にも大虐殺にでもなっても。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 26: Utilitarian Free-Market Economics, Part B

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One variant of utilitarianism stresses Pareto efficiency in making changes. But, Rothbard points out, this emphasizes changes from the status quo; while it prevents things from getting worse, it also makes improvements to the status quo hard by giving those benefiting from it an absolute veto. Since many aspects of the status quo generate such opposition, it makes the current state of affairs nearly permanent in effect. 功利主義の変形の一つは変化を考える時にパレート効率性を強調する。だが現状からの変化だけだ。現状の劣化を拒むけど改良をもほとんど拒む。現状を選好する者に絶対拒否権を上げる。現状にいろんな点について選好する者がある以上、現状を永遠に維持する、とロスバードが述べる。
A variant of this variant states that you can violate Pareto efficiency if you compensate the victims of a given change. This again fails when Rothbard considers the nature of utility. It cannot be measured, so “fair market price” is not the value that compensates the loss in utility. この変形の変形はパレート効率性を侵しても被害者に償ったら正当化する、と主張する。功利を考えてこの変形も落ちる、とロスバードが述べる。測定できないから公平な市場価格が功利の損失の償いにならない。
In my view, regarding the latter variation, the “compensation” can be deduced to be insufficient. If some change is proposed, there is no reason why payments should be excluded. When a man purchases goods from a vendor at an agreed price, it is an example of Pareto efficiency- both parties agree, so both parties benefit (or rather expect to benefit). 拙者の意見では後方の償いが足りないと推定できる。提案した変化を考えたら償いを除外する理由はない。商売では購買者と販売者が承諾した価格があるとパレート効率性がある。両方が承諾したから両方が得する。
To qualify as “compensated Pareto optimal,” the price must be one which the parties don’t agree on. One party must necessarily be short-changing the other party; that’s what makes it not Pareto efficient. That the victim is partially compensated makes it a lesser violation of rights than outright theft, but it remains a violation of rights. 「償ったパレート効率性」があると、両方が承諾しない価格もある。必須に片方が他方をパクっている。そうだからパレート効率性がない。被害者が部分的に償われても権利侵害でござる。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 26: Utilitarian Free-Market Economics, Part A

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In this chapter, Rothbard criticizes utilitarian justifications of the free market, to show that only natural rights form a solid basis for a free society. この章節でロスバードが功利主義の自由市場の正当化を責める。そうして天賦人権だけが自由市場を正当化できると示すつもりだ。
Utilitarianism advocates pursuing the most happiness for the most people. Rothbard’s criticisms are: 功利主義が最大多数の最大幸福を追求することを主張する。ロスバードの非難は：
  1. They give no justification for following the majority of the people. Minorities must bend to the “happiness” of the majority, and in fact have no right to object to any deprivation.
  2. They hold, in theory, that each person’s happiness counts equally, but can give no justification.
  3. They take the people’s desires as a constant guide to dutifully fulfill, but again offer no reason. If we examined those desires, we might find them inadvisable or even loathsome. Yet, the duty to fulfill them stands.
  4. There is no way to add individual happinesses in to a “net social benefit.” It is literally impossible to ascertain if some change or other leaves society better or worse off.
  1. 最大多数を従う正当化がない。少数派には従う選択しかない以上どんな被害を受けても文句を言う権利もない。
  2. 人々の幸福が等しく足すと言うけど、個人的に功利に重みを付けない理由を言わない。
  3. 人々の欲を導きとして受け取るが、また理由を言わない。その欲を観れば愚行とか不届きに見えても従う義理が変わらない。
  4. 人々の幸福を足せないから社会功利を弾けない。考える変化が社会的な費用便益分析が不可能だ。
All I would add to this is emphasis that nothing is inviolable to utilitarianism. No property cannot be redistributed, no liberty cannot be infringed, and no life cannot be taken, if, in the theoretical calculation of society’s “happiness,” it results in a slightly higher value. 拙者の加わることは一つだけでござる。功利主義には不可侵権がない。理論的な計算式で少しでも高い価値が出れば再分配できない所有物も侵せない自由も奪われない命もない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 25: On Relations Between States

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In this chapter, Rothbard examines the vital topic of war and peace. The first thing he observes is that harming innocents in pursuit of a just war (or other justified violence) is criminal. So, “War, then, even a just defensive war, is only proper when the exercise of violence is rigorously limited to the individual criminals themselves” (p. 190). この章でロスバードは重要な和戦の話題を調べる。初めに、正当化した暴力で正義を求めても無罪者に害を及ぼすことが犯罪であると述べる。で、「正当な防衛戦が犯罪者に厳しく限られた場合でしか正しくない」（ｐ．１９０）。
Then, modern vernacular’s “collateral damage” is unjust. Therefore use of nuclear weapons is unjust; they are entirely useless to a free society. Rothbard condemns their existence and recommends nuclear disarmament as a good end. と言うことで、巻き添え被害が犯罪だ。それに、核兵器を使うのも犯罪になる。自由社会では無用だ。核兵器の存在を非難していい目的として核軍縮を推薦する。
On the grounds that just wars executed justly are the only justified ones, but no States actually do this (although theoretically, they could), he condemns all State war-making. Where a just cause does exist, it is still best pursued on an individual level, by the revolutionaries willing to directly act. 正しく実施された正しい戦のみが正当化した戦だとしても、政府がそうしないとの根拠で政府の全ての戦争を非難する。戦を正当化した場合でも人々の個人的な行動が最善だ。革命は革命家お任せ。
Also, in a departure from the topic of war, Rothbard finds foreign aid to be unjust. 和戦の題から少しそれて、ロスバードは外国援助が正しくないと述べる。
I’d say Rothbard is correct throughout this chapter. 拙者の意見は、この章ではロスバードが正解でござる。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 24: The Moral Status of Relations to the State

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Having demonstrated that the State is a criminal enterprise, in this chapter Rothbard describes how a man can ethically interact with it.政府が犯罪の組織であることを証明したことに続き、この章でロスバードが人と政府の正しい相互作用を述べる。
In short, you can do no wrong against the State. Lying, cheating, tax resistance, or other defiance of authority, none of these makes a man a criminal. He does not here address harming government agents, which he might or might not endorse; he does cite H.L. Mencken’s system of punishing jobholders back in Chapter 13, calling it “brilliant and witty” (p. 91, footnote).つまりにすると、政府に犯罪を犯せない。嘘も盗みも税抵抗も権力への反抗も犯罪にならない。ここで政府の者への暴力を調べないが第十九章の脚注でメンケンの刑罰制度が「素晴らしくて機知に富んだ」と褒めた。
One cannot, however contribute to the crimes of the State. While a man can bribe an official to secure some of his rights, he cannot bribe that official to violate another subject’s rights.だが政府の犯罪に手伝うことはならない。自分の権利を保つために政府の者を買収できるけど、他人の権利を犯すために買収できない。
Rothbard also asserts that a man can vote or engage in political action without thereby committing a crime.そして、投票することも政治に関わることも犯罪ではない。
I argue that issuing blanket permission to steal from the State is a bit simplistic. A man who stole all the assets of his State does not “homestead” it and become its new owner. If that State committed such crimes against him that his claim of all it owned is just, he does not homestead it, for it was rightfully his all along. To the extent that it is otherwise, he appropriates the rightful property of others.無条件に政府からの盗みを正当化できない、と拙者が主張する。国家の全部の所有物を盗んだ人がその所有権を手に入らない。その国家があの人にそんな償いを正当化する犯罪を犯した場合ではあの人は盗む前からその所有権を持った。その場合じゃない限り、そこまで他人の権利的な所有物を私する。
I also argue that a State could come to rightfully own some property, under the right circumstances. If a State acquires some revenue by taxation, but also acquired some by gift and/or some of its citizens voluntarily forgave some of its taxation, then, if the latter were great enough, the State would rightfully own a portion of its assets. This would not diminish the claim its victims have against it, however. Where they meet or exceed the value of the State’s assets, it does indeed rightfully own nothing.それに、国家が権利的な所有物を持つようになれる。例の国家が税で収入しながら志願の贈り物と税の許しを足りる程度まで受け取ったら、国家が一部の所有物の所有権を持つようになる。だが、それが被害者の償いを減らない。償いが国家の全部の価値を超えた場合では国家が確かに権利的な所有物を持たない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 23: The Inner Contradictions of the State

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This chapter’s title is a misrepresentation. It examines only the shortcomings of theories of limited government, the laissez-faire, night-watchman idea of the State. Still, this is valuable because the contradictions of those theories need exposure.この章の題名が正しくない。レッセフェール、夜警国家のような小さな政府の理論のみを調べる。だけど、その理論の矛盾を曝す必要がある。
Limited government theory grants to the State the powers of taxation and final authority, then pretends to set limits on that State. Rothbard observes:小さな政府の理論は政府に税の最終権力を譲ってから政府に限定を付けようとする。ロスバードが述べる：
Once these powers are granted, there is no institutional mechanism that can limit their exercise.When these theories posit that taxes should be neutral to the market, they overlook the fact that all taxes result in gains for some and losses for others, making neutrality impossible.The proposal that a State is necessary to make laws fails to observe that the State’s powers of taxation and final authority are obviously illegal, so the State is itself an illegal system.Even if a State should be limited to only providing protection, there is no way to answer the question of how much protection to produce.These theorists have no cogent theories of taxation, of a State’s appropriate territorial size, or of secession.There is an inconsistency in allowing the State to exercise sovereignty to produce protection, but not other goods and services.権力を譲った時点からその権力を限定する制度仕組みはない。「税について経済に中立的な方法を選ぶべき」と主張する理論は税が受け取り人と支払う人を作ることを述べない。中立的な税がない。法律を作る為に政府が必要と言う提案は法律を破る税と独占を見ない。政府自体が不法です。政府が保護に限定させれてもどの位保護を製作する問題が答えられない。理論者には税、領土の程度、脱退の理路整然的な理論がない。保護に限定する理由がない。
Now, while these are all relevant points addressed to laissez-fairists, not all of them are contradictions as such.この点がレッセフェール主義者に話しかけることには適切な欠点だけど、全点が矛盾ではない。
As for actual contradictions of the State as such, I must observe there are none. Insofar as the State acts as a single ethical agent, its behavior is clear: it grapples with its subjects not as similar ethical agents, but as so many truculent livestock.政府自体の矛盾と言うと、そんなことはないと拙者が述べる。国家が一個の倫理行動者として見える限り、その行動が明白でござる。臣民との取り組みは同じ倫理行動者との行動ではなく、獰猛な家畜との行動でござる。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 22: The Nature of the State

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In this chapter, Rothbard describes government: The traits it possesses, and what those traits mean from an ethical standpoint. この章でロスバードが政府の特徴とその特徴の倫理的な意味を述べる。
According to Rothbard, “The State may … be defined as that organization which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area” (p. 172). So, “In a truly free society, a society where individual rights of person and property are maintained, the State, then, would necessarily cease to exist” (p. 173). ロスバードによると、「政府は以下の特徴のいずれか（実際にほとんどいつも両方）を持つ組織です。その特徴は（Ａ）収入を強制で得る（税）、と（Ｂ）決定した領土で暴力と権威の強制的な独占を成し遂げる」（ｐ．１７２）。で、「自由な社会では、自身と所有の個人権利を維持する社会では、政府は必須に断絶する」（ｐ．１７３）。
… And there’s really nothing I can add to that. 。。。拙者には加えることはない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 21: The “Rights” of Animals

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Rothbard denies human rights to animals, on the ground that the nature of humans differs from that of animals. “Man is a rational and social animal. No other animals or beings possess this ability to reason” (p. 155), among other traits. ロスバードは動物に人権がないと主張する。人類の性質と動物の性質が違うから同じ権利を当たることが不適切だ。「人は有利で社交的な動物です。別の動物がこんな推論する能力を持ちません」（ｐ．１５５）。
Rothbard admits that, while he repeatedly emphasizes that natural right are absolute, “there is one sense in which they are relative: they are relative to the species man” (p. 155, italics in original). 天賦人権の絶対性をいつも強調するロスバードが「相対的である意味が一つある。天賦人権が動物の一種である人類に相対的です」（ｐ．１５５）。
He also points out that animals don’t respect any rights outside of their species. And he admits the possibility of treating with other sentient species (assuming we ever make contact with one) as equals. 動物が別種の動物の権利を認めないと指摘する。そして人外の有情種が見つければ匹敵者として接することを支持する。
I would take this one further: even if we granted human rights to animals, there would be no practical need to respect them. So they have the right to demand redress for their enslavement and/or mass slaughter? Nevertheless, they won’t exercise that right, which is as good as never having it at all. 動物に関して拙者が一歩続く。動物に人権を許しても現実的に見守る必要はない。奴隷かつ大量殺害の賠償を求める権利を持ってもその権利を使用しないから最初から持たなかった推定と同じ結果になる。
The animal rights groups could then try to say, “We will do it for them!” But it is absurd to let self-appointed champions exercise rights that they don’t possess. If they want to act as an animal’s agent, they have to pass the same bar as becoming another human’s agent: get it to agree to a contract of agency. 「ならば我々が動物たちの代わりに使用します！」という動物権利組織が現れるが、自任闘士が自分の持っていない権利を使用できない！動物の代理として行動したいならその動物から代理契約に賛成を得るからするべきでござる、人の代理になるように。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 20: Lifeboat Situations

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In this chapter, Rothbard examines some extreme scenarios concocted by opponents of property rights. This opponents believe that the system of property rights breaks down in these situations, so they cannot be held absolute. この章でロスバードが所有権の反対者の極端な脚本に答える。反対者が場合によって所有権が故障すると言って、所有権の絶対性を否定する。
Rothbard first objects that testing the ethical system in this way is invalid: the ethic is intended for use in normal situations, not abnormal situations. ロスバードの初の抗議は、こんな脚本で倫理を試験するのが無効だ。倫理は異常の状況ではなく通常の状況に使用するものだ。
He then proceeds to show how property rights can resolve those situations best, anyway. If only a limited number of people can be saved, then whoever rightfully controls – owns – access to safety chooses whom he saves. If access is unowned it can be homesteaded, i.e., it goes to the first to bodily claim it. と言っても、続いてその脚本に所有権を使用してうまく解決する。限定数の命だけ救える状況では安全な場所の所有者が救われる者を選択する。所有者がないと一番乗りが所有者になる。
The outcome is still tragic, but the scenario was constructed such that tragedy was unavoidable. 結果は悲劇的だけど最初から悲劇を避けられない局本だった。
Some people otherwise inclined to support property rights apparently can’t bring themselves to blame a man for violating them to save his own life in a desperate context, so they make these situations an exception, weakening the principle. Rothbard rejects this. Even if it was to save his life, he can be rebuffed in the moment and/or brought to justice after the fact. 普段に所有権を支持する者にはこんな状況を考えて必死で所有権を犯す者を非難できない者がある。こういう者が所有権に例外を立つ。ロスバードが例外を拒否する。自分の命を救うためだとしても、所有者には最中では力で押し返す権利も事後では訴訟する権利もある。
Rothbard is right in my book, for the most part. His first objection is absurd, though. The situation is rare, therefore it’s irrelevant? That’s no consolation to the unfortunate souls who find themselves in them! Furthermore, an ethic should be universal: Applicable to all men, at all times, under all circumstances. We could apply it to our hunter-gatherer ancestors (who may have seen desperation much more frequently than we) as well as we apply it to ourselves. ロスバードの大部分が正解だ、と拙者が思う。初の抗議が不合理だけど。状況が珍しいから不適切だと？そんな状況に合う不運な者達に言えるか！それに、倫理は普遍的のはずでござる。大昔の狩猟採集民にも現在の人々にのように応用できるはず。その時代は必死な状況で溢れていただろう。そして、率直に不可能な状況でも倫理の使用を示すことで価値を持つ。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 19: Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts

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In this chapter Rothbard breaks with current legal conventions to describe a theory of contracts. Basically, a contract transfers property. Agreements or statements, written or oral, that do not are not enforceable as contracts. この章でロスバードが現在の法律と別れた契約の理論を述べる。基本的に契約が所有を譲渡する。譲渡しない協定が契約じゃない。
When it comes to exchanges or gifts of present goods, this is simple and obvious, but contracts are most valuable for their transfer of future rights- and this is where interpretation is hard. 現在物の交換か贈り物には簡単で当たり前のようだけど、契約の価値が未来物について一番高くなる。そしてこれが解釈の難しいところでござる。
For instance, “I promise to give you one silver coin in one day,” is not a contract, but, “I agree to give you one silver coin in one day,” is. There needs to be a way to express present intent to transfer in the future and present transfer of a future good. But because the ideas are so similar, we have to be careful and precise in our language. 例えば、「一日で一銀貨を上げると約束する」が契約じゃないけど「一日で一銀貨を上げると承諾する」が契約でござる。未来で譲渡する現在の意志と未来で送る現在に譲渡することを述べる言葉が必要でござる。考えが似ていて言葉扱いが注意深く正確にしないとならない。
Unfortunately, imposition of a different legal standard may have contributed to the ambiguity of our language in this area. っと、それが今の英語の状態だけど。日本語では正確な言葉があるかは分からない。知識が不完全で困る。
Rothbard does have a curious contradiction when it comes to voluntary slave contracts. He says they are not enforceable, but later says if someone sells himself for a great sum of money and after some time wants to be free again, then he has to return the money. Yet suppose he doesn’t have the money. Rothbard stated in his chapter on punishments that a man can be enslaved to repay a debt, such as this one. There is little to distinguish this enforceable contract from the unenforceable one, once the money is gone. ロスバードの理論に志願な奴隷契約について矛盾がある。執行できないと言うけど、後でそういう条件で大金を受け取ったら、また自由が欲しくなるとその金を返さなきゃならない。もういないと、ロスバードの刑罰の理論で奴隷にされると主張したんだ。金がなくなった後、これは志願な奴隷契約では？
But it gets better! でもまだまだ先がある！
Rothbard endorses the use of performance bonds (now unenforceable by legal fiat), so a man can contractually bond his service for life, with any arbitrary penalty levied upon him if he refuses at some point to follow through. So the slave doesn’t even need to be paid beforehand! 条件付きの支払金を契約できると述べるから奴隷状態に逆らう条件では金を受け取らなくても奴隷になれるだろう。
I wonder what he would say to that. ロスバードがどう答えたかな？
Rothbard also shows that fraud is a crime in this framework, and that bankruptcy laws are unethical. この制度では詐欺が犯罪のことも現在の破産法が倫理に反していることもロスバードが述べる。
I find it interesting how this basically removes “enforcement of contract” from the legal system. It’s less that the contract is being enforced, and more that property rights are, and the contract merely describes what the property rights in question are. It’s evidence of what to enforce, rather than being itself something to enforce. 基本的に契約執行を法律から取り除くことが面白い、と拙者が思う。契約の執行ってことより所有権の執行になる。契約が所有権を定義するだけでござる。