Month: May 2021

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The Homestead as the Fruits of Man’s Labor

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Having established that the only rational choices for the basis of an ethic are individualism and socialism, and having chosen to base our ethic on individualism, we can now turn to how the ethic can construct rights. The homestead principle is the vehicle. I assert that man has a right to the fruits of his labor. Where the labor is upon unowned resources, it is proper to say that that labor makes those resources his property, to the extent that — and for the duration that — his labor bears fruit. 個人主義と社会主義しか有利な倫理根幹はないと見たところ、個人主義を根幹として選んだところで、今から権利の組み立てに目を留めれる。その組み立て方法はホームステッドでござる。人は努力の賜物に権利があると主張する。その努力が無主な資源に働く場合、努力が資源を本人の所有にする、努力が賜物を付く程度と存続に限って。
This means that, unlike other theorists in this tradition, I incorporate an expiration in the ownership of property. Further, this means that property rights diminish over time, as labor’s fruits diminish. When we consider punishment for violations of the ethic, violating a attenuated property right will be seen to be less serious an offense than violating a fresher property right. これで、伝統の別の理論化と違って拙者が所有に満了を組み込む。また、経時的に努力の賜物が減るほど所有も減ることになる。倫理の違反の賠償を考えるときに来たら弱まった所有権利を犯すことが新鮮な所有権利を犯すことほど重度ではない。
This feature is necessary to allow a mechanism for property abandonment that does not require the property owner to positively renounce ownership. Without this feature, any time an owner abandoned a property without notifying anybody, it would forever be ‘owned’ de jure (since it was never renounced), and so it would be wrong to trespass (in theory). All archaeology would be presumptive trespass, unless the archaeologists could secure adequate records that a site was renounced properly or locate the original owners’ heir(s) and get explicit permission. この特徴が必要でござる。いなければ、所有委付の方法は所有者の形式上の棄権しかない。故に所有者が棄権無しで所有を捨てる度に法律上では所有物で続けれることで他人が永遠に使えられない。考古学全体が見なしに侵害でござる,考古学者が棄権記録か所有継承許可が無ければ。
Let us consider, as an example, a sandcastle. A man goes to an unowned beach, and constructs a sandcastle. My theory finds that the man owns that sandcastle. Hence, it would be wrong for another man to come along and wreck it. However, should the owner leave for some hours or days — however long, until the elements do their work — when he returns, and his sandcastle is gone, then he no longer owns it; he does not even own the land where it used to stand. 例として砂の城を考えよう。人が無主な海辺に行き砂城を作る。拙者の論理上では本人が砂城を所有する。だから他人が来て砂城を壊すのが不正でござる。だが、所有者が砂城を置いて行きて数時間か数日間か（天資が削る時間）が経った後戻ったら、無くなった砂城がもう本人の所有物ではない。立っていた土地でも所有しない。
Other theories would assert that the man either never truly owned the sandcastle, or that he continued to own the land on which it stood after it was gone. I find both of these alternatives unsatisfactory. The sandcastle might not be a valuable investment in the typical sense, but I would consider it a useful demonstration for teaching the basics of property rights. What one learns in the sandbox can be constructively applied outside the sandbox. 他の論理上では、本人が最初から砂城に所有権が無かったことに、それとも無くなった後にも所有権があることにする。拙者にはこの両方が意に満たない。正常では砂城が高価な投資ではないが、所有権の基礎を教えるいい方法と思う。砂場で教わったことが砂場外では効果的に使える。
Now, one might say of my theory, “That allows everybody to homestead everything, by asserting that the ‘labor’s fruits’ are the changes wrought by the labor, and by application of the Butterfly Effect, every man can claim their labor has changed the entire world (over time), and that those are the fruits, and therefore they homesteaded everything in the world.” Unfortunately for this line of reasoning, men are not omniscient. We cannot track all of the changes that our labor wreaks. It may be true that every man’s labor changes the whole world, but where a man can’t prove that his labor effected a specific change, it is as good as if he had effected no change at all. 一つの意義を考えよう。「それでは、みんなが全てをホームステッド出来る。努力の賜物とは努力に代わったものであるならバタフライ効果の使用でみんなが（長時間で）世界を代わって全世界をホームステッドしたことになる」、と。この理屈には残念だが、人が全知で無い限り無効な理屈でござる。努力の効果の全てを分かられない。各々の人が全世界を代わるが本当かも知らないが、人が努力で具体的な変更を起こした証拠が無ければ無効化と同じ結果にしかならない。
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On the Impossibility of an Ethical Regression Theorem

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Ludwig von Mises developed the monetary regression theorem, solving a circular value-of-money question: Money is valuable to us because we can buy things with it; we can buy things with it because it is valuable to us; whence came its value, then? Mises solved this by deducing that people gradually attributed value to money commodities over time; eventually, regressing far enough back in history, all commodities we now consider “money” were not monetary commodities, but examples of any commodity. ルートヴィヒ・フォン・ミーゼスが金銭的回帰理論と発した。その理論が循環的な金銭価値問題を解いた。金でものを買えるから金には価値がある、そして金には価値があるから物を買える。ならば、金の価値がどこでどうやって由来している？人が弥久にかけて徐々に金商品に価値を与えた、歴史に遠く回帰すれば今では「金」と思われる商品が全て普通の商品でした、とミーゼスは論理した。
I recently contemplated such a regression for establishing a basis for ethics. I have stated before that one can argue for absolute individualism, or one can argue for absolute socialism, but any and all compromise positions are completely arbitrary, and should be rejected out of hand for being so. 最近、そう回帰すれば倫理の根拠を見つけるかも、と拙者が熟考した。前には完全的な個人主義に理論ができる、そして完全的な社会主義に理論が出来る、と主張した。また、その二つのあらゆる妥協が恣意的であって論理的に否定するべき理論でござる、と主張した。
What if the starting point for ethics should be treated in a manner similar to money? The present value of money is neither zero nor infinity, which would be analogous to the ethical absolutes of individualism and socialism. It is, at any given time, at a “compromise position.” だが、倫理の原点が金みたいに回帰するものだったらどうなる？倫理の絶対極地である個人主義と社会主義には類似する零と無限大が金の価値ではない。いつも「妥協点」でいられる。
What if the current state of ethics, too, is the result of countless iterations of a process, and so its location at a given point at a given time is not only not arbitrary, but justified? We could regress back to the original state of ethics, and justify all the steps that led us to the given point and given time. 類似的に、倫理の現在状態もある過程の無数の反復の結果であれ、任意時の現在点は恣意的でなく、正当であるのでは？倫理の発端まで回帰でき、その任意時の現在点まで手順を正当化できる。
If this theorem were valid, then a state of ethics which is a compromise between individualism and socialism can be justified. この理論が妥当ならば、個人主義と社会主義の妥協の倫理的状態が正当化できる。
Ultimately, this theorem is impossible. The historical ebb and flow of the conflict between individualism and socialism is not analogous to the drift of the value of money between zero and infinity. First, money started at zero (that is, zero value as a medium of exchange; as a commodity itself, it still had use-value). If analogous, that means that ethics must have started at pure individualism (because men possess individual wills, minds, and souls). But the continuity of the value of money resets every generation; a newborn child values gold (or whatever money commodity) at zero until he comes to recognize, accept, and adopt the prevailing value of money. 結論的にこの理論が不可能でござる。歴史上の個人主義と社会主義の干満が金の零と無限大の間で変動と類似しない。まずは、金が零から始まった。（交代媒体として零価値で、商品として使用価値があったけど。）類似だったら、人には個人的な意思、心、魂があるから倫理も完全個人主義から始まったはずでござる。だが、代々に金の価値が零に戻るんだ。赤ちゃんが金銭商品を零に価値する、行き渡る金の価値が分かって認めて取り入れるまで。
This means that if the analogy holds, then every child is born with the rights attendant to pure individualism — among which is the right to reject socialism outright. To justify any socialism, every child, in every generation, would have to freely waive his rights to the social power. He could not be unconditionally deprived of them at birth, or in infancy, or as a child, or during adolescence, any more than he could be made to value money at a certain minimum value for the rest of his life. 類似するならば、各々の子供が純粋個人主義の権利で生まれる。その権利が社会主義を拒絶する権利をも含む。社会主義を正当化するには代々に各々の子供が自由に個人権利を社会に譲ることが必要でござる。出生にも幼少期にも思春期にも無条件で権利を剥ぐのは不正でござる。人生の残りまで金の最小限価値を教化すると同じく不可能なことでござる。
The proposal might arise that children learn a pledge or oath of allegience in some areas of the world, and recite it; and having pledged or sworn allegience, it is binding for life. This is wholly invalid on individualist grounds. Individualist ethics operates on contracts, not on pledges or oaths. If this were any form of contract, then both parties have contractual obligations. No pledge I know of gives these obligations — with regard to either party — with any degree of specificity. Considering the gravity of the rights supposedly waived and the impositions supposedly justified thereby, its vagueness renders it impossible to enforce; neither party could rightly assert what the pledge bound the two parties to do. 幾つかの地方には子供が忠誠の誓約を唱えることがあって、そう誓って人生の最果てまでしばられる、との提案が来るだろう。個人主義では全く不妥当な提案でござる。個人主義が誓約でなく契約で作動する。契約であれば、両方には責務がある。拙者の知っている制約が全てその責務（両方にも）を具体的に記述しない。仮定で譲れる権利と仮定で正当化した押し付けの重要性を考慮すれば、有耶無耶で適用できない。両方も誓約の縛りを正しく主張できない。
(This may very well be purposeful; those who design such pledges may not want to lock their favored party in to obligations on their part, nor to limit the obligations of the counterparty.) （故意にそうなったかも。そんな誓約を設計したものの贔屓の一方に責務を押し付けたくなくて、他方に責務を限りたくなくてそうなるだろう。）
Due to this (among other justifications), pledges and oaths recited by children do not move the ethical state of things one iota. これと多々にある正当化の元で、子供の誓約が倫理の状態を一分一厘も動かさない。
Having found that even if we assumed the individualism/socialism compromise were operating on principles analogous to the regression theorem of the value of money, it would only justify any socialism where pure individualism does so (that is, only with unanimous consent), we conclude that this analogous regression theorem of ethics is entirely nugatory. 個人主義と社会主義の妥協が金銭的回帰理論と類似する原理で作用しても、完全個人主義と同じく全会一致でしか社会主義を正当化する。そう見つけた故、この倫理回帰理論が完全に無効だと結論する。