Author: Brian Wilton

I'm a libertarian. I prefer reading articles and books to listening to podcasts, although I hear that podcasts are more popular. Call it Picard's Syndrome.
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On the Justification for The State

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Having justified individual rights, can we now justify the state? At first glance it would appear that the state has no right whatsoever to operate as we know states to operate. They claim the right to tax, which is confiscation of the property of innocent men, and the right to tell citizens what they can and can’t do, without regard to those citizens’ rights, as we have begun to describe them here. Can this be justified, or are all states unethical? 個人権利を正当化したところで、政府を正当化できるのか？一見したところ、拙者が知る政府見たいに行動する政府には存在する権利がない。政府は無罪である個人から所有を奪うと等しい課税する。個人の権利を無視して恣意に独裁する。これらの正当化が可能なのか？それとも、政府自体が不正なのか？
As it happens, it can be justified. I’ve alluded to the process before, while discussing the choice between ethical individualism and ethical socialism. In short, the state is justified if, and only if, its citizens consent to its operation. 結局、正当化が可能でござる。倫理的な個人主義と社会主義を選択する時には一瞬触れた。政府の作動が正当化するために被治者が同意しなければならない。
If individuals have rights, they can waive those rights, conditionally or unconditionally. So, a group of individuals might propose to institute a state amongst themselves, and with everyone’s consent, that state will be justified. This is not to say that every individual has to sign the new state’s constitution, or even to have read it. Some of the individuals might delegate the decision to others, placing their rights in the hands of people they trust to judge the proposed state well. With enough iterations of congregation and delegation, even a world government could be justified. 個人には権利があれば、その権利を放棄できる。で、個人の集団が政府を設けることを提案して、全員の同意でその政府が正当化される。被治者が全員、憲法に署名する必要も憲法を読んだ必要もない。員の部分が信頼する判断を持つ他人を選択権の代表として派遣することもある。
Due to the a priori economic proof that government is destructive of prosperity, establishment of such states is economically unwise in the extreme. Further, the existence of obstinate individualists in various locations basically dooms the “ethical state” from the outset. 政府は繁栄に破壊的であることが前知の経済学で証明されている故、経済学的に政府の設けが非常に愚かなことでござる。また、頑固な個人主義者の存在でこんな「倫理的な政府」は最初からありえないでござる。
To my knowledge, this process of securing individual consent — through delegates where individuals see fit to do so — has never justified any state larger than some village-sized experimental communes. These communes were doomed to one of two fates: to collapse and scatter when individual consent dwindled, or to consolidate into a typical state that doesn’t rely upon unanimous consent (and thereby lose ethical justification). If states-by-consent are not inherently impossible, it seems clear that they are not tenable under any circumstances they have been tested in to date. 拙者の知識上では、このような個人同意で政府を正当化したことが村の規模の試験コミューンに限られている。そのコミューンには二つの運命が待っていた。個人同意が果たした後、破局して散らす運命と個人同意を捨て強固する運命でござる。同意上の政府自体が不可能じゃないなら、今まで試した条件では適わぬ。
All states but these experiments are ethically unjust. They are all more or less reliant upon imposition of their dictates on individuals without their consent. Where any state exercises sovereignty over even one man without his consent, that state is unjust. This is true of all forms of state, even democracies and republics, despite any popularity they enjoy. One man’s dissent is all it takes. この試験以外、政府各個が倫理的に不正でござる。各個が多少で同意なしに個人に独裁する。政府が一人の不同意者にも主権を強いれば、その政府が不正でござる。政府の形状には関係がない。人気である民主制でも共和制でも関係ない。一人の不同意だけあれば、不正になる。
No historical state of significant scale has been just, no present state of significant scale is just, and the future prospects of a just state are bleak. 歴史上の正である大規模な政府はない。現状では正である大規模な政府はない。未来に正である政府が現れる見込みがほとんどない。
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Birth and Death

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Men, as ethical actors, have rights. But, we are not timeless; each of us is only here for a limited time. And it is only during that time that we are ethical actors. So, when do we start being ethical actors having rights worth considering, and when do we cease being the same and lose our rights? And related to that, if we start ethical life with any property, from whom is that property taken, and what happens to our property when ethical life ends? 倫理的な行動者として人には権利がある。だが人の時間が限られている。その時間の間だけ倫理的な行動者である。だから、いつ権利を持つ倫理的な行動者になる？そして、いつ行動者じゃなくなって権利を失う？その時の所有について、倫理的な生命を始まった時、ある最小限の所有を持つ？誰から貰う？そして、倫理的な生命が終わる時に、所有はどうなる？
These questions are necessarily tied up in the questions of who is an ethical actor and what is not an ethical actor. Some might assert that ethical actors are only working-age men between the ages of 18 and 65, and everything else (including men outside of that age range) is not. Again, it is not our purpose to dictate the answer to that question. We only observe that ethical actors must become such at some point in time, and cease being such at a later point in time. この問題は必然で誰が倫理的な行動者か、何が倫理的な行動者じゃないかの二つの問題と絡み付いている。「十八歳から六十五歳まで、生産年齢の人だけが倫理的な行動者だ」と主張するものがあるかも知らない。また行っておくが、その質問の答えは拙者の目的ではない。ただ、倫理的な行動者が「そんな者」になる時がある、そしてその後のいつかで「そんな者」じゃなくなると述べる。
In describing this theory, we will assume as a convention that all living human beings are ethical actors. So, upon conception, a child is a human being (whereas before that point “he” was two gametes, which are not human, since they lacked a human’s full genetic data), and alive, so he becomes an ethical actor at that moment. Then, when he dies, he ceases to be an ethical actor. この理論の記述では、仮定として全ての生きている人間が倫理的な行動者でござる。で、妊娠の時点から子が人間であって（その時点まで二つの人間の遺伝子を不全で持った配偶子だけであって、完全なる人間ではなかった）、生きていって、その時点で倫理的な行動者になる。そして、死ぬ時点で倫理的な行動者じゃなくなる。
All ethical actors possess the right to acquire property in the same ways: via homesteading, and via transfer from another ethical actor. But, do they start their ethical lives with any property? While intuitively I would say that they start owning their bodies, this necessarily means that if their body-matter were someone else’s property before, at the beginning of ethical life they deprive that other party of property without a contract — i.e., through an invalid property transfer. We must therefore conclude that ethical actors start life without any property at all, until they homestead some or receive some from others. A corollary of this observation is that one cannot commit crimes against such an ethical actor, as he owns no property, and we will find later that all crimes are violations of property rights. This can result in parental tyranny, but it follows from absolute property rights that cannot be stripped without consent. 全ての倫理的な行動者が所有を貰う方法を二つ持つ。ホームステッドをすることで、そして他の倫理的な行動者から受けることで。だが、倫理的な生命の初めに所有を持つのか？直観的に体がこの所有と言いたいが、それでは体の質量が他人の所有だったら子が契約無しの不正な譲渡で所有を貰うことになる。だから倫理的な行動者が何の所有もなく生命を始まる、ホームステッドするか他人から受けるかまで。後で「違反」は所有権を侵すことと見ますから、その帰結でそういう倫理的な行動者には違反は不可能でござる。親の圧制になることもあろうが、絶対所有権から所有を承知無し譲渡することを否定するしかない。
For sentimental reasons as well as economic reasons, I would advocate that parents raise their children well, which would include recognizing their self-ownership immediately, but I cannot dictate that behavior. 感情の理由と経済の理由で自体所有を認める育ち方を選ぶ親が良いと意見するが、拙者がその行動を決定付けれない。
On the other end of the ethical actor’s life is their death. Once a man is no long an ethical actor, he no longer has any rights. His property, therefore, is lost to him. What happens to the ownership of that property? If he made contracts with others wherein he gifted to the other parties his various possessions in the event of his death, then the conditions of those contracts are fulfilled, and that property which he willed to those other parties become theirs. All his other property immediately becomes unowned, free for anyone to homestead. 倫理的な行動者の生命の逆転は死でござる。人が倫理的な行動者じゃなくなると、もう権利はない。だからその人の所有が自分に失われる。その所有権はどうなる？死の条件で所有を譲渡する契約を結んだ場合、条件が満たされることで他者に指名した所有が譲渡される。だがそう指名しなかった所有が無主になり、誰でもホムステッドできるものになる。
There are, here and there, cultural customs governing the disposition of a man’s property when he dies without leaving behind a will. These can be justified under the grounds that some executors homestead the unowned property by parsing it out to friends and family in accordance with the custom. Where the custom has support, the opportunist who swoops in to claim possessions from the recently dead (without wills) can be excoriated as virtually a grave robber, and brought to heel by social pressure. 各地には遺言無き亡き人の所有を配置する文化の慣習がある。執行役人が無主の所有を分けることでホームステッドすることと見れば慣習が正当化する。その慣習の地では遺言無き亡き人の所有を貰う飛び掛けるご都合主義者が慣習を侵した異端者として社会的な圧力で慣習に従わせることもある。
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Property Transferral and Contracts

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Up to this point, we have considered how men acquire property rights, and described those rights as exclusive, rightful control of property. This has some important features that we have not touched upon yet, however, and very well deserve mention. 今まで、人が所有権を得ることを考えた、そしてその所有権を排他的な正しい所有制御と記述した。だが重要な特徴がまだ残っている。
A feature of property rights is the right to transfer that property, in whole or in part, to other men. Now, we could conceive an ethic that does not allow this feature, but it would violate the basis we have chosen for this ethic — that it is individualist. The individualist basis means that we must acknowledge all individual rights we can conceive, until and unless some newly-conceived right conflicts with other rights; such rights, and only such rights, must be discarded, lest the ethic become self-contradictory. 所有を他人に譲渡することも所有権の特徴の一つでござる。この特徴を含まない倫理を思いつけるが、そんな倫理がここで選択した根幹と矛盾する。個人主義と両立できない。個人主義の根幹上では矛盾が生まれない限り思いつける個人権利を全部受け入れる。
The ethic must have individual rights that are maximal while still being fully internally consistent. この倫理は完全に一貫することで最大限の個人権利を認めなければならない。
We could observe that denying the right of property transfer would have dire consequence to the prosperity of all parties involved. While that would be an accurate observation, it is only pertinent to a consequentialist ethic- and ours is a deontological ethic. The observation is well and good for other purposes, such as convincing consequentialists to adhere to our ethic, but in constructing our ethic, it is irrelevant. 所有譲渡を否定することが全人類の反映に厄介な影響を生むと述べれる。だが、正確な観測であっても、帰結主義の倫理だけに論外ではない。本の倫理は義務論の倫理であるから論外でござる。観測には別の用に使える（例えば、帰結主義者を倫理に従う理由を証明すること）が、倫理を組み立てることには無用でござる。
For the specifics of how property rights can be transferred, Rothbard’s “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts” (chapter 19 of The Ethics of Liberty) is an excellent system; I would only object to his claim that voluntary slave contracts are unenforceable. Walter Block has also criticized this facet of Rothbard’s theory. 所有譲渡の詳細について、ロスバードの「所有権と契約の理論」（「自由の倫理」の第十九章）が優秀な体系でござる。拙者の唯一の議論は彼の志願な奴隷契約を拒む主張でござる。ウォルター・ブロックもロスバードの理論のこの点を批判したことがある。
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The Homestead as the Fruits of Man’s Labor

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Having established that the only rational choices for the basis of an ethic are individualism and socialism, and having chosen to base our ethic on individualism, we can now turn to how the ethic can construct rights. The homestead principle is the vehicle. I assert that man has a right to the fruits of his labor. Where the labor is upon unowned resources, it is proper to say that that labor makes those resources his property, to the extent that — and for the duration that — his labor bears fruit. 個人主義と社会主義しか有利な倫理根幹はないと見たところ、個人主義を根幹として選んだところで、今から権利の組み立てに目を留めれる。その組み立て方法はホームステッドでござる。人は努力の賜物に権利があると主張する。その努力が無主な資源に働く場合、努力が資源を本人の所有にする、努力が賜物を付く程度と存続に限って。
This means that, unlike other theorists in this tradition, I incorporate an expiration in the ownership of property. Further, this means that property rights diminish over time, as labor’s fruits diminish. When we consider punishment for violations of the ethic, violating a attenuated property right will be seen to be less serious an offense than violating a fresher property right. これで、伝統の別の理論化と違って拙者が所有に満了を組み込む。また、経時的に努力の賜物が減るほど所有も減ることになる。倫理の違反の賠償を考えるときに来たら弱まった所有権利を犯すことが新鮮な所有権利を犯すことほど重度ではない。
This feature is necessary to allow a mechanism for property abandonment that does not require the property owner to positively renounce ownership. Without this feature, any time an owner abandoned a property without notifying anybody, it would forever be ‘owned’ de jure (since it was never renounced), and so it would be wrong to trespass (in theory). All archaeology would be presumptive trespass, unless the archaeologists could secure adequate records that a site was renounced properly or locate the original owners’ heir(s) and get explicit permission. この特徴が必要でござる。いなければ、所有委付の方法は所有者の形式上の棄権しかない。故に所有者が棄権無しで所有を捨てる度に法律上では所有物で続けれることで他人が永遠に使えられない。考古学全体が見なしに侵害でござる,考古学者が棄権記録か所有継承許可が無ければ。
Let us consider, as an example, a sandcastle. A man goes to an unowned beach, and constructs a sandcastle. My theory finds that the man owns that sandcastle. Hence, it would be wrong for another man to come along and wreck it. However, should the owner leave for some hours or days — however long, until the elements do their work — when he returns, and his sandcastle is gone, then he no longer owns it; he does not even own the land where it used to stand. 例として砂の城を考えよう。人が無主な海辺に行き砂城を作る。拙者の論理上では本人が砂城を所有する。だから他人が来て砂城を壊すのが不正でござる。だが、所有者が砂城を置いて行きて数時間か数日間か（天資が削る時間）が経った後戻ったら、無くなった砂城がもう本人の所有物ではない。立っていた土地でも所有しない。
Other theories would assert that the man either never truly owned the sandcastle, or that he continued to own the land on which it stood after it was gone. I find both of these alternatives unsatisfactory. The sandcastle might not be a valuable investment in the typical sense, but I would consider it a useful demonstration for teaching the basics of property rights. What one learns in the sandbox can be constructively applied outside the sandbox. 他の論理上では、本人が最初から砂城に所有権が無かったことに、それとも無くなった後にも所有権があることにする。拙者にはこの両方が意に満たない。正常では砂城が高価な投資ではないが、所有権の基礎を教えるいい方法と思う。砂場で教わったことが砂場外では効果的に使える。
Now, one might say of my theory, “That allows everybody to homestead everything, by asserting that the ‘labor’s fruits’ are the changes wrought by the labor, and by application of the Butterfly Effect, every man can claim their labor has changed the entire world (over time), and that those are the fruits, and therefore they homesteaded everything in the world.” Unfortunately for this line of reasoning, men are not omniscient. We cannot track all of the changes that our labor wreaks. It may be true that every man’s labor changes the whole world, but where a man can’t prove that his labor effected a specific change, it is as good as if he had effected no change at all. 一つの意義を考えよう。「それでは、みんなが全てをホームステッド出来る。努力の賜物とは努力に代わったものであるならバタフライ効果の使用でみんなが（長時間で）世界を代わって全世界をホームステッドしたことになる」、と。この理屈には残念だが、人が全知で無い限り無効な理屈でござる。努力の効果の全てを分かられない。各々の人が全世界を代わるが本当かも知らないが、人が努力で具体的な変更を起こした証拠が無ければ無効化と同じ結果にしかならない。
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On the Impossibility of an Ethical Regression Theorem

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Ludwig von Mises developed the monetary regression theorem, solving a circular value-of-money question: Money is valuable to us because we can buy things with it; we can buy things with it because it is valuable to us; whence came its value, then? Mises solved this by deducing that people gradually attributed value to money commodities over time; eventually, regressing far enough back in history, all commodities we now consider “money” were not monetary commodities, but examples of any commodity. ルートヴィヒ・フォン・ミーゼスが金銭的回帰理論と発した。その理論が循環的な金銭価値問題を解いた。金でものを買えるから金には価値がある、そして金には価値があるから物を買える。ならば、金の価値がどこでどうやって由来している？人が弥久にかけて徐々に金商品に価値を与えた、歴史に遠く回帰すれば今では「金」と思われる商品が全て普通の商品でした、とミーゼスは論理した。
I recently contemplated such a regression for establishing a basis for ethics. I have stated before that one can argue for absolute individualism, or one can argue for absolute socialism, but any and all compromise positions are completely arbitrary, and should be rejected out of hand for being so. 最近、そう回帰すれば倫理の根拠を見つけるかも、と拙者が熟考した。前には完全的な個人主義に理論ができる、そして完全的な社会主義に理論が出来る、と主張した。また、その二つのあらゆる妥協が恣意的であって論理的に否定するべき理論でござる、と主張した。
What if the starting point for ethics should be treated in a manner similar to money? The present value of money is neither zero nor infinity, which would be analogous to the ethical absolutes of individualism and socialism. It is, at any given time, at a “compromise position.” だが、倫理の原点が金みたいに回帰するものだったらどうなる？倫理の絶対極地である個人主義と社会主義には類似する零と無限大が金の価値ではない。いつも「妥協点」でいられる。
What if the current state of ethics, too, is the result of countless iterations of a process, and so its location at a given point at a given time is not only not arbitrary, but justified? We could regress back to the original state of ethics, and justify all the steps that led us to the given point and given time. 類似的に、倫理の現在状態もある過程の無数の反復の結果であれ、任意時の現在点は恣意的でなく、正当であるのでは？倫理の発端まで回帰でき、その任意時の現在点まで手順を正当化できる。
If this theorem were valid, then a state of ethics which is a compromise between individualism and socialism can be justified. この理論が妥当ならば、個人主義と社会主義の妥協の倫理的状態が正当化できる。
Ultimately, this theorem is impossible. The historical ebb and flow of the conflict between individualism and socialism is not analogous to the drift of the value of money between zero and infinity. First, money started at zero (that is, zero value as a medium of exchange; as a commodity itself, it still had use-value). If analogous, that means that ethics must have started at pure individualism (because men possess individual wills, minds, and souls). But the continuity of the value of money resets every generation; a newborn child values gold (or whatever money commodity) at zero until he comes to recognize, accept, and adopt the prevailing value of money. 結論的にこの理論が不可能でござる。歴史上の個人主義と社会主義の干満が金の零と無限大の間で変動と類似しない。まずは、金が零から始まった。（交代媒体として零価値で、商品として使用価値があったけど。）類似だったら、人には個人的な意思、心、魂があるから倫理も完全個人主義から始まったはずでござる。だが、代々に金の価値が零に戻るんだ。赤ちゃんが金銭商品を零に価値する、行き渡る金の価値が分かって認めて取り入れるまで。
This means that if the analogy holds, then every child is born with the rights attendant to pure individualism — among which is the right to reject socialism outright. To justify any socialism, every child, in every generation, would have to freely waive his rights to the social power. He could not be unconditionally deprived of them at birth, or in infancy, or as a child, or during adolescence, any more than he could be made to value money at a certain minimum value for the rest of his life. 類似するならば、各々の子供が純粋個人主義の権利で生まれる。その権利が社会主義を拒絶する権利をも含む。社会主義を正当化するには代々に各々の子供が自由に個人権利を社会に譲ることが必要でござる。出生にも幼少期にも思春期にも無条件で権利を剥ぐのは不正でござる。人生の残りまで金の最小限価値を教化すると同じく不可能なことでござる。
The proposal might arise that children learn a pledge or oath of allegience in some areas of the world, and recite it; and having pledged or sworn allegience, it is binding for life. This is wholly invalid on individualist grounds. Individualist ethics operates on contracts, not on pledges or oaths. If this were any form of contract, then both parties have contractual obligations. No pledge I know of gives these obligations — with regard to either party — with any degree of specificity. Considering the gravity of the rights supposedly waived and the impositions supposedly justified thereby, its vagueness renders it impossible to enforce; neither party could rightly assert what the pledge bound the two parties to do. 幾つかの地方には子供が忠誠の誓約を唱えることがあって、そう誓って人生の最果てまでしばられる、との提案が来るだろう。個人主義では全く不妥当な提案でござる。個人主義が誓約でなく契約で作動する。契約であれば、両方には責務がある。拙者の知っている制約が全てその責務（両方にも）を具体的に記述しない。仮定で譲れる権利と仮定で正当化した押し付けの重要性を考慮すれば、有耶無耶で適用できない。両方も誓約の縛りを正しく主張できない。
(This may very well be purposeful; those who design such pledges may not want to lock their favored party in to obligations on their part, nor to limit the obligations of the counterparty.) （故意にそうなったかも。そんな誓約を設計したものの贔屓の一方に責務を押し付けたくなくて、他方に責務を限りたくなくてそうなるだろう。）
Due to this (among other justifications), pledges and oaths recited by children do not move the ethical state of things one iota. これと多々にある正当化の元で、子供の誓約が倫理の状態を一分一厘も動かさない。
Having found that even if we assumed the individualism/socialism compromise were operating on principles analogous to the regression theorem of the value of money, it would only justify any socialism where pure individualism does so (that is, only with unanimous consent), we conclude that this analogous regression theorem of ethics is entirely nugatory. 個人主義と社会主義の妥協が金銭的回帰理論と類似する原理で作用しても、完全個人主義と同じく全会一致でしか社会主義を正当化する。そう見つけた故、この倫理回帰理論が完全に無効だと結論する。
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On “a peculiar form of lottery tickets“

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In “Against Fiduciary Media”, Chapter 7 of The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (originally printed in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1998)), Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Jörg Guido Hülsmann, and Walter Block attempt to refute George Selgin and Lawrence White’s article “In Defense of Fiduciary Media”, from the Review of Austrian Economics 9 no. 2 (1996): 83-107. Selgin and White’s article itself is a reply to a criticism by Hoppe of earlier writings by Selgin and White; Hoppe’s critism is found in the concluding pages of Chapter 6. 『私有財産の経済学と理論学』の第七章「受託資金に対して」（元は『オーストリア学派経済学の季刊誌』一、第一（春１９９８年）に発行した）ではハンス＝ヘルマン・ホッペとイェルク・ギド・ヒュルスマンとウォルター・ブロックが『オーストリア学派経済学の査読』九、第二（１９９６年）ｐ．８３－１０７からジョージ・セルギンとローレンス・ホワイトの「受託資金の擁護論」を反論しようとする。セルギンとホワイトの論説自体がホッペのまた前の二人の論説への非難でござる。
I don’t find Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block’s ethical argument convincing. Given, however, that I have not read any of the two’s writing outside of Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block’s quotes of them, and I’ve come to agree with the two of them, at the very least Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block have not presented the two’s arguments in strawman form. 拙者には三人の理論的論法が説得力を持たない。三人の引用句以外で二人の文章を読んだことがないのに拙者が二人に賛成になったので、せめても三人は二人の論法をストローマンのように提出していない。
I won’t be covering the economic arguments here; it’s outside the scope of this blog. 経済学的な論法を検査するつもりはない。このブログの範囲外でござる。
The most surprising thing about this chapter is its lack of any reference to Hoppe’s frank admission, in Chapter 6 of the same book, that Selgin and White had introduced a practice that, if implemented, “would indeed dispose of the charge of fraud” (p. 201). 章の一番驚くことが「あるもの」を言及していないこと。同本の第六章にホッペが二人の論法に「いかにも詐欺の非難を処分する」（ｐ．２０１）習慣があるとの率直な承認でござる。
Either Hoppe and his new co-authors have conveniently overlooked a portion of Selgin and White’s article, or Selgin and White were rather remiss in not trumpeting, “No fraud, says Hoppe,” therein. Hoppe did express an economic opinion afterwards (it would turn banknotes into “a peculiar form of lottery tickets,” which is too colorful a metaphor to let pass—so it now features in this post’s title), but ethically, the argument is over, until Hoppe clarifies or retracts his statement. “Charge of fraud disposed of; quod erat demonstrandum.” ホッペとその新たな同胞がセルギン達の記事の一部を見落としたか、セルギン達が「詐欺無し、とホッペが書く」を言い広めずことでかなり怠慢でしたか。ホッペがその認めの後に漱石枕流で「紙幣がおかしな宝くじになる」という経済的な意見をだしたが、倫理的では議論が終わった、ホッペが詐欺の解決のことを撤回するまで。「詐欺の非難が処分された、Ｑ．Ｅ．Ｄ．」、と。
Nevertheless, we have some interesting ethical arguments to examine. Structurally, this chapter is composed of an introduction, three sub-chapters addressing ethics, one sub-chapter addressing economics, and a conclusion. だけど、とても面白い倫理理論を解説することが出来る。この章の構造が紹介、三つの倫理節、一つの経済学節、そして結論になる。
The first ethics sub-chapter’s argument is that all demand deposits are by nature bailment contracts and cannot be classified, in ethical terms, as a loan contract. Before they even state this, however, they give the proper answer, straight from Selgin and White: “Whether a particular bank is committing fraud by holding fractional reserves must depend on the terms of the title-transfer agreements between the bank and its customers” (p. 209). Exactly correct. Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block say (quite repetitively) that two people can’t own the same thing at the same time, and a demand deposit is title to, and ownership of, the money, and money-lending can only be done by the money-owner, so by lending money, the bank is claiming ownership thereof. 倫理節の第一説の理論が「預金通貨が本性でベイルメント契約で、倫理的に融資契約になられない」とのことだ。だが、そう主張する前に、（セルギン達からの）正解な反論を書く。「特定な銀行が部分準備銀行制度で詐欺を犯すか否かは銀行とその顧客の所有転送契約の条件に依存する」（ｐ．２０９）。まさにその通りでござる。ホッペ達が（ワンパターンで）二人が同じものを同時に所有できないので、預金通貨が金の所有であるので、貸金は金の所有者にしか出来ないことで貸金することで銀行が金の所有を主張する、と。
(What about money-lending done with the permission of the money-owner?) （じゃあ、金の所有者の許可の下での貸金はどうなる？）
Here’s a key assertion by Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block: “[Selgin and White] do not provide a praxeological explanation and reconstruction of the origin of such a peculiar entity [fiduciary media] and state of affairs [fractional reserve banking]” (p. 214). ホッペ達の重要な主張の一つが、「彼ら（セルギン達）がこの可笑しな存在（受託資金）や状況（部分準備銀行制度）の起源の行動科学的な解説と構成を指定しない」（ｐ．２１４）。
Alright, I’ll provide one. In fact, I’ll provide two! じゃあ、拙者が指定する。実際、二つを！
For the first, let’s start with a bailment of money. A bailor transfers money to a bailee, which the bailee must hold in trust until the bailor demands the money; so, the bailment endures until the bailor terminates the contract. The bailee cannot use the money in any way (that would be a loan, not a bailment). If the bailee does use the money, that is a violation of the contract, and punishable as a tort. This is, if my assessment of their theory is correct, how Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block define the standard deposit-bailment. However, the terms of the contract are up to the bailor and bailee, including the liability that falls on the bailee in the event he uses the money in some way. They have the ethical right to agree that the bailee can use the money (e.g., lend it out) and that the bailor will not hold him liable for that. A standard Hoppe-Hülsmann-Block bailment, with a waiver of certain liability. 一つ目では、金のベイルメントから始めよう。寄託者が委託者に金を上げ、委託者は寄託者が求めるまでその金を信頼できるように保持しなければならない。で、ベイルメントが寄託者が契約を終了するまで継続する。委託者がその金を利用できない（それでベイルメントではなく、貸金になる）。委託者が金を利用すれば、契約違反になって不法行為として委託者が罰させられる。これがホッペ達の標準ベイルメント契約でござる（拙者が正確的に分かるなら）。だが、契約の条件を決めるのは委託者と寄託者でござる。それは金を利用した委託者に落とす罰をも含む。委託者が金を貸金とかで利用しても寄託者が罰しないことにする合意する倫理的な権利は、二人が持っている。特定した罰する権利を権利放棄した標準ホッペ‐ヒュルスマン‐ブロックのベイルメントでござる。
The bailor retains ownership, but the bailee can use the money, with no criminal penalties, until the bailor demands it. 寄託者が所有権を渡さないが、委託者が処罰無しで委託した金を使用出来る、寄託者が求めるまで。
For the second, let’s start with a loan of money. A lender transfers money to a borrower, and the borrower owns it and may use it as he sees fit until the loan expires, whereupon he returns principal and interest to the lender. During the loan, the lender does not own the money, but instead owns a claim to future money from the borrower. For this explanation, it will have to be a “call loan,” as described　by a quote from Selgin and White in footnote 11 on page 215. Since Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block failed to acknowledge that a call loan can exist, I must start by constructing it from a series of fixed-length loans. So, the lender and borrower begin with a one-minute loan (in that same footnote 11, Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block admit that the duration of a loan is only a matter of degree, not of kind). One minute passes, and the lender returns to the borrower. However, instead of payment of principal and interest, the lender and borrower agree to compound the loan instead. The new loan amount is the principal and interest of the old loan. The two iterate this pattern for a while, then they agree to an improved arrangement: the loan will automatically compound, without the lender returning to the borrower every time (freeing up valuable time for both parties). This compounding loan can be terminated at any iteration (i.e., at any minute) at the option of either party. Thus, we have constructed a call loan from the more common fixed-term loan. 二つ目は、貸金から始めよう。貸手が借手に金の所有権を上げる。それで借手が融資が終えるまで所有して勝手に使用出来る。その時が来ると、借手が貸手に元利を払う。貸金の間、貸手がその金を所有しないが、指定した時に借手から金を貰う権利を持つ。解説のためにコール・ローンに必要がある、ｐ．２１５の脚注１１でセルギン達からの引用で記述されたようなもの。ホッペ達がコール・ローンなんて存在を認めなかったから固定時間貸金の連続から構成しよう。では、貸手と借手が一分の融資を交わす（同じ脚注１１で、ホッペ達が融資の期間が類の差別でなく度の差別であることを認めた）。一分後、借手が貸手に戻る。だが、元利を払う変わりに貸手と借手が融資を福利にすると決める。新しい貸金が終了した貸金の元利になる。二人がしばらく繰り返すと、改善した設営に合意する。借手が貸手に戻らなくても貸し金が自動的に福利する。両手が手間を省ける。この福利融資が任意の期間（というと、任意の分）にいずれの片手の選択で終了される。それで、固定融資からコール・ローンを構成した。
The borrower owns the money for the duration of the call loan, but the lender can call it at any time and cash out. 借手がコール・ローンの期間では貸金を所有するが、貸手がいつでもコールして貸金を引き出せる。
The difference between these two constructions is in which of the money substitutes will be money certificates, and which will be fiduciary media. Where there is a modified bailment, the depositor (bailor) holds the money certificates, and the bank’s (bailee’s) loans are the fiduciary media; where there is a depositor-to-bank call loan, the depositor (lender) holds the fiduciary media, and the bank’s (borrower’s) loans are the money certificates. この二つの構成の差はどの金代用が金証書になるとどれが信頼金になることでござる。変更ベイルメントでは、預金者（寄託者）が金証書を持って、銀行（委託者）が信頼金を持つ。コール・ローンの場合、預金者（貸手）が信頼金を持って、銀行（借手）が金証書を持つ。
From there, the bank attempting to keep loans and reserves in an optimally profitable balance follows naturally from the bank’s profit motive; hence, fractional reserve banking will result. どの道、それから銀行が融資と準備の金を最適な利益をもたらす構成を維持しようことが銀行の営利目的から当然になる。だから、部分準備銀行制度が起こる。
But wait, there’s more! I present you with a bonus, third construction! だが終わっていない！サービスとして三つ目の構成を指定する！
Let’s start with a loan of money. This time, we’ll take a time deposit. The depositor-lender can notify the bank that he’s terminating the loan, whereupon the bank-borrower has a period of time (hence “time deposit”) to let its own loans expire so as to have money on hand to pay back the depositor-lender. However, the bank decides to set aside a fund—a reserve, if you will—for a program. While the bank has money in this reserve, it lets its depositor-lenders take their money at any time, lending them money for precisely the duration contracted in the time deposit. As a service to its customers, this loan has no interest! In effect, the depositor-lenders can get their money on demand, with no time discount, even though they only hold time deposits. Now, the depositor-lenders only possess titles to future money, not titles to present money, but if the bank successfully operates their “special program” for long enough, their customers—and, with time, the market at-large—may come to see their deposits as being effectively (if not legally) as good as titles to present money. Should the bank’s accounts then be accepted as money substitutes (despite being loans) by the market, then the bank is de jure perfectly legal, even according to Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block, but they are operating de facto exactly as a fractional reserve bank would. 貸金から始めよう。今度は、時間預金でござる。預金者兼貸手が銀行に融資の終了を知らせる。と、銀行兼借手が指定した時間（だから時間預金）で自分の融資を切れて預金者の元利を集めれる。だが、銀行が「準備」を用意することに決める。銀行がこの準備に元手を持っていれば、預金者がいつでも金を引き出せる。名目上では、これが出金ではなく、預金者への貸金でござる。期間は時間預金に指定した時間と同じ。そして、客へのサービスとしてこの貸金は無利子でござる！効果的に、預金者が時間預金しかもたないのにいつでも金を値引き無しで出金できる。では、預金者が現在でなく未来で金を求める権利しか持たないが、銀行が首尾良くその準備を維持出来れば、客（そして、やがて総市場）がその銀行の預金を効果的に金と等しいと考えることになる。銀行の預金が市場に（融資なのに）金代用として受け入られれば、その銀行がホッペ達の理論上でもデ・ジュリ完全に合法だけど、デ・ファクト部分準備銀行制度を行っている。
In each of these three constructions, there would be differences to the execution of withdrawals when the bank runs out of reserves, in accordance with how the present/future ownership is structured. 三つの構成では、準備が尽きると出金の実行には違いが出る、現在所有と未来所有の構成に従って。
Although this is an economic statement rather than an ethical one, let me assert that there could be a market for each one—though it could be that only two, one, or even none stands up to the market test. 経済学の主張だけど、どれにも購買層が出る可能性がある。が、二つにしか、一つにしか、一つにも購買層が出ない可能性もある。
The second ethics sub-chapter’s argument is a defense of Chapter 6’s assertion that “fractional reserve banking involves the making of contracts regarding the property of third parties” (p. 200, also quoted on p. 221). Curiously, in Chapter 6, Hoppe cited three parties that are victimized (“all other money owners,” “all depositors,” and “all other borrowers”, p. 200-201), but now he, Hülsmann, and Block only defend two—the first, sort of, in this sub-chapter, and the second, implicitly, in the previous. Perhaps they realized how the last one wasn’t really defensible. 倫理節の第二説の理論が第六章の「部分準備銀行制度が第三者の所有について契約を伴う」（ｐ．２００、そしてｐ．２２１に引用され）との主張の擁護論する。不思議に、第六章ではホッペが第三者の三種（金の所有者の全員と預金者の全員と他の借手の全員、ｐ．２００‐２０１）を挙げたけど、いまではホッペ達が二種しか防衛しない。この第二説で第一種を部分的に防衛する。前の説で第二種を暗黙的に防衛した。第三種が無理だと気付いたかな？
Anyway, this argument asserts that, although conceding that “spill-overs from others’ actions to the value of [a man]’s property . . . are an inescapable free-market phenomenon and not a violation of [his] private-property rights, [whereas] physical invasions of [his] property . . . are of course inconsistant with the protection of [his] property rights” (p. 221, quoted from Selgin and White), other money owners’ properties are physically affected. とにかく、この理論がセルギン達の「他人の行動で人の所有の価値にの波及は…避けられない自由市場現象で、その人の所有権の違反ではないが、人の所有の物理的な侵略…はもちろん人の所有権に不整合です。」（ｐ．２２１）を認めるが、他の金の所有は物理的に影響が出る。
This was flabbergasting at first. The victims are “all other money owners,” and “[i]t does have a physical effect” (p. 223). Are Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block really asserting that every issue of fiduciary media has a physical effect on all money everywhere in the world? Under what laws of physics? 最初に読んだ時、度肝を抜くところでござった。被害者が「金の所有者の全員」で「物理的な影響がある」（ｐ．２２３）。ホッペ達が本当に「信頼金を発行する度に全世界の金の全部に物理的な効果がある」というのか？どんな物理法則で？
But Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block don’t actually write “all other money owners” in this chapter. Hoppe only wrote that in the previous chapter. Herein, there is “some current … owner’s property” and “other people’s property” (p. 223). They could be retreating from “all” to “some,” which makes some sense in light of their argument that other people’s money is misappropriated. In that case, however, the way that they present themselves as defending the same thing Hoppe defended before—when they have actually changed it—could lead the reader to suspect them of moving the goalposts. だが実際、この章ではホッペ達が「金の所有者の全員」を書かない。それはホッペが前章で書いたことだ。この章では、「とある現在の…所有者のもの」と「他人の所有」（ｐ．２２３）しかそんな言葉が出ない。ホッペ達が「全部」から「一部」に退去しているようだ。他人の金が使い込まれる主張だから筋が立つが、ホッペ達がなぜホッペの前の主張に擁護論をやっているように書くんだ？実際に対象の主張が代わったからホッペ達の読者がムービング・ゴールポストの疑を考えるところでござろう。
Nevertheless, in this chapter they neither ask nor answer the important question, “Exactly whose money is misappropriated?” It’s a rather shocking oversight. その疑を置いても、この章には彼らが大切な質問、「具体的に誰の金が使い込まれる？」を問わずで答えない。驚くほどの手落ちでござる。
The third ethics sub-chapter’s argument is an attack on Selgin and White’s assertion that many people choosing fractional reserve banking is proof that they benefit from it, and therefore restriction of the practice is an illegitimate intervention in the market. 倫理節の第三説の理論でセルギン達のとある主張を攻撃する。セルギン達が部分準備銀行制度を選ぶ人が多いことでその人に利がある証拠であるから、その制度を制限することは市場に非摘出な介入だ、と主張する。
This should be a much shorter sub-chapter than it is; Selgin and White are clearly mistaken this time. Insofar as they are saying it is just because many people support it is an argumentum ad populum—and therefore fallacious—and all the talk about “demonstrated preference” and “benefits” (p. 224, quoted from Selgin and White) are economic assertions—and therefore of no ethical force. Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block spend ten pages writing up analogies and denouncements to what I’ve dismissed in one sentence. この説がもっと短いべき説でござる。今度、セルギン達が明らかに間違っている。多くの人が支持するから正であるというなら、衆人に訴える論証だから誤謬でござる。そして「実証した選好」と「利」（ｐ．２２４、セルギン達からの引用）の話は経済学の主張だから倫理的に無力でござる。拙者が二文で解いたのに、ホッペ達が十面を使って類例と非難を書く。
Therein, they attempt to “prove” that fractional reserve banking requires a state, based on the assertion that free-market courts would accept their ethical theory, and therefore fractional reserve banking only exists because of state protection from that market force. その一部で、部分準備銀行制度には政府が必要だと”証拠”しようとする。自由市場の裁判所が彼らの倫理理論を受け入れるから部分準備銀行制度が存在することはその市場力から政府に守られている故だ。
Whether that ethical theory is correct or not is the exact thing under debate here; you can’t just assume that good free-market courts would adopt it, then find—wonder of wonders—that only bad state courts would allow fractional reserve banking, and therefore fractional reserve banking requires a state (which is to say, requires injustice), so should be forbidden in the ethical theory. That’s a circular argument, since you’re assuming the ethical theory is correct. その倫理理論が正しいか否かは議論の係争物そのものでござる。善である市場裁判所が取り入れると仮定して、奇跡的に悪である政府裁判所だけが許すと見つけて、部分準備銀行制度には政府（というと、不正）が必要だと続いて、故に部分準備銀行制度が倫理理論で禁じられることにするこてが出来ない。仮定で倫理理論が正しいにするから循環論法でござる。
A different, valid argument would be to assume that your opponents’ ethical theory is accepted by the free-market court, and then demonstrate that it is insufficient to actually accomplish its aim. 相手の倫理理論が市場裁判所に取り入れられても実際に意図を果たせないと実証することは有効な理論の一つでござる。
Do you see where this is going? You do? Good. どこ行ってるか分かるのか？分かるんだ？よし。
So, the free-market courts accept the theory of Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block. Some rabid anti-fractional reserve activists start suing banks. Given the Hoppe-Hülsmann-Block theory construes demand deposits as bailments, the primary victims of fractional reserve banking are the bailor-depositors (and possibly “some others” whose money has been “physically affected”). They are the victims, so it is they who have the right to demand reparations from the criminal banks. So, they go to court against the banks where they hold deposits. で、市場裁判所がホッペ達の理論を取り入れる。過激な対部分準備活動家が銀行を詐欺訴訟を行う。ホッペ達の理論では預金はベイルメントで、一次の被害者が寄託者兼預金者（後、金が「物理的に障れた」「ある他人」かも）でござる。被害者だから、犯罪者の銀行から賠償を求められるのはその人達でござる。で、活動家が実際に預金している銀行を訴えて裁判所に行く。
Surely a good way to get yourself black-listed by the banking industry. But I digress. 銀行産業に黒表されることにいい方法でござる。あ、すまん、脱線でござる。
Now, going to court isn’t an automatic favorable judgment, even with your theory at the helm. Following Rothbard’s theory, the burden of proof falls on the accuser, so the depositor has to prove that the bank is operating on fractional reserves. The bank most likely won’t disclose its balance sheet, and can’t be legally obligated to do so. That the deposit bears interest is evidence, but by itself may not suffice to convict. That depends on the standard of evidence required by the court, a curiously rare topic in libertarian ethical theory. I always go back to The Ethics of Liberty, but this is one point it doesn’t address. I would lean towards the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The simple fact of interest paid on a few accounts may not suffice for it, as there are other reasonable explanations. 訴えるのは自動的な順調判決ではない、自分の理論が取り入れられても。ロスバードの論理では立証が訴人の責任で、預金者が銀行に部分準備で働いていることを証明しなければならない。銀行が法的に貸借対照表を曝け出される義務はなくて、自由でそうしないでござろう。預金に利子が付くのは証だた、それだけで有罪の判決が出ないかも知らない。裁判所の証明の程度に依存する。証明の程度は完全自由主義の倫理理論で不思議に珍しい話題でござる。拙者はいつも「自由の倫理」に戻るが、その本も対処しない。拙者なら、合理的な疑いに決めた。他の合理的な説明もあるから利子の存在だけで証明の程度を満たさないかも知らない。
That’s one potential failure point. 可能な障害点でござる。
Supposing the bank is convicted. What is the punishment? Based on single proportionality, they refund the deposit. Hardly a punishment at all, given the depositors could simply have withdrawn it without a lawsuit. After the depositors’ black-listing, they’ll have a hard sell trying to get the remaining depositors to throw in lawsuits of their own; these activists would have a better time calling for boycotts, because that would at least save the time and trouble of court cases. In order for the movement to be at all sustainable, double proportionality (such as Dr. Block has advanced elsewhere, and which I also dispute) would have to be accepted by the courts as well. Lacking that, the prohibition of fractional reserves is a dead letter. 銀行が有罪だと仮定しよう。賠償はなんだ？一重比例の刑罰原則では、預金を返金させられる。預金者が訴訟無し出金できたから罰なんてならない。その預金者の黒表の後、残る預金者の協力を取得するのは難しいだろう。訴訟の時間と手間が省けるから、活動家が不買を行ったほうがいい。持続可能な活動が欲しければ、二重比例の処罰原則（ブロック博士が他所で提唱したが、それも拙者が否定する）が裁判所に取り入れられる必要がある。それがないと、部分準備の禁止は死文でござる。
That’s another potential failure point. また、可能な障害点でござる。
So, in order to assert that the ethical prohibition of fractional reserve banking would actually drive such banks out of the market, there are a couple of ancillary assertions that need to be made. I know Dr. Block has made the double proportionality case, but consider it improper to assume his co-authors agree by association, as this particular point was not raised in the chapter. つまり、倫理的な禁止が部分準備銀行制度を市場から追い出すと主張する前に、また補助の主張が必要でござる。ブロック博士が二重比例の論理を主張したことがあるが、彼の同胞が連想で一致すると決め込んではならない。この章ではその論理が提起されていない。
That concludes the ethical topics in Chapter 7 of The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. The economics sub-chapter sticks to economics, and the conclusion does not introduce new arguments. In conclusion, I believe fractional reserve banking should allowed under the libertarian ethic. これで『私有財産の経済学と理論学』の第七章の倫理話題が終了でござる。経済学節が経済学の範囲から逸れない、そして結論には新しい論理が出ない。拙者の結論は、完全自由主義では部分準備銀行制度が許されるべきでござる。
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The Spectrum of Ethics

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Back in my review of Chapter 8 of The Ethics Of Liberty, I brought up the point that individualism and socialism are two absolutes, and there exists a spectrum between them that examples of social organization might occupy. Any given social organization might be one absolute or the other, or it might occupy a point between the two. Can this be justified from an ethical perspective? Yes, taking either absolute as a starting point. Can starting somewhere other than an absolute be justified? No, it cannot. 自由の倫理の第八章の復習で、拙者が個人主義と社会主義の極点の間に社会制度の例があちこちあると書いた。そのあらゆる制度が一方の極点か、他方の極点か、その中のどこかの位置をにある。倫理的に正当化できるか？どちらの極点を原点にしてから、そうできる。極点でない原点を正当化できるか？いな、それはできない。
Starting from individualism, if every individual agrees to abide by a pure socialism, then that socialism is just, because every individual consents to it. Starting from socialism, if Society decides to enact a pure individualism, then that individualism is just, because it is Society’s will that it be enacted. The likelihood of these outcomes may be small, but they are possible, so deserving of mention in an ethical theory. 個人主義の原点から、個人全人が社会制度に承知すれば、個人全人が賛成したからその社会制度が正当でござる。社会主義の原点から、「社会」が純粋な個人制度を建つと決めたら、社会の意思であることでその個人制度が正当でござる。その結果の確立が低くても、可能だから倫理の論では認めざるを得ない。
However, the ethical theory cannot start from any other position coherently. It would be an oversimplification to say, “The ethic should start at the midpoint, a 50-50 split,” even leaving aside the point that you need to first justify that proportion, as contrasted with any other proportion. That could mean any number of things: one gender is individualist, where the other is socialist; one hemisphere is individualist, where the other is socialist; 50% of all resources produced are individually owned, the remainder are socially owned; and so on. If everything once allocated to individual or social control remained so allocated forever, what happens if, over time, one side maintains and increases its resources, while the other squanders and depletes its resources? だが、理路整然と別の極点に倫理の論が基づけない。「中央の点、どちら五分五分から倫理が始まるべきだ」と言うのはその割合の正当化の必要を置いても過度に単純化でござる。いくつかの意味になる：「一方の性が個人主義化、他方の性が社会主義化」、「一方の半球が個人主義化、他方の半球が社会主義化」、「生産されたものの全ての半分が個人主義的に制した、その残りが社会主義的に制した」、とか。あるものが個人主義化にされたか、社会主義化にされたか、永久にそう続けたら、時間がたつと一方が資源を維持して増加するの他方に資源を浪費して枯渇すれば、どうなる？
Finding a starting point, by itself, would be an incredibly complex endeavor. The starting point, itself, would be an incredibly complex point. And any number of ethicists who independently attempted to choose a starting point could hardly expect to land upon the same one. Indeed, even if a great number so attempted it, mostly likely none of the starting points would comport with any other. Even if they could be coherently analyzed (which may not be possible) and a number of factors found to be common (which may not hold true), taking those together as a starting point is no basis for any philosophy, because philosophies are disciplines that seeks truth through reasoning, not through empirical survey, not even a survey of philosophers’ ideas. 原点を見つけること自体がすごく複雑なことになる。原点自体もすごく複雑な点になる。幾人ものの倫理者が独立的に原点を選ぼうとすれば同じ点に着くなんて期待できない。いかにも、大数の選びになっても同じ点の二例が現れないのを予期できる。分析できても（不可能かも知らない）、いくつかの共通点があっても（ないかも知らない）、合体して原点を決めるのは哲学の矛盾になる。哲学は理性で真実を求める学問でござる。哲学者の意見でも実証的のものは哲学に関係しない。
For this reason, attempting to start at any point but pure individualism or pure socialism is an invalid philosophical choice. この理由で、純粋な個人主義または純粋な社会主義から始まらない倫理は哲学的に根拠のない倫理でござる。
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Individualist Ethics versus Socialist Ethics

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Having described both individualist ethics and socialist ethics, with the men involved being considered equals in each case, let’s consider how to choose between them. The decision will necessarily come down to the virtues of the two ethics, and the consequences of the two ethics. So let’s examine those. 個人主義と社会主義の両方、匹敵する人の倫理を書き表したことからどう選ぶかを考えよう。結局、その選択が倫理の徳と結果のことになる。
The defining trait that separates these ethics is the locus of autonomy. One can choose to implement a centralized or a decentralized authority structure. この倫理の区別する特徴が自主権の位置でござる。一方は中央集権で、他方は地方分権でござる。
Under individualism, every individual possesses autonomy. So, under individualism, the core virtue is respect for the intrinsic value of every man’s autonomy. Important religious traditions, especially those of Western Civilization, go so far as to say that every man’s worth is sacred. 個人主義で各人が個人的に自主権を持つ。だから個人主義の心の徳が「各人の自主権への尊敬」でござる。大事な信教の、特に西教の伝統が各人の価値に神聖視する。
Under socialism, only the social group itself possesses autonomy. So, the core virtue is respect for the interests of society-at-large. No individual gets to selfishly hold everybody else back, as it were, so society can progress optimally, without hindrance. 社会主義で社会の集団だけが自主権を持つ。だから社会主義の心の徳が「社会全会の権益への尊敬」でござる。一人でも私欲の個人が全会を妨げず、社会が支障なく至適的に信仰できる。
The socialist might assert that the individualist ethic allows for wealthy and powerful men to subvert social goals for their own interests. If you ask him what these “social goals” are, however, all he can do is offer is his opinion. It might be his opinion of what they would be, or perhaps his opinion of how society might form those goals, or, if he is particularly honest, his opinion that, whatever the goals would turn out to be, they would be good. 個人主義の倫理では富強な人が自分の権益の為に社会目的を覆せる、と社会主義者が主張するかも。その「社会目的」は何なのかと聞くと、自分の意見しか出せない。何になるはずの意見か、社会が目的を体系着ける方法の意見か、それとも（正直な人ならば）どんな目的になるとしても善良なことになる意見か。
The individualist counter-asserts that the socialist ethic allows for the “society” to trample upon the people that comprise it. This accusation is entirely accurate. Society has all authority, and the people therein have none. If Society even decides to purge a subset of its population, it need not consider their interests any more than a man needs to consult with his appendix when he is considering an appendectomy. Society makes the decisions for its own purposes, not to make its people happy. 個人主義者も、社会主義の倫理では「社会」が自身を構成する人たちを蹂躙されると主張する。その非難が完全に正確でござる。社会が全ての権力を持って、社会の民には何の権力も持たない。社会が一部の民を粛清すると決めても、盲腸炎手術を考える人が盲腸と相談する必要がないように、その一部の民に心配する必要がない。社会が民の喜びの為じゃなく、社会自身の為に選択する。
That’s a discussion of the relative virtues of individualism and socialism. Now to consider their consequences. Individualism can point to its results; the historical record is clear that it produces enormous wealth and prosperity- a seemingly endless improvement in quality of life for those who organize themselves by its precepts. Socialism, however, has to posit theoretical benefits, and furthermore, theoretical benefits that are better than individualism’s manifest accomplishments. 個人主義と社会主義の徳はそうと、両方の結果を考えよう。個人主義の結果は良いでござる。歴史の証が明らかにすごい富と繁栄をもたらす証拠になる。個人主義の教訓を従う人たちが見える限り底知れない生活進化を起きる。対して、社会主義には理論的な利益、しかも個人主義の結果を超越する理論的な利益、を立つ必要がある。
Perhaps they could say that Society, in pursuit of its own health, will keep its constituent people healthy. Perhaps they could say that Society, having a perspective entirely different from the individuals’, would see threats to itself (and, by extension, to its people) that they would not, and could take appropriate action to preserve them. 社会が自分の健康の為に民の健康を見守るとか、個人の視点と違う社会の視点から自分と民への危険が見えて効率な行動が取れるとか。
This relies on a naive faith in Society, however. That describes a healthy Society. But, if a healthy and conscientious Society is possible, an unhealthy and dysfunctional Society is possible as well. Erect a global Socialism blindly, and which will you get? だが、それが世間知れずな社会への信仰に頼る。その社会が健康的でござるが、健康良く良心的な社会が可能ならば、健康悪く機能不全な社会も可能でござる。闇雲に「社会」を建てば、どっちになる？
Prudence might suggest that loading the world’s population into an experimental vehicle, with all their lives and belongings at risk, would be a very bad idea until such a vehicle had proven reliably safe and effective at smaller scales. Yet, as far as potential consequences go, this is analogous to any demand for the socialist ethic at this time. A healthy Socialism that doesn’t break down in under a century, doesn’t have genocidal oppression as a prominent feature, and makes its people happy would be a good proof of concept. 世界の人たち全員の命と所有物を賭けて実験的な乗り物に乗せる前に、小規模でそのような乗り物の安全を証拠するべき。これが思慮でござる。だが、結果について今社会主義を求めるのは類推的でござる。百年以内に崩壊しない、大虐殺な迫害に頼らない、自分の民を喜ばす健康的な社会が出来れば実証実験になる。
Economic theory and economic history are clear in their conclusion regarding the consequences of individualism and economic socialism (that is, government control of all capital goods). Individualism can produce wealth for its people. Socialism, by contrast, can only consume wealth. The socialist theory that society-wide coordination of the economy can eliminate redundant or conflicting economic activities and thereby increase production is profoundly wrong. Ludwig von Mises in particular proved that a socialist economic system cannot make rational decisions. What the socialist sees as redundancy and conflict are vitally important for generating economic signals, which the people of the society need in order to know what they should do. Without them, the individuals are lost, and consequently society as a whole is lost as well. 経済学の理論と経済歴史が個人主義と社会主義の経済的な結果に同意する。個人主義が人に富をもたらせる。違って、社会主義が富を費やせるしか出来ない。社会主義の全社会で経済を強調すると冗長と衝突を除去するとの理論が重要に間違っている。前世紀の経済学者、特にルートヴィヒ・フォン・ミーゼス、は社会主義が合理的な決断に至れないことを証明した。社会主義者がと冗長と衝突と見えるものが経済的な兆候を作成するために必須なものでござる。その兆候こそが社会の人々には絶対必要でござる。その兆候がないと、各々の個人が道に迷って、社会全体も道に迷う。
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Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics

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Hans-Hermann Hoppe writes from time to time on the time on his basis of the libertarian ethic, which he calls argumentation ethics. As he describes it, in order to justify something, you must justify it in argument. Therefore, certain presuppositions necessary to argumentation must hold, lest the whole theory collapse from a defective foundation. Here I will quote from The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pp. 341-342: ハンスヘルマンホッペ（Ｈａｎｓ－Ｈｅｒｍａｎ　Ｈｏｐｐｅ）が時々自分の議論倫理と言う自由の倫理について書く。正当化することなら議論で正当化することだと記述する。だから議論の予断が持たないと、論理が根拠の残欠で崩壊する。「私有財産の経済学と倫理学」のｐ．３４１－３４２に書く：
The question of what is just or unjust … only arises insofar as I am, and others are, capable of propositional exchanges. … [I]f this is so, … then any ethical proposal … must be assumed to claim that it is capable of being validated by propositional or argumentative means. … [I]t must be considered the ultimate defeat for an ethical proposal if one can demonstrate that its content is logically incompatible with the proponent’s claim that its validity be ascertainable by argumentative means. …
何が正義か不正義かの質問が…私たち人間は提案的な交換することが出来るほどだけ現れる。…なら、あらゆる論理の提案が提案的な、議論的な方法で正当性を証明できると主張することになる。…倫理の提案の究極の敗北がその内容が議論的な方法で正当化する主張と矛盾すること、と考えるべきです。…
[T]he means which a person demonstrates as preferring by engaging in propositional exchanges are those of private property. … [A]nyone who tried to justify any norm whatsoever would already have to presuppose the exclusive right of control over his body as a valid norm simply in order to say, “I propose such and such.” …
提案的な交換をする人の示した手段が私有財産の手段です。…どんな典型を提案する人が「これを提案する」と言うために自分の身体を排他的に制御することを予断する。
Furthermore, it would be equally impossible to sustain argumentation … if one were not allowed to appropriate in addition to one’s body other scarce means through homesteading action.
もう一つ、人が身体と加わって別の不足な手段をホームステッドで充当することが許されないなら…議論を維持も不可能になる。
Let’s grant that arguments that contradict the tenets of argumentation are invalid. Hoppe, however, begs the question when asserting that that means an absolute system of private property. A couple of men could have a full-fledged argument under complete socialism. The society sets aside time and space for the debate, and grants to the two the privilege of free expression for it. Since, under socialism, society has absolute authority, it certainly has the authority to arrange this. 議論の原理と矛盾する議論が根拠なしと認めよう。だが、それから絶対的な私有財産の制度になる主張で、ホッペが循環論法する。完全な社会主義の下でも人が本格的な議論ができる。社会が議論の為に時間と空間を配置し、数人に表現の特権を許す。社会主義では社会には絶対な権力を持つんだから、そうする権力を必ず持つ。
Can you object that what occurs is not an argument? Then that objection must carry, to some extent, to all arguments that occur outside of a pure private property society. Yet, it is still possible that the socialist debate may strike on something that is justified. Is the conclusion invalidated by the circumstances under which the debate occurred? その出来事が議論じゃないと講義できる？ならば、その講義が大なり小なり純潔な私有財産の社会の外に起こる議論にも繰り上げるはずでござる。でも、社会主義の議論でも正当なことに当たるかも知らない。起こる環境で議論の結論が無効になるか？
It is not; a true proposition is true (or just, in the context of ethics) without any respect to the circumstances surrounding its discovery. 否。正しい提案（倫理学では正当な提案）が発見の環境には関係なく正しいでござる。
One can just as easily claim that all debates presuppose socialism as individualism. Simply: Society, the locus of all authority under socialism, always exists where two or more people interact. Even two seemingly atomistic “individualists” who engage in a debate are actually forming a society by their own actions, and therefore the debate occurs with Society’s blessing. A larger society, with more socialized members, could do much better, of course; just ask any socialist. 議論の予断が「個人主義」みたいに「社会主義」に簡単に基づくと主張できる。ほれ、社会主義で全権力を持つ社会が人の相互作用で常に存在する。「個人主義者」と名乗る二人でも、議論を始めることで自分の行動で社会に体系付けることで、社会の権力の下で議論する。当然、もっと大きい、もっと社会化した人を持った社会ならもっとよくできる、社会主義者の意見では。
What I really find outright silly about Hoppe’s theory is that, if I’m right, it presupposes things that are perfectly sufficient to prove private property, without all that circumlocution, but fails to recognize it. Right from the start, it is never questioned that, in one of these debates, both participants possess equal rights. Historically, it’s a common argument: “I don’t need to listen to your objections, you are by nature subordinate to me.” Give both sides equal rights, and acknowledge the individual’s intrinsic worth, and the social order of private property is the conclusion. 拙者が可笑しいに思うホッペの理論の点が、拙者が正しければ、私有財産を婉曲法なし正当化する予断もあるが、ホッペ自身が気付かない。最初から、議論では「両社が匹敵な権利を持つ」ことを疑わない。歴史上、「私がおまえの異論に聞く必要はない。貴賎の性質で、おまえが微賎だ。」と言うのががありふれた議論でござる。両方に匹敵な権利を上げ、個人の内在的な価値を認めることだけで、私有財産の社会制度が結論になる。
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Individualism in Ethics

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Individualism in ethics asserts that every individual man gets a certain sphere of autonomy, within which he can do what he pleases. Every man’s sphere is different, but they are still ethically equal, because, if the ethic is formulated properly, the spheres are constructed under rules that treat them equally. 倫理では個人主義が人々に勝手に自律する領域をあたる主張でござる。倫理が正確に考案されたら、領域が個々に違えど行動者として無差別な法律で製作された領域だから各人が匹敵する。
Unlike socialism, which we might describe as an end point that we don’t know the path to, individualism is more of a beginning point that we chart a path from. Every man has a will of his own, and the right to exercise that will – but the ethic needs to prevent conflict between rights. Rights cannot conflict. One man’s right to control a resource – say, an apple – precludes everybody else from controlling that apple. If another man also had the right to control it, then a conflict in control rights occurs if the two don’t agree on how to use it. What is the right allocation? 終着点へのたどり道を知らない主張である社会主義と違って、個人主義が分かった始点からの道を作る主張でござる。各人には自分の意思があることと、その意思を行使する権利を持つ。だが、倫理の理論が対立を防がなきゃならない。権利と権利の対立がありえない。人が資源を制度する権利を持つなら、その権利がその人以外の人々に制度する権利を否定する。他者にもその権利があったら、使用に同意がないと権利と権利の矛盾になる。どっちが正しいか、誰も判断できない。
I say this frequently, but the purpose of ethics is to differentiate between right and wrong action. Where an ethic fails to make that differentiation, it fails as an ethic. A conflict of “rights” within an ethic is therefore a sign of a failing ethic, at least so far as the scope of that conflict extends. 拙者がよく言うが、倫理学の目的が正しい行動と正しくない行動を区別することでござる。その区別のできない倫理は倫理としての失格でござる。故に倫理での「正しいことの矛盾」は矛盾の周囲では倫理の失敗の印でござる。
So the question to begin with is, how can we derive rights to control things, i.e., property rights, in such a way that those rights never conflict? 問題は、どうやって例外なく矛盾しない世界のものを制御する権利、いわゆる所有権、を作り出す？
Basically, the solution to this is to start property rights for each man centered on himself, acknowledging their right to expand those property rights outward (through the ethical framework of homesteading) until they reach another’s property, at which his right to expand stops. In this way, everything starts out unowned, but can become owned, and through every step of the process, there is no conflict of rights. 基本的に、問題の解決は各人の権利を個人自身から生み出し、ホームステッドの理論で世界に広げる権利を認めて、拡大化を止める他人の所有まで。これで、世界の全てが無主で始めるが、所有になれる。その通り、最初の一歩から全世界の所有化まで権利の矛盾がない。