In “Against Fiduciary Media”, Chapter 7 of The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (originally printed in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1998)), Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Jörg Guido HÃŒlsmann, and Walter Block attempt to refute George Selgin and Lawrence White’s article “In Defense of Fiduciary Media”, from the Review of Austrian Economics 9 no. 2 (1996): 83-107. Selgin and White’s article itself is a reply to a criticism by Hoppe of earlier writings by Selgin and White; Hoppe’s critism is found in the concluding pages of Chapter 6. |
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I don’t find Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block’s ethical argument convincing. Given, however, that I have not read any of the two’s writing outside of Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block’s quotes of them, and I’ve come to agree with the two of them, at the very least Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block have not presented the two’s arguments in strawman form. |
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I won’t be covering the economic arguments here; it’s outside the scope of this blog. |
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The most surprising thing about this chapter is its lack of any reference to Hoppe’s frank admission, in Chapter 6 of the same book, that Selgin and White had introduced a practice that, if implemented, “would indeed dispose of the charge of fraud” (p. 201). |
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Either Hoppe and his new co-authors have conveniently overlooked a portion of Selgin and White’s article, or Selgin and White were rather remiss in not trumpeting, “No fraud, says Hoppe,” therein. Hoppe did express an economic opinion afterwards (it would turn banknotes into “a peculiar form of lottery tickets,” which is too colorful a metaphor to let passâso it now features in this post’s title), but ethically, the argument is over, until Hoppe clarifies or retracts his statement. “Charge of fraud disposed of; quod erat demonstrandum.” |
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Nevertheless, we have some interesting ethical arguments to examine. Structurally, this chapter is composed of an introduction, three sub-chapters addressing ethics, one sub-chapter addressing economics, and a conclusion. |
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The first ethics sub-chapter’s argument is that all demand deposits are by nature bailment contracts and cannot be classified, in ethical terms, as a loan contract. Before they even state this, however, they give the proper answer, straight from Selgin and White: “Whether a particular bank is committing fraud by holding fractional reserves must depend on the terms of the title-transfer agreements between the bank and its customers” (p. 209). Exactly correct. Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block say (quite repetitively) that two people can’t own the same thing at the same time, and a demand deposit is title to, and ownership of, the money, and money-lending can only be done by the money-owner, so by lending money, the bank is claiming ownership thereof. |
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(What about money-lending done with the permission of the money-owner?) |
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Here’s a key assertion by Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block: “[Selgin and White] do not provide a praxeological explanation and reconstruction of the origin of such a peculiar entity [fiduciary media] and state of affairs [fractional reserve banking]” (p. 214). |
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Alright, I’ll provide one. In fact, I’ll provide two! |
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For the first, let’s start with a bailment of money. A bailor transfers money to a bailee, which the bailee must hold in trust until the bailor demands the money; so, the bailment endures until the bailor terminates the contract. The bailee cannot use the money in any way (that would be a loan, not a bailment). If the bailee does use the money, that is a violation of the contract, and punishable as a tort. This is, if my assessment of their theory is correct, how Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block define the standard deposit-bailment. However, the terms of the contract are up to the bailor and bailee, including the liability that falls on the bailee in the event he uses the money in some way. They have the ethical right to agree that the bailee can use the money (e.g., lend it out) and that the bailor will not hold him liable for that. A standard Hoppe-HÃŒlsmann-Block bailment, with a waiver of certain liability. |
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The bailor retains ownership, but the bailee can use the money, with no criminal penalties, until the bailor demands it. |
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For the second, let’s start with a loan of money. A lender transfers money to a borrower, and the borrower owns it and may use it as he sees fit until the loan expires, whereupon he returns principal and interest to the lender. During the loan, the lender does not own the money, but instead owns a claim to future money from the borrower. For this explanation, it will have to be a “call loan,” as describedãby a quote from Selgin and White in footnote 11 on page 215. Since Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block failed to acknowledge that a call loan can exist, I must start by constructing it from a series of fixed-length loans. So, the lender and borrower begin with a one-minute loan (in that same footnote 11, Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block admit that the duration of a loan is only a matter of degree, not of kind). One minute passes, and the lender returns to the borrower. However, instead of payment of principal and interest, the lender and borrower agree to compound the loan instead. The new loan amount is the principal and interest of the old loan. The two iterate this pattern for a while, then they agree to an improved arrangement: the loan will automatically compound, without the lender returning to the borrower every time (freeing up valuable time for both parties). This compounding loan can be terminated at any iteration (i.e., at any minute) at the option of either party. Thus, we have constructed a call loan from the more common fixed-term loan. |
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The borrower owns the money for the duration of the call loan, but the lender can call it at any time and cash out. |
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The difference between these two constructions is in which of the money substitutes will be money certificates, and which will be fiduciary media. Where there is a modified bailment, the depositor (bailor) holds the money certificates, and the bank’s (bailee’s) loans are the fiduciary media; where there is a depositor-to-bank call loan, the depositor (lender) holds the fiduciary media, and the bank’s (borrower’s) loans are the money certificates. |
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From there, the bank attempting to keep loans and reserves in an optimally profitable balance follows naturally from the bank’s profit motive; hence, fractional reserve banking will result. |
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But wait, there’s more! I present you with a bonus, third construction! |
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Let’s start with a loan of money. This time, we’ll take a time deposit. The depositor-lender can notify the bank that he’s terminating the loan, whereupon the bank-borrower has a period of time (hence “time deposit”) to let its own loans expire so as to have money on hand to pay back the depositor-lender. However, the bank decides to set aside a fundâa reserve, if you willâfor a program. While the bank has money in this reserve, it lets its depositor-lenders take their money at any time, lending them money for precisely the duration contracted in the time deposit. As a service to its customers, this loan has no interest! In effect, the depositor-lenders can get their money on demand, with no time discount, even though they only hold time deposits. Now, the depositor-lenders only possess titles to future money, not titles to present money, but if the bank successfully operates their “special program” for long enough, their customersâand, with time, the market at-largeâmay come to see their deposits as being effectively (if not legally) as good as titles to present money. Should the bank’s accounts then be accepted as money substitutes (despite being loans) by the market, then the bank is de jure perfectly legal, even according to Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block, but they are operating de facto exactly as a fractional reserve bank would. |
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In each of these three constructions, there would be differences to the execution of withdrawals when the bank runs out of reserves, in accordance with how the present/future ownership is structured. |
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Although this is an economic statement rather than an ethical one, let me assert that there could be a market for each oneâthough it could be that only two, one, or even none stands up to the market test. |
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The second ethics sub-chapter’s argument is a defense of Chapter 6’s assertion that “fractional reserve banking involves the making of contracts regarding the property of third parties” (p. 200, also quoted on p. 221). Curiously, in Chapter 6, Hoppe cited three parties that are victimized (“all other money owners,” “all depositors,” and “all other borrowers”, p. 200-201), but now he, HÃŒlsmann, and Block only defend twoâthe first, sort of, in this sub-chapter, and the second, implicitly, in the previous. Perhaps they realized how the last one wasn’t really defensible. |
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Anyway, this argument asserts that, although conceding that “spill-overs from others’ actions to the value of [a man]’s property . . . are an inescapable free-market phenomenon and not a violation of [his] private-property rights, [whereas] physical invasions of [his] property . . . are of course inconsistant with the protection of [his] property rights” (p. 221, quoted from Selgin and White), other money owners’ properties are physically affected. |
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This was flabbergasting at first. The victims are “all other money owners,” and “[i]t does have a physical effect” (p. 223). Are Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block really asserting that every issue of fiduciary media has a physical effect on all money everywhere in the world? Under what laws of physics? |
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But Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block don’t actually write “all other money owners” in this chapter. Hoppe only wrote that in the previous chapter. Herein, there is “some current … owner’s property” and “other people’s property” (p. 223). They could be retreating from “all” to “some,” which makes some sense in light of their argument that other people’s money is misappropriated. In that case, however, the way that they present themselves as defending the same thing Hoppe defended beforeâwhen they have actually changed itâcould lead the reader to suspect them of moving the goalposts. |
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Nevertheless, in this chapter they neither ask nor answer the important question, “Exactly whose money is misappropriated?” It’s a rather shocking oversight. |
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The third ethics sub-chapter’s argument is an attack on Selgin and White’s assertion that many people choosing fractional reserve banking is proof that they benefit from it, and therefore restriction of the practice is an illegitimate intervention in the market. |
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This should be a much shorter sub-chapter than it is; Selgin and White are clearly mistaken this time. Insofar as they are saying it is just because many people support it is an argumentum ad populumâand therefore fallaciousâand all the talk about “demonstrated preference” and “benefits” (p. 224, quoted from Selgin and White) are economic assertionsâand therefore of no ethical force. Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block spend ten pages writing up analogies and denouncements to what I’ve dismissed in one sentence. |
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Therein, they attempt to “prove” that fractional reserve banking requires a state, based on the assertion that free-market courts would accept their ethical theory, and therefore fractional reserve banking only exists because of state protection from that market force. |
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Whether that ethical theory is correct or not is the exact thing under debate here; you can’t just assume that good free-market courts would adopt it, then findâwonder of wondersâthat only bad state courts would allow fractional reserve banking, and therefore fractional reserve banking requires a state (which is to say, requires injustice), so should be forbidden in the ethical theory. That’s a circular argument, since you’re assuming the ethical theory is correct. |
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A different, valid argument would be to assume that your opponents’ ethical theory is accepted by the free-market court, and then demonstrate that it is insufficient to actually accomplish its aim. |
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Do you see where this is going? You do? Good. |
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So, the free-market courts accept the theory of Hoppe, HÃŒlsmann, and Block. Some rabid anti-fractional reserve activists start suing banks. Given the Hoppe-HÃŒlsmann-Block theory construes demand deposits as bailments, the primary victims of fractional reserve banking are the bailor-depositors (and possibly “some others” whose money has been “physically affected”). They are the victims, so it is they who have the right to demand reparations from the criminal banks. So, they go to court against the banks where they hold deposits. |
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Surely a good way to get yourself black-listed by the banking industry. But I digress. |
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Now, going to court isn’t an automatic favorable judgment, even with your theory at the helm. Following Rothbard’s theory, the burden of proof falls on the accuser, so the depositor has to prove that the bank is operating on fractional reserves. The bank most likely won’t disclose its balance sheet, and can’t be legally obligated to do so. That the deposit bears interest is evidence, but by itself may not suffice to convict. That depends on the standard of evidence required by the court, a curiously rare topic in libertarian ethical theory. I always go back to The Ethics of Liberty, but this is one point it doesn’t address. I would lean towards the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The simple fact of interest paid on a few accounts may not suffice for it, as there are other reasonable explanations. |
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That’s one potential failure point. |
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Supposing the bank is convicted. What is the punishment? Based on single proportionality, they refund the deposit. Hardly a punishment at all, given the depositors could simply have withdrawn it without a lawsuit. After the depositors’ black-listing, they’ll have a hard sell trying to get the remaining depositors to throw in lawsuits of their own; these activists would have a better time calling for boycotts, because that would at least save the time and trouble of court cases. In order for the movement to be at all sustainable, double proportionality (such as Dr. Block has advanced elsewhere, and which I also dispute) would have to be accepted by the courts as well. Lacking that, the prohibition of fractional reserves is a dead letter. |
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That’s another potential failure point. |
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So, in order to assert that the ethical prohibition of fractional reserve banking would actually drive such banks out of the market, there are a couple of ancillary assertions that need to be made. I know Dr. Block has made the double proportionality case, but consider it improper to assume his co-authors agree by association, as this particular point was not raised in the chapter. |
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That concludes the ethical topics in Chapter 7 of The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. The economics sub-chapter sticks to economics, and the conclusion does not introduce new arguments. In conclusion, I believe fractional reserve banking should allowed under the libertarian ethic. |
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