| Yet, the attentive reader may notice that I have written of proportionality with approval. This comes from historical examples of stateless justice. While past example cannot be assumed perfect, the proportionality of Common Law affords proportionality a plausible chance of adoption by the free society. | それにしても注意深い読者が気付いただろう、拙者が比例の刑罰原則のことを賛成しそうに書いたことに。それが歴史上の例からの結論だ。政府外の正義制度に比例性がある。過去の例は必ず正しいなんて確定できないが、コモン・ローの比例性の例で自由社会にも比例性が現れる可能性があると思われる。 |
| For what it’s worth, my best guess is that single-proportionality, of the principle-plus-interest variety, will be most common. There will be cases where the settlement is less and cases where the settlement is more, but this is my guess for the typical case in the typical court. | 拙者の推定では利子付き一重比例が普通の原則になる。もちろん、それ以下に承諾する被害者とそれ以上に承諾する犯罪者も現れるが、普段の訴訟が普段の法廷にそうなると推定する。 |
| Rothbard’s examples suffer from an inconsistency: they measure the magnitude of the crimes incompletely, according to his theory itself, to-wit: “the criminal loses his rights to the extent that he deprives another of his rights” (p. 85, italics in original). Deprivation of rights is what we should measure, then. Take two examples, “Deprived the victim of 10 oz. gold for thirty days,” and “Deprived the victim of 10 oz. gold for thirty years.” These are different crimes, and should therefore deserve different punishments. | ロスバードの理論と例が不整合を持つ。理論の「犯罪者が奪い取る権利の程度だけ自分の権利を失う」（ｐ．８５）に従おうとするが、不完全にその程度を測る。奪い取った権利を測るだろう。例として「十個の金貨を三十日間に奪い取った」と「十個の金貨を三十年間に奪い取った」を考えよう。犯罪が違うために違う刑罰になるべきだ。 |
| Yet, when Rothbard describes some crimes later in this chapter, he doesn’t consider duration of deprivation. “Theft of $15,000,” say no more. Return the $15,000, then (because Rothbard advocates double-proportionality), pay another $15,000. To frame it with the two durations described above, if the criminal only held the money for thirty days, the victim gets a good “return on investment”, but if he held it for thirty years, the victim gets a pretty bad return on investment. Any investor of capital could easily make a case that they were not only deprived of $15,000, but also of the interest that money would have earned them over thirty years. Rothbard could then double both, in accordance with his stand for double-proportionality. | だが、ロスバードが犯罪を話した時に奪い取りの間を考えなかった。「一万五千ドル」だけだった。一万五千ドルを返して、そしてロスバードの二重比例を満たすためまた一万五千ドルを払うべき、と。以上の例の間を考えたら、三十日間の場合では被害者が海老で鯛を釣ることになるが、三十年間では資本利益率が別に良くない。一万五千ドルだけじゃなくその三十年間の利子をも奪い取った論を立てる。その後に二重比例に従ってロスバードが倍にするべきだ。 |
| “But,” you might object, “the criminal didn’t intend to steal for a limited time, nor could the victim expect the money to return to him in one.” But, let me repeat, “the criminal loses his rights to the extent that he deprives another of his rights.” The state of mind of the participants is irrelevant to this, and considering it is an invitation to perjury (a highly discouraged state in jurisprudence) to both parties, it should be abandoned entirely. | 「そうだけど犯罪者が限られた間だけ奪い取ったつもりがなかったし被害者も限られた間だけ期待しなかった」と反対する人があるだろう。「犯罪者が奪い取る権利の程度だけ自分の権利を失う」と拙者が繰り返す。両方の思考は関係ない。そしてその思考を加えたら両方に偽証の誘惑になる。法学では非常に抑止されている状態だから丸ごと捨てるべきだ。 |
| With one final observation, that double-proportionality gives incentive to the evil practice of entrapment, I conclude here. | 二重比例が邪悪なエントラップメントの実行に動機を供給することを述べて、これで終わる。 |
Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 13, Continued
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