| Rothbard now considers options for the question of who should own (control) what, first specifically with regard to everybody’s physical bodies, then extending that to other physical property. Then he condemns aggression against property. | 今章ではロスバードが誰が何を所有するかを考える。はじめに人たちの肉体、そして他の物理所有へ。所有への攻撃行動を非とする。 |
| There are three absolute and universal answers to who should own our bodies. Either (a) we each own our own bodies, (b) we all collectively own all our bodies, or (c) nobody owns anyone’s bodies. There are also non-absolute answers, including the non-universal answers, such as “these people own those people’s bodies.” (A) is the most common answer of people who pose and consider this question. (B) is what we might call the socialist or communist answer, though few people who describe themselves as either would go so far. (C) is a null universe; there is no ownership, therefore nobody has the right to do anything, and therefore everybody is wrong all the time, with no exceptions. | 誰が体を所有するかには絶対な普遍原理は三つだ。（Ａ）個人は自分の体を所有するか、（Ｂ）我々は共同で全ての体を所有するか、（Ｃ）誰も何も所有しないか。普遍じゃない回答も絶対じゃない回答もある、たとえば「この人たちがあの人たちの体を所有する」。こんな問題を考える人には（Ａ）が一番よくある返事だ。（Ｂ）は社会主義や共産主義の答えだと言えるが、その主義者の中ではそこまで行くものは少ないかも知らない。（Ｃ）は無の世界、所有権は誰にも無いと誰もが何の行動をしても権利を持たないから不正しか無いんだ。 |
| Rothbard relegates (c) to a footnote, with some justification: that footnote is the only place I’ve seen it mentioned, and nowhere advocated. He also dismisses (b) for practical reasons, leaving him to argue that (a) is correct. He does not consider any compromises between (a) and (b), although this is closest to our current situation; individuals have some rights, but the collective has some rights, too. Now, this position should be rejected, but not by simply failing to mention it. | ロスバードが悪くない判断で脚注に（Ｃ）を降格する。その脚注にしか見たことは無い。実地で達成できないため（Ｂ）を否定するから（Ａ）が正しいと結論する。現状の状態に一番近い（Ａ）と（Ｂ）の妥協案を考えない。今では個人には権利があるが、共同にも権利がある。否定するべき姿勢だが、この姿勢を言わずに結論するのは間違いだ。 |
| This discussion deserves much more space than Rothbard gave to it. Why would we choose this one versus that one, and what would the consequences be? And why would we choose a compromise, and what results from that? Ethics can be decided by many paths, and they deserve some mention- here I will refer specifically to the Virtue Ethics and Consequentialist Ethics ideas. | この議論はロスバードが熟考したほどより値する話題だ。どう選ぶ？選んだ原理の結果は何だ？妥協案を作る理屈は？そしてその結果は何だ？倫理は複数の道を渡って結論に着く。そのいろんな道を同列に論じるべきだ。今日は徳倫理学と帰結主義を視る。 |
| Virtue Ethics is the idea that one should behave in congruence with certain virtues: Honesty, or Compassion, or Courage, and so on. It’s a bad fit for a legal system, because a legal system necessarily needs to be deontological. But one can construct a deontological system based on some matrix of virtues, and conversely take a deontological ethic and reconstruct the virtue or virtues it embodies. | 徳倫理学は人がある徳（正直とか悲とか勇気とか）に従うべきと言う原理だ。法規が義務論的で居られなければならないから徳倫理学は法学に相性が悪いだが、徳の集で義務論を作り上げれる、そして義務論から具象した徳に分かてる。 |
| Choosing (a) above and constructing the ethic of the free society could be said to enshrine the virtue of Respect for the Autonomy of Your Fellow Men. Choosing (b) and constructing a collectivist ethic could be said to deify Cooperating with Your Fellow Men for the Greater Good. Choosing (c) really doesn’t resonate with any virtues that I know of. | 上の（Ａ）を選んで自由社会の倫理を作る上げるのは「人間同士の自律を尊敬する」徳の義務論だ。（Ｂ）を選んで集団主義の倫理を作り上げるのは「社会協力」の徳の義務論だ。（Ｃ）には拙者の知ってる徳で相当なのが無い。 |
| Some might say that (a) embodies not a virtue, but a vice: that of selfish Greed. Others assert that (b) is simply organizing society around resentful Envy. | 「（Ａ）は徳じゃなく不徳である貪欲の原理」だと言う人がある。別の人も「（Ｂ）は羨望の社会を作る」と言う。 |
| Then there’s the idea of Consequentialist Ethics. Under this system, one judges actions as good or bad based on their results. Again a bad fit for a legal system; we would need omniscience to judge any action, due to the complexity of cause and effect, and to know whether some action or other is justified beforehand, we would need prescience as well. But, with knowledge of philosophy- particularly economics- we can paint (with broad strokes) the results of different deontological ethical systems, and then assess those results. | 次に帰結主義を考えよう。この主義の下で行動は帰結に依存して善か悪になる。また、法学に相性が悪い。どの行動を考えても判断するには因果の複雑さのゆえに全知が必要だ。事前に行動を正しく選ぶには未来予知も必要になる。だが、哲学（特に経済学）の知識ではいくつかの倫理の帰結を一般的に記述すれば、その帰結を評価できる。 |
| (A) above results in harmony and is conducive to prosperity. (B) results in impoverishment, and, if there are disagreements as to what constitutes The Greater Good, can produce strife. (C) results in nihilistic anything-goes. | 上の（Ａ）は調和を起こして、繁栄に資する。（Ｂ）は貧窮化を起こす、そして一致が無いと騒乱が上がれる。（Ｃ）は虚無主義の弱肉強食を起こす。 |
| From a consequentialist perspective, (a) is the obvious choice, if you favor peace and prosperity. | 帰結主義の観点から、平和と繁栄を支持すれば（Ａ）を選ぶべき選択だ。 |
| Now, let’s consider the question of practicality: which, if any, of these can be realized in practice? (A) is easy to implement, and in fact almost automatic. We, by nature, have autonomous individual wills. (B) has never been implemented successfully; as Rothbard observes, every single time it devolves into (if it didn’t originate as) an oligarchy ruling for their own good, but in the name of the “Greater Good.” Men simply do not possess a collective will, and in order to use it as our guiding principle, we would have to organize and operate some system of aggregating our individual wills into a “collective will,” without degradation or manipulation. This has never happened for a very good reason: it is impossible; our individual wills cannot be added together into an aggregate “collective will,” any more than gathering together a pile of stones results in them becoming one big boulder. (C) is thoroughly impossible; since it denies that anything can be right, there is no way to do it right. | 今から実用性を考えよう。どれかを実用できる？（Ａ）は簡単だ。自動的に近いだ。自然で人間は個々に自律な意思を持つ。（Ｂ）は歴史上では実用されたことが無い。ロスバードが述べるように、例外なく寡頭制として生まれなかったらそうなることは時間の問題だけだ。「社会」の名の下に一部が自分のために支配する。人間は共同意志を持たない。導く原理として使うには全社会の人の個人意思を「共同意志」に落たなく操られなくまとめる体系が必要だ。不可能性だから実現したことは無い。小石を集めても大石にならないように個人意思は共同意志にまとめられない。（Ｃ）はどう考えても可能性の無いものだ。正しい権がないと正しく果たすこともない。 |
| (A) should be the obvious choice; it upholds a noble virtue, it results in (almost) universally-desired outcomes, and it’s practical to boot. (B) does attempt to pursue a virtue, but its outcomes are generally unappealing, and it is impossible in practice. (C) really has no popular case, except perhaps to nihilists. | （Ａ）が当たり前の選択だ。上品な徳を持ち上げ、多少一般に欲された帰結を起こして、実用することもある。（Ｂ）も徳を持ち上げようとするが、帰結は冴えなくて、実用することもできない。（Ｃ）は虚無主義者だけに興味をそそるものだ。 |
| These are the absolute and universal answers. Non-universal treatments include ethics that separate men arbitrarily into groups that have different sets of rights; these are generally non-absolute as well. It has appeal, however; since it partitions men into Übermenschen and Untermenschen, those assigned a place amongst the former enjoy a privileged position, so they will often defend it. Note that above we observed that attempts at collective ownership devolve into oligarchy- this is another form of unequal ethical categories, where the oligarchs have rights that the lowly masses are denied. In accordance with the name of my blog, I reject ethics that divide men into unequal ethical categories. The Kantian Categorical Imperative also denies non-universal ethics such as these. | これが絶対と普遍な解答だ。普遍じゃない解答は人を恣意的に別の団体に分かち、その団体に別の権利を上げる。典型的に絶対じゃない。とある魅力を認める。人を超人人種と劣等人種に分離して、超人に分かたれた人はその倫理を守ることはよくある。前に集団主義は寡頭制に落ちると述べた。これも匹敵しない種類だ。寡頭者は凡人に否定された権利を持つ。ブログの名のように、拙者は人を匹敵しない種類に分離する倫理を拒絶する。定言命法もこのような倫理を拒絶する。 |
| Also deserving examination are the non-absolute answers. As observed above, when in theory (in practice, still an oligarchy) the current state of affairs is defended, it comes to a compromise between (a) and (b). “Pursuing only one virtue denies the other; we should find a happy medium. The results of both extremes have both benefits and detriments; we should choose the middle way to get the best of both worlds.” Ignoring for the moment the economical inaccuracy of claiming collectivism has any benefits, one cannot make an argument for this. One can only advance one’s opinion: “We should hold this virtue 60% of the time, and no more; the remainder should be taken by the other virtue. Here is where the benefits of both extremes are maximized and their detriments are minimized.” This will inevitably vary wildly between one man and the next. One man holds 60% is the right ratio, and the next holds it should be 50%, and yet another holds 70%. Assessing the relative value of different virtues, and the relative value of a matrix of benefits and detriments, must rely upon valuation, which is an individually subjective process. It changes not only from one person to the next but also from one point in time to another in the same person! Once allow any option but the absolutes, and nothing can be certain. We could enjoy 99% individualism one day, then 1% the next day, when men’s minds have changed. | 絶対じゃない解答をも考えよう。前に述べたように、現状は理論上に正当化しようと（Ａ）と（Ｂ）の妥協案になる。「一つの徳を持ち上げて他の徳を拒絶するから、極端には利も不利もあるから、中に至摘があるはず」と。共同所有には利があるの経済学的な不明確さを置いても論法できない。できることは自分の恣意的な意見を述べることしかない。「この徳を６割に、その徳は４割に。この点に極端の利を至適し、不利を最小にする」と。必至に人々に激しく異なる。一人が６割を述べて、一人が５割を、一人は７割を。別の徳か様々な利と不利を評価することは個人的に主観的な過程だ。個人によって変わるだけじゃなく時によって同人にも変わる！絶対じゃない解答を許すと、確信するものはどこにもいない。一日に９９％な個人主義的な社会があっても、人の意見が変わって翌日は１％になれる。 |
| Then there’s the thorny problem of reconciling all the viewpoints available at any given time into a single compromise plan. How are we to do it? Aggregate our individual wills into a collective will? Or, allow individuals the autonomy to choose for themselves? These options are the same two options, on a different level! Doing it by collectivist means (for instance, by putting it up to a vote) will mean that no individual has any rights, except so far as the collective deigns to allow it, and doing it by individualist means will mean that the collective has no rights, except so far as individuals choose to empower it. | それに複数の意見を一つの妥協案に丸く収まることの問題だ。どうするか？みんなの個人意思を共同意思にまとめる？それとも人が個々に選ぶ自律を許す？これも別の階層に同じ問題になる！集団方法を使えば（たとえば票数で決めれば）個人権利は集団が許すほどしかならない。個人方法を使えば権限委譲されたほどしか集団は無力だ。 |
| … | 。。。 |
| This blog entry could continue, but I have dwelt too long on this tangent. | この書き込みは続けれるけどこの話題はもう長すぎだ。 |
| Let me only say that Rothbard is mistaken when he describes criminals as violating the nature of their victims, and even of violating their own nature. This is an nonsensical as asserting that a rock could violate its own nature. | 犯罪人は被害者の自然と自分の自然を破ると述べるロスバードが間違えた。石には自の自然を破る可能性があるほどの戯言だとしか、これで言わない。 |
Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 8: Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression
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