The Time Element of Criminality and Punishment

Today, LewRockwell.com published an article by David Gordan titled, “Rothbard and Double Restitution” (originally published at Mises.org). I’ve often thought about single- and double-restitution, and while my conclusion on that particular might interest the reader, for now I wish to look at an aspect of restitution that seems to have been neglected in this theory: Time. 今日のLewRockwell.comがダヴィッド・ゴードンの(元はMises.orgに発行された)「Rothbard and Double Restitution」という記事を発行した。拙者がよく一倍と二倍の損害賠償を考える。その点の結論が読み手に面白いかも知らないが、今は損害賠償の忘れた局面を見たい。それが時間でござる。
As Rothbard himself put it, “the criminal loses his rights to the extent that he deprives another of his rights.” The extent of deprivation is not merely what the victim is deprived of, but also for how long, I contend. In the business of rentals and loans, the renter/loaner agrees to be deprived of some goods for some period of time, at a certain price. Given that (and many other observations on the topic of time preference), it may be inferred that duration of deprivation is economically important. ロスバードの書いたとおり、「犯罪者が他者から権利を奪取した程度に犯罪者も権利をうしなう。」奪取の程度が何が被害者の奪取されただけではなく奪取された時間も含む、と拙者が主張する。賃貸料と貸借には借し手がある価格である時間に金品の奪取に承知する。それと他の時間選好の知識で、奪取の時間も経済学的に大事なものと察知する。
This matters little to the proverbial tooth-for-a-tooth, as the victim loses a tooth for the rest of his life, then the criminal loses one or two teeth for the rest of his life. But consider Rothbard’s example, quoted by Dr. Gordon, of the theft of $15,000. Following Rothbard’s formulation, the criminal must return the $15,000, plus pay another $15,000 from his own assets or through his own labor. However, this is without any regard for how long the criminal was in possession of the money; ten minutes means the same thing as ten years. Rothbard did parenthetically add in interest foregone, but the instant he picks up the cash, the criminal is saddled with an immediate criminal liability of $30,000. ことわざの「歯には歯を」に差が小さい。被害者が残りの人生に歯を失って、犯罪者も残りの人生に一個か二個の歯を失う。だが、ゴードン博士が引用したロスバードの一万五千ドルの盗みの例を考えよう。ロスバードの論で、犯罪者が一万五千ドルを返されるから、また一万五千ドルを払わされる、自分の資産からか自分の労力からか問わず。しかし、これが犯罪者が金を持った時間に関わらず損賠でござる。十分が十年と同じ結末になる。ロスバードがひそひそ話で損した利子も含んだけど、その金を取り上げた瞬間から犯罪者が三万ドルの刑事責任も取り上げた。
This places upon him an unfortunate economic incentive: to commit fully to his criminal act. We might like him to repent and return the $15,000, but he’ll then have to pony up another $15,000 or look forward to an extended period of indentured servitude. That’s a serious deterrent to backing out. Sure, the sooner he backs out, the less “interest foregone” he’ll have to worry about, but that’s a drop in the bucket in any given hour or day (even at a punitively high 20% interest rate, $30,000 costs only $16.44 per day). これが惜しい経済的の誘因を起こす。犯罪者が犯罪に確約する。奪った瞬間から最善の結末が犯罪者の悔い改めで一万五千ドルの返しでござるが、それに加わって犯罪者が一万五千ドルの資金を払わないと年季奉公で払う。引っ込みには大きいな抑止力になる。早く引っ込むほど払和される損した利子が小さくなるが、日に日にそれが九牛一毛でござろ。討伐的に高い二十%の金利で、三万ドルが日ごとに十六ドル四十四セントだけの費用を加わる。
“But if he returns it, the victim might forgive him,” you might say. Yes, he might. But he, too, is affected by the flip side of the same economic incentive. Should the criminal comes back begging forgiveness, the victim has a very significant incentive not to forgive. Accept the $15,000, then sell the remainder to a collections agency for a 10% discount? Not many people would object to making $13,500 in a day. 「でも、返したら被害者が許すかも」と言うこともある。そうかも。だが被害者もその経済的の誘因の他面の影響を与えられる。犯罪者が許しをお願いに来ても、被害者の許しに反する強い誘因がある。元の一万五千ドルを受けて、残りを一割でサービサーに売れば、一日で一万三千五百ドルになる。
The human race is not blindly enslaved to economic incentives. But they most certainly respond to it on the margin. The result will be less repentance, and less forgiveness. 人類が盲目的に経済的な誘因に従うものではないが、確かに眼界効用に反応する。結果的に、悔い改めも許しも減少する。
Bear that in mind, but let us set it aside for one single question. The purpose of an ethic, after all, is not to promote virtue, but to establish justice. I should be very happy if virtue and justice were correlated (if they could be measured and therefore statistically compared), but perhaps they aren’t. 忘れずに、一つの質問に置いておこう。結局、倫理の目的が道徳ではなく、正義である。正義の倫理が道徳を強化すれば拙者が喜ぶけどそうはならないかも知らない。
Ask yourself only this: If punishment should be proportional, is it proportional that a man who deprived another of something temporarily be, in punishment, himself deprived of something of similar value permanently? これだけを自分に尋ねて。刑罰が犯罪に比例するべきならば、他人から何かを一時的に奪取した人が相似な何かを永続的に奪取されることが比例的か否か?

About Brian Wilton

I'm a libertarian. I prefer reading articles and books to listening to podcasts, although I hear that podcasts are more popular. Call it Picard's Syndrome.
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