| Children’s rights is a difficult case, as Rothbard notes. It’s hard to say whether it is easier for me or not. Since my basic premise is the equality of all moral actors, the question is not, What rights should we give to children, and when, but, What can you rightfully do to and with another actor who behaves as children do? | ロスバードの書いたとおりに子供の権利は難しいでござる。拙者の制度のほうが簡単か否かは言いがたい。基本的な前提が人の匹敵である主張で問題は「子供に何の権利を上げるか」と「いつ上げるか」ではなく「子供のようにふるまう行動者に何が権利的にできる？」 |
| I am not a proponent of children’s rights, but of human rights. Those ethics that describe one set of rights for adults and another for children do not propose human rights. If you wish to speak of human rights, then all humans possess them. When you deny human rights to any class of people, you assign that class subhuman ethical status. | 拙者は子権ではなく人権を支持する。大人に一揃いの権利を当てて子供に別の一揃いの権利を当てるものは人権の支持者ではない。人権と言いたいなら全人類の権利にしないと矛盾になる。一部に人権の一つでも拒絶すればその人類の一部を人間以下にする。 |
| You describe a system of human and subhuman rights. | 超人権と劣等人権の制度になる。 |
| Rothbard, therefore, has the right idea when he says, “Let us concede… that fetuses are human beings, … and are therefore entitled to full human rights” (p. 98). He says it is for the purpose of the discussion, so perhaps he truly feels otherwise. Yet, he accepts the correct premise and reaches the correct conclusion, so if his true beliefs are otherwise, he may keep them. The mother’s right to abort an unwanted baby is correct. | と言うことで「幼児は人間であって…全ての人権を持つ…と譲ろう」（ｐ．９８）と書いたロスバードが正しい。それは議論のための譲りとも書いたからロスバードの真意ではないかも知らないが、正しい前提に承諾して正しい結論に辿り着くから真意が違ったとしてもそうでもいい。結局母親には妊娠中絶する権利を持つ。 |
| Moving forward to infants, Rothbard outlines a guardian’s rights vis-a-vis his infant. It could be better; this is a subset of a broader collection of actions: those actions on the person or property of the temporarily inactive. | 乳児に続きロスバードが後見人の乳児に関しての権利を述べる。改良がある。これが一時的に行動しない人の体・所有にの行動の部分集合だから。 |
| We speak often of action, and in the context of ethics, there are actions and actors. What of an ethical actor who is inactive? This includes not only infants and the unconscious, but also those absent from their property, and it can apply to crimes in progress (an interloper may wish to assist the victim, but circumstances preclude a discussion wherein the interloper gets consent from the victim to employ violence against the criminal). | 行動についてよく語る。倫理では行動と行動者がある。行動しない行動者のことをどうする？乳児と意識不明の人だけではなく留守所有も犯罪中も含まれる。 |
| In these circumstances, the active actor has no unqualified right to help the inactive actor. Such a right can only be acquired by consent. Regardless, the former may choose to help the latter before getting consent (which may not be forthcoming until too late), but when the latter is able to act, he can review the former’s actions on his person and property, and retroactively give or withhold his consent. | こんな状況では行動する人は行動しない人を手伝う権利を持たない。そんな権利は承知の上にしか得られない。それにしても前者が後者を手伝うと選べるが、後者が行動する時に前者の行動を検討して遡及的に承知を与えるか拒絶するかが決めれる。 |
| With regard to infants, this means that he can sue his guardian for damages when he grows into the exercise of this right. This has a lot of implications, but we’ll go too far afield if we pursue them now. Suffice it to say that Rothbard is basically correct. | 乳児の件には権利を振るうように育った乳児が後見人を訴えれる。含意が山ほどあるが、追ったら長すぎになる。今ではロスバードがあらかたに正解でござると言おう。 |
| However, as children grow older, it is a little bit oversimplified to say that the only way they get adult rights is when they leave home. They have other options as well. | だが育っていく子供が家出だけで権利を得れるとは単純化しすぎでござる。他にも方法がある。 |
| It’s interesting to note that Hillary Rodham had some good things to say in 1973, quoted in a footnote in this chapter. | 面白いことにヒラリー・ロドハムが１９７３年にいいことを書いた。この章の脚注に引用された。 |
Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 14: Children and Rights
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