| This is the first of two chapters dealing with real estate. Rothbard here defines land engrossment as claiming unowned land without labor investment, and finds it invalid and therefore enforcement of it is criminal. He claims that land ownership is permanent until abandonment. He attacks the common law doctrine of adverse possession, and a land practice he labels feudalism (which does not correspond exactly with the historical concept). | これは不動産の二章の第一章だ。ロスバードが不動産禁制（“Ｌａｎｄ Ｅｎｇｒｏｓｓｍｅｎｔ”）を労働投資なく不動産所有主張と定義する。無力な主張であって、その主張の強行が犯罪と判断する。不動産の所有権が捨てない限り永久なものと主張する。コモン・ローの逆所有（“Ａｄｖｅｒｓｅ Ｐｏｓｓｅｓｓｉｏｎ”）と不動産独占（“Ｌａｎｄ Ｍｏｎｏｐｏｌｙ”）を攻める。 |
| The engrossment bit is good, and the attacks on feudalist land theft and adverse possession have some merit, but are still greatly flawed. The proposal of perpetual land ownership is flat-out mistaken, however. | 不動産禁止の判断は正しいが、逆所有と不動産独占への攻撃には正しい点と間違えた点がある。不動産の永久所有権は全然な間違いだ。 |
| Permanent ownership is a mistake because we acquire ownership through labor (as I described last time), and the fruits of our labor do not persist forever without maintenance. Property rights are rightful claims to the fruits of our labor, so insofar as those fruits are perishable, so are our property rights. | 人は労働で所有権を得る、と前回に主張した。労働の成果は保たずに永久に続かないから永久所有権は間違いだ。 |
| Adverse possession does accrue in my view, after a fashion. In Rothbard’s framework, suppose some speculator decides to homestead a huge swath of land, but to comply nominally with the rules, he invests one hour of (likely hired) labor in minimal land improvements per ten acres he claims. He then sits on his claim for a few decades, to let the land’s value appreciate; meanwhile, his improvements degrade to barely discernible, but his title is established, so he doesn’t need to invest in maintenance. Then a genuine settler comes along and decides to settle on some of the speculator’s land (knowingly or not). By the time the speculator takes action, the settler has been on a forty-acre parcel for three months, investing seven hundred twenty hours of his own labor in it. Rothbard would have to side with the speculator, who decades ago invested four hours of labor in that forty acres, over the new settler, who has more recently invested a hundred sixty times as much labor. Incidentally, if the settler can’t afford to take his investment with him, then the speculator gets to keep it, free. | 逆所有は拙者の原理では違い方法で起こる。ロスバードの原理のもとで、投機家が巨大な領土を所有するためにある程度の（多分、雇用な）労働投資を満たす。所有権が固定した時から値上がるために数十年を待つ。その時間で投資の証拠が劣化して弁えがたくなるけど、所有権が固定だから保つことが必要ない。その点で入植者が現れ、投機家の領地の一部に納まろうとする。投機家が行動するまでは半年で、入植者は投機家の投資の数十倍を使う。ロスバードが投機家の肩を持たなきゃならない。ついでに、入植者が地から投資を引き出せない場合では投機家がただで持ち得る。 |
| What Rothbard has done is allow land engrossment, only requiring more investment than some other systems do. | 不動産禁制に達するだろう。別の原理より高い投資が必要だけだ。 |
| I assert that the settler has a stronger claim than the speculator, and if they submitted their claims to mediation, the mediator might decide that he owes the speculator a nominal fee as compensation and thereafter owns the land. | 拙者は入植者の方が投機家より所有権が強いと主張する。居中調停に頼れば、調停者が入植者から投機家に名ばかりの罰金を払えることで入植者が所有者と認める、と判断できる。 |
| This is not how adverse possession works in common law, of course. | もちろん、コモン・ローの逆所有とかなり違うだけど。 |
| Moving on to feudalist land theft, Rothbard is again incorrect in advocating dispossession when the original victims are lost. Once again, he’s willing to punish the bad guy for the sake of punishment, not for the benefit of his victims. I again assert that where the victim cannot be found, nobody has the right to punish the bad guy. If, on the other hand, the feudal land thief with lost victims aggresses against someone else, he can be punished for that. Enforcing serfdom (of new victims) on his land, for instance, might result in his forfeiting the land to the serfs, when he is brought to justice. | 不動産独占について、ロスバードがまた被害者が紛失したら悪者を被害者のためじゃなく罰するためだけに所有権を取って罰する。拙者がまた、被害者が見つけられない場合では誰にも犯罪者を罰する権利はないと主張する。だけど、犯罪者には別の違反を犯したら、その被害者が罰できる。例えば、独占した地に農奴制度を使用したら正義が農奴にその地の所有権を移転することができる。 |
Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 10: The Problem of Land Theft
Bookmark the permalink.