Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 8, Revisited

Rothbard asserts that everybody owns their own bodies, as we saw earlier. Of the available choices (ownership by ownself, or by all of society, or by some arbitrary other person), he chose self-ownership. Naturally, it extends to every man’s labor. The same choices apply, and Rothbard again picks self-ownership. Every man owns his own body, and his own labor. 前に書いたようにロスバードがみんなは自分の体を所有すると主張する。選べる選択(自分所有、共同所有、他人所有)から自分所有を選ぶ。もちろんみんなの労働にも同じ選択があって、ロスバードがまた自分所有を選ぶ。人々全員が自分の体と自分の労働を所有する。
Who owns everything else, the resources of the natural world? It starts off unowned, but Rothbard says that if a man mixes his labor with it, then he owns that part of it. This creates property in tangible resources. He then owns that property thereafter, until he abandons it or transfers it to another. では、誰が世界の自然資源を所有する?始めに所有者がないけど、ロスバードがこう主張する:人が自分の労働と自然資源を混ぜたら、その自然資源を所有する。それで所有権が現れる。そのときからあの人がその物を所有する、捨てるか他人に上げるまで。
I take a different approach. As we found that men own their own bodies, and their own labor, they also own the fruits of their labor. When they exert labor on natural resources, they can rightfully claim and control the benefits that result; this “right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labor, by having rightful control over those fruits as embodied in transformed resources” we can call “property rights.” 拙者は別の理屈を主張する。人の体のように、人の労働のように、人の労働の成果をも自分所有になる。自然資源に労働を行使すればその利を権利として制御できる。この「変えた資源を権利の制御で労働の成果を享受する権利」は「所有権」と言う。
This formulation has a couple important corollaries; one is that all property rights degrade over time. For instance, if one man builds a sandcastle on an unowned beach, he has a property right in it, and if another man comes and kicks it down, that is a criminal violation of the first man’s property rights. If, however, he leaves the sandcastle unmaintained for some time, the ocean will destroy it. Then, he owns nothing, although he used to have a property right. この理屈には大事な系がある。一つは、全所有権は時が経つと落ちる。例えば人が所有者のない海岸に砂の城を作り上げたら、その砂の城を所有する。他人が蹴り落としたらそれは所有権に犯罪だ。所有者が砂の城を保たずに放って置いてて海が破れば、所有権が持ったけどそれで何の所有権がない。
(Typically, serious labor investment is reserved for property rights much less ephemeral than this, but it applies, on some time scale, to all property rights.) (本気な労働投資は普段こんなはかない所有権に使われていないがある時間の比較で全所有権に当てはまる。)
Another corollary is that, since property rights are functionally defined rather than spatially defined, they can spatially overlap without conflict. One example is a shared road. All parties using it (and by doing so, transforming it from a natural state of plant growth to a dirt road) have a property right in it, for the functions it serves. Each can contest changes that impact functionality, such as erecting a building on the road, but they can’t contest changes that do not, such as paving the road while no other parties happen to be using it. またの系は、所有権が空間ではなく機能で定義されるから、複数の所有権は同じ空間で対立せずに重ねる。共有の道路は一例だ。複数の利用者の通りかかりで道路が自然の植物を踏みにじって道を作れ、使用者の全員がその道に所有権を持つ。道に建物を立つような機能を害する行動を論争できるが道を舗装するような機能を害しない行動を論争できない。
It can be argued that overlapping claims such as these are not all of the same strength; those that invest more labor (and other resources) have more claim on the property, such as the one who paves the road in the previous example. We might say he “owns the road,” a property right in the road, but the other users would have an easement to use it, which are also property rights in the road. こんな重ねた所有権は全て同じ力じゃないと主張できる。もっと労働と別の資源を投資したものはもっと強い所有権を持つ。上の例では舗装したものが所有権を持つと他の使用者が地役権を持つように定める。
So, this is how men come to own property in the material world. これで人が自然の資源を所有することができる。

About Brian Wilton

I'm a libertarian. I prefer reading articles and books to listening to podcasts, although I hear that podcasts are more popular. Call it Picard's Syndrome.
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