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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 18: The Boycott

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“A boycott is an attempt to persuade other people to have nothing to do with some particular person or firm,” Rothbard begins this chapter. And he finds that boycotts are universally legitimate. 「ボイコットはある会社、又はある人のことに関わらないようの説得です」とロスバードがこの章を始める。そして、ボイコットが正当と説明する。
There is a problem with picketing as we know it, however, because picketers generally don’t assemble on their own property. The property owner can demand they leave, and since the favored picketing locations are the protested location and the street in front of it, they likely would, and continuing the picket would then become a crime. だが、ピケットが一般に参加者の所有地に起きないから問題になる。ピケットラインの場所の所有者が散らばることを要求できる。好まれたところがピケットされた者の所有地とその前の通りだから要求が出ることが多いと思われる。となると、ピケットを続けるのが犯罪になる。
The street owner is only presumptively on the protested party’s side, though. It could happen that he favors the picketers, but cannot deny access to the property due to contractual obligations. He could, in that case, allow picketing on his street (without blocking access). だが、通りの所有者がピケットされた者の見方じゃない可能性もある。契約の義務で通りを防げなくても通りに防がないようにピケットを許せる。
In the free society, the boycott would be the only outlet for moral busybodies. One wonders if they would really have the drive to mount them effectively, though. So many of them are armchair activists or bureaucrats. Once the armchair activist must employ his own time and resources instead of simply voting for his favorite flavor of tyranny and the bureaucrats don’t receive a salary for enforcing the tyranny anymore, we may find that they were never so committed to their principles as they claimed. 自由社会ではボイコットがお節介の唯一の捌け口でござる。効果的にできるのを疑えるけど。青白き運動家と背広組が多くて自分の努力と資源にしか頼れなくなったら本当に今言ってるように打ち込んでいないと見えるかも知らない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 17: Bribery

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This short chapter merely establishes the right to offer and pay bribes. It asserts that taking a bribe, however, is a contract violation, and that’s the only sense in which a bribe is a bad thing. この短い章はただ賄賂を払う権利を主張する。だが、賄賂を受け取るのが契約違反で倫理の違反になる。
That this chapter, too, comes before the contracts chapter makes me think that Rothbard might have been well advised to rearrange his chapters. For instance, placing theory description before theory application. この章も契約の章の前に出されたからロスバードが違う整理にするべきだったと思える。例えば、原則の応用する前に原則を明確する。
On the other hand, since all the examples in the chapter are of private-sector bribes and not public-sector bribes, might he have been holding discussion of government until after introducing government? But no. He has condemned government any number of times already. その一方、政府への賄賂がこの章にないとなった理由は政府をまだ明確してないのでは？いやいや、もう幾つかの非難をしてきた。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 16: Knowledge, True and False

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In this chapter, Rothbard discusses how a man can exercise his property rights to disseminate information or refrain from disseminating information. This includes telling the truth, telling lies, keeping secrets, and protecting copyright. The general rule is, all men have the right to say or not say anything they like, except when they have already agreed otherwise by contract. この章でロスバードが人の所有権で情報のことを語る。真実を言うことも偽りを言うことも秘密にすることも著作権のことも。一般に人は望むように何でも言う権利も何も言わない権利も持つ。事前に契約でその権利を譲ったことが唯一の例外でござる。
All men have the right to tell any truth they wish. They also have the right to tell any lie they wish. Furthermore, they have the right to say nothing on any topic. 人には何の真実でも言う権利がある。何の偽りでも言う権利がある。そしてどんな状況でも何も言わない権利がある。
The exceptions are contractual agreements: a man might contractually agree to say some truth or lie, or not to say some truth or lie. For example, he might accept payment to keep a secret, or to testify at trial. 例外は契約の賛成でござる。人は契約で何かの真実か偽りかを言うことに賛成できる。何かの真実か偽りかを言わないことに賛成できる。例えば支払金を受け取って秘密を守ることも法廷に証言することもある。
Rothbard attempts to justify common law copyright, but oversteps somewhat. He is correct that a copyright owner can share knowledge on condition of secrecy, or sell items on condition of not reproducing them. But he cannot obligate anyone else- it is not binding upon society as a whole- and in the event of breach of contract, the guilty party is only liable for what they’ve received: the compensation that a confidante accepted to agree to secrecy, or the copyrighted goods a buyer purchased. ロスバードがコモン・ローの著作権を正当化しようとするが、少々度を超える。著作者は内緒の条件で知識を伝えるか物を売るかが権利であるのは正解だけど、他の人が自由に逆らえる。そして、契約違反の場合に有罪者が受け取った分だけ責任になる、支払金だったり著作物だったり。
This would benefit from a contract theory, which Rothbard introduces later. この話題が契約理論で分かりやすくなるが、ロスバードの契約理論はまだ先にある。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 15: “Human Rights” As Property Rights

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This chapter attacks the idea some hold that property rights should be curtailed, but yet human rights should be protected. Rothbard asserts that this is unworkable: “the concept of rights only makes sense as property rights. For not only are there no human rights which are not also property rights, but the former rights lose their absoluteness and clarity and become fuzzy and vulnerable when property rights are not used as the standard” (p. 113). Two examples he gives are: “A person does not have a “right to freedom of speech”; what he does have is the right to hire a hall and address the people who enter the premises. He does not have a “right to freedom of the press”; what he does have is the right to write or publish a pamphlet” (p. 113, emphasis in original), and try to distribute it. この章が所有権を切り詰めても人権を守る意見を責める。これが不可能だ、とロスバードが述べる。「権利の概念は所有権でしか筋が通りません。所有権ではない人権はないの他にも所有権を基いてない人権は絶対性と明瞭さを失いはっきりしなくて傷つきやすくなる」（ｐ．１１３）。二例として「人には“表現の自由”を持ちません。持つのはホールを借りて入る人に演説する権利です。“報道の自由”を持ちません。持つのはパンフレットを書く・出版する権利です」（ｐ．１１３）。
He’s right; these rights are basically moot without a property right through which to exercise them. Soapbox oration in public may be a cultural image, but their actual prevalence is less than that of beggars. Without a place to assemble an audience, “freedom of speech” is nearly useless. Without a press to print with you’ll print nothing at all, “freedom of the press” notwithstanding. ロスバードが正しい。こんな人権は所有に通じて使用しないと無力になる。文化には街頭演説の心像があるが実際に乞食より少ない。聴衆を集める場所がないと表現の自由は不用に近い。印刷機を所有しないと出版することはない、報道の自由など言われても。
These right arose in response to government edicts that, “You can’t say that,” “You can’t write that,” “You can’t assemble unless we approve it.” Governments were attempting to stifle dissent and impose conformity, and these right were expressions of opposition. この権利は政府の「それは言えない」「それは書けない」「許可なしで集めれない」のような政令に反して表した。政府は反対を押えて社会を支配しようとした、そして反抗の表現はこの人権でござった。
But they were strictly secondary. The original proponents of these rights would never consider giving up property rights for these. だが二次的だった。この権利の発案者達は所有権を引き渡してそんな人権を得るなんて考えていなかった。
Yet some now think that keeping these secondary rights while losing the more primary right to property would somehow be acceptable. Rothbard is spot on in reframing human rights in this way, both logically and strategically. けれども今では一次的な所有権を失いこの二次的な権利を持ち続けることが結構と思う人がある。この人権を所有権の派生物に変えたロスバードが理論的にも戦略的にも明哲でござった。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 14: Children and Rights

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Children’s rights is a difficult case, as Rothbard notes. It’s hard to say whether it is easier for me or not. Since my basic premise is the equality of all moral actors, the question is not, What rights should we give to children, and when, but, What can you rightfully do to and with another actor who behaves as children do? ロスバードの書いたとおりに子供の権利は難しいでござる。拙者の制度のほうが簡単か否かは言いがたい。基本的な前提が人の匹敵である主張で問題は「子供に何の権利を上げるか」と「いつ上げるか」ではなく「子供のようにふるまう行動者に何が権利的にできる？」
I am not a proponent of children’s rights, but of human rights. Those ethics that describe one set of rights for adults and another for children do not propose human rights. If you wish to speak of human rights, then all humans possess them. When you deny human rights to any class of people, you assign that class subhuman ethical status. 拙者は子権ではなく人権を支持する。大人に一揃いの権利を当てて子供に別の一揃いの権利を当てるものは人権の支持者ではない。人権と言いたいなら全人類の権利にしないと矛盾になる。一部に人権の一つでも拒絶すればその人類の一部を人間以下にする。
You describe a system of human and subhuman rights. 超人権と劣等人権の制度になる。
Rothbard, therefore, has the right idea when he says, “Let us concede… that fetuses are human beings, … and are therefore entitled to full human rights” (p. 98). He says it is for the purpose of the discussion, so perhaps he truly feels otherwise. Yet, he accepts the correct premise and reaches the correct conclusion, so if his true beliefs are otherwise, he may keep them. The mother’s right to abort an unwanted baby is correct. と言うことで「幼児は人間であって…全ての人権を持つ…と譲ろう」（ｐ．９８）と書いたロスバードが正しい。それは議論のための譲りとも書いたからロスバードの真意ではないかも知らないが、正しい前提に承諾して正しい結論に辿り着くから真意が違ったとしてもそうでもいい。結局母親には妊娠中絶する権利を持つ。
Moving forward to infants, Rothbard outlines a guardian’s rights vis-a-vis his infant. It could be better; this is a subset of a broader collection of actions: those actions on the person or property of the temporarily inactive. 乳児に続きロスバードが後見人の乳児に関しての権利を述べる。改良がある。これが一時的に行動しない人の体・所有にの行動の部分集合だから。
We speak often of action, and in the context of ethics, there are actions and actors. What of an ethical actor who is inactive? This includes not only infants and the unconscious, but also those absent from their property, and it can apply to crimes in progress (an interloper may wish to assist the victim, but circumstances preclude a discussion wherein the interloper gets consent from the victim to employ violence against the criminal). 行動についてよく語る。倫理では行動と行動者がある。行動しない行動者のことをどうする？乳児と意識不明の人だけではなく留守所有も犯罪中も含まれる。
In these circumstances, the active actor has no unqualified right to help the inactive actor. Such a right can only be acquired by consent. Regardless, the former may choose to help the latter before getting consent (which may not be forthcoming until too late), but when the latter is able to act, he can review the former’s actions on his person and property, and retroactively give or withhold his consent. こんな状況では行動する人は行動しない人を手伝う権利を持たない。そんな権利は承知の上にしか得られない。それにしても前者が後者を手伝うと選べるが、後者が行動する時に前者の行動を検討して遡及的に承知を与えるか拒絶するかが決めれる。
With regard to infants, this means that he can sue his guardian for damages when he grows into the exercise of this right. This has a lot of implications, but we’ll go too far afield if we pursue them now. Suffice it to say that Rothbard is basically correct. 乳児の件には権利を振るうように育った乳児が後見人を訴えれる。含意が山ほどあるが、追ったら長すぎになる。今ではロスバードがあらかたに正解でござると言おう。
However, as children grow older, it is a little bit oversimplified to say that the only way they get adult rights is when they leave home. They have other options as well. だが育っていく子供が家出だけで権利を得れるとは単純化しすぎでござる。他にも方法がある。
It’s interesting to note that Hillary Rodham had some good things to say in 1973, quoted in a footnote in this chapter. 面白いことにヒラリー・ロドハムが１９７３年にいいことを書いた。この章の脚注に引用された。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 13, Revisited

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Reviewing this chapter again, I noticed that Rothbard did (parenthetically) include interest (p. 88) in reparations, which means that he didn’t completely disregard the time dimension of crimes. So I was mistaken in much of my comments yesterday. またこの章を読みながらロスバードが（挿入句で）利子（ｐ．８８）を刑罰に含めたことに気付いた。だから犯罪の時間を完全に無視しなかった。と言うことで、拙者が昨日書いたものの一部が間違った。
However, I remembered an important insight on the topic that had earlier slipped my mind. だが、この話題について今まで忘れていた大事な洞察を思い出した。
A temporary crime deserves a temporary punishment. 一時的な犯罪には一時的な刑罰が適当でござる。
This is only fitting, if the criminal should forfeit his rights to the extent that he violated others’ rights. So, theft can be punished (after the goods are recovered) with a temporary loss of the same value and duration, as near as can be assessed. Alternatively, since temporary possession has a price (rent, or interest for money), courts may sentence the criminal to restitution of the original goods plus rent/interest, instead of setting up a schedule for a new temporary transfer of property. This is the reason that my opinion is that principal-plus-interest proportionality will obtain in the free society. 犯罪者が他人の権利を破った程自分の権利を失うならばそれだけが適当でござる。盗みの場合では盗んだ所有品を返した後同等な品を同期に没収されることで刑罰される。代わりとして、一時的な所有には値段があるから細かいことを避けて法廷が所有品の賠償と借り賃で刑罰できる。これは元金と利子の比例が広まる理由になると思う。
On the other hand, for permanent crimes, such as a lost tooth, my assessment doesn’t differ from Rothbard’s, aside from favoring single-proportionality. その一方、歯を無くすような永久な犯罪について一重比例以外ではロスバードと意見が異ならない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 13, Continued

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Yet, the attentive reader may notice that I have written of proportionality with approval. This comes from historical examples of stateless justice. While past example cannot be assumed perfect, the proportionality of Common Law affords proportionality a plausible chance of adoption by the free society. それにしても注意深い読者が気付いただろう、拙者が比例の刑罰原則のことを賛成しそうに書いたことに。それが歴史上の例からの結論だ。政府外の正義制度に比例性がある。過去の例は必ず正しいなんて確定できないが、コモン・ローの比例性の例で自由社会にも比例性が現れる可能性があると思われる。
For what it’s worth, my best guess is that single-proportionality, of the principle-plus-interest variety, will be most common. There will be cases where the settlement is less and cases where the settlement is more, but this is my guess for the typical case in the typical court. 拙者の推定では利子付き一重比例が普通の原則になる。もちろん、それ以下に承諾する被害者とそれ以上に承諾する犯罪者も現れるが、普段の訴訟が普段の法廷にそうなると推定する。
Rothbard’s examples suffer from an inconsistency: they measure the magnitude of the crimes incompletely, according to his theory itself, to-wit: “the criminal loses his rights to the extent that he deprives another of his rights” (p. 85, italics in original). Deprivation of rights is what we should measure, then. Take two examples, “Deprived the victim of 10 oz. gold for thirty days,” and “Deprived the victim of 10 oz. gold for thirty years.” These are different crimes, and should therefore deserve different punishments. ロスバードの理論と例が不整合を持つ。理論の「犯罪者が奪い取る権利の程度だけ自分の権利を失う」（ｐ．８５）に従おうとするが、不完全にその程度を測る。奪い取った権利を測るだろう。例として「十個の金貨を三十日間に奪い取った」と「十個の金貨を三十年間に奪い取った」を考えよう。犯罪が違うために違う刑罰になるべきだ。
Yet, when Rothbard describes some crimes later in this chapter, he doesn’t consider duration of deprivation. “Theft of $15,000,” say no more. Return the $15,000, then (because Rothbard advocates double-proportionality), pay another $15,000. To frame it with the two durations described above, if the criminal only held the money for thirty days, the victim gets a good “return on investment”, but if he held it for thirty years, the victim gets a pretty bad return on investment. Any investor of capital could easily make a case that they were not only deprived of $15,000, but also of the interest that money would have earned them over thirty years. Rothbard could then double both, in accordance with his stand for double-proportionality. だが、ロスバードが犯罪を話した時に奪い取りの間を考えなかった。「一万五千ドル」だけだった。一万五千ドルを返して、そしてロスバードの二重比例を満たすためまた一万五千ドルを払うべき、と。以上の例の間を考えたら、三十日間の場合では被害者が海老で鯛を釣ることになるが、三十年間では資本利益率が別に良くない。一万五千ドルだけじゃなくその三十年間の利子をも奪い取った論を立てる。その後に二重比例に従ってロスバードが倍にするべきだ。
“But,” you might object, “the criminal didn’t intend to steal for a limited time, nor could the victim expect the money to return to him in one.” But, let me repeat, “the criminal loses his rights to the extent that he deprives another of his rights.” The state of mind of the participants is irrelevant to this, and considering it is an invitation to perjury (a highly discouraged state in jurisprudence) to both parties, it should be abandoned entirely. 「そうだけど犯罪者が限られた間だけ奪い取ったつもりがなかったし被害者も限られた間だけ期待しなかった」と反対する人があるだろう。「犯罪者が奪い取る権利の程度だけ自分の権利を失う」と拙者が繰り返す。両方の思考は関係ない。そしてその思考を加えたら両方に偽証の誘惑になる。法学では非常に抑止されている状態だから丸ごと捨てるべきだ。
With one final observation, that double-proportionality gives incentive to the evil practice of entrapment, I conclude here. 二重比例が邪悪なエントラップメントの実行に動機を供給することを述べて、これで終わる。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 13: Punishment and Proportionality

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Rothbard opens this chapter by lamenting that libertarian punishment theory is in a sad state. 自由意思論の刑罰原則は不適当であると、ロスバードがこの章を始める。
No wonder, I reply. There is no such theory, in my view. 「当然だ」と拙者が答える。そういう原則なんてないから。
How much should the criminal do, give, or be subjected to, in order to redeem his good name? Whatever he and his victim agree to. 犯罪者はどの侘び・罰で自分の名誉を回復する？被害者と同意することで。
Some advance the single-proportionality theory of punishment. Some, such as Rothbard and Dr. Walter Block, advocate double-proportionality. In common, they propose a set formula of punishments for crimes – not that different from the states’ arbitrary punishment schedules. Yet the formula is entirely moot if the victim and criminal choose to disregard it. If they should choose to submit their case to a court that uses another formula or a fixed schedule, that’s it; there’s nothing more to say. 一重比例の刑罰原則を昇進する人がある。ロスバードとウォールター・ブロック博士のような二重比例の刑罰原則の支持者もある。共通に決定した公式で犯罪から刑罰を解決しようとする。だが、犯罪者と被害者が無視すればその公式は無力だ。二人が違う公式か決定した計画を使用する法廷に訴訟を提出すればそれより言うことはない。
What’s Rothbard to say to that? If such a court attracts plaintiff/defendant clients, despite breaking Rothbard’s rules, what then? The libertarian order affords no opportunity to shut down successful businesses, and sanctimonious derision of the benighted masses is neither Rothbard’s style nor likely to be effective. こんな状況でロスバードがどう答える？公式を破る法廷が依頼人を引き付けれるとどうなる？自由の社会には成功する商売を閉鎖する機械はない。そんな商売を贔屓する卑しい大衆を信心深そうに非難することはロスバードの様式もないし効果的もなさそう。
When the plaintiff and defendant can’t agree on a court is the best situation for resorting to a formula to assure oneself that the punishment to be inflicted is just. But self-assurance in this style is really all it’s good for. 被告が法廷の判断に賛成しない場合では自分の刑罰の正義に請合うために公式を使うころだがそれは自信付けしかない。
It’s another attempt to manufacture certainty and finality. また確信をでっち上げることだ。
That’s it; it’s an attempt on Rothbard’s part to defeat uncertainty and risk. But it isn’t the theorist’s job to grapple with uncertainty – that role belongs to the entrepreneur. そうだ。ロスバードが不確定性を排除しようことだ。だが不確定性と争うことは哲学者の仕事じゃなく企業家の仕事だ。
In my framework, the plaintiff who acts to punish a defendant without an agreement necessarily faces uncertainty. He isn’t omniscient, so there is always a chance that he is making a mistake; for instance, the defendant may be innocent. Holding a mistaken guilty verdict does not justify harming an innocent. 拙者の制度では同意なく被告を刑罰しようとする原告は必然的に不確定性と直面する。全知じゃないゆえに間違いを犯している可能性がある。例えば被告が無罪である可能性。誤った有罪判決を持っても無罪者を傷つけることは正当にならない。
How can we deal with recalcitrant criminals, then? We don’t know, and can’t know; not yet. The entrepreneur of the free society will need to grapple with that. Perhaps a schedule of punishments will arise that reliably brings defendants to make trial arrangements with an acceptable cost on false positives. Perhaps exile (house arrest for land owners) will return to modern society. Or perhaps some other innovation entirely will emerge. どうやって反抗的な犯罪者に対処する？今では知れない。自由社会の企業家がその問題と取り組む。被告をその気にする頼りになる刑罰の計画は立ち上げれるかも知らない。流罪（不動産の所有者に軟禁）が現代に戻るかも知らない。それともまた未知な改革が現れるかも知らない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 12: Self-Defense

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Self-Defense is quite the issue. Is it a right? How much is rightful? If you exceed your rights, will you therefore owe reparations? 自衛は面白い問題だ。権利か？どこまで？権利を越したら賠償になるか？
Rothbard may have agreed with me, if I interpret a certain ambiguity correctly. This specifically relates to the interrelation of self-defense and punishment. Rothbard does state that excessive force in defense violates the rights of the original criminal, and that it exceeds proportionality. This means that self-defense is limited by proportionality just like punishment is, and (this is the interpretation I would like Rothbard to have held) that both added together must not exceed proportionality. ロスバードが拙者と同意したかも、ある曖昧を正しく解しているなら。自衛と処罰の関係についてだ。自衛のために過度な力は比例を越して本来の犯罪者への権利侵害になると、ロスバードが述べた。ならば、自衛も処罰のように比例に限定される。自衛と処罰を足して犯罪の比例を越さないべきだ、と拙者が主張する。ロスバードもそう信じたと思いたい。
I hold that there is no line between self-defense and punishment. The distinction is arbitrary (I’ll present my argument that this is so later), so I hold that it should be void, and self-defense and punishment should operate under the same rules. 自衛と処罰には境界はないと思う。そのけじめが勝手な決定だと後に論ずる。今じゃその境界を無力と見なして、両方を同じ法例の下で扱うべきにする。
Rothbard attacks the “maximalist” self-defense doctrine, whereunder execution is appropriate for any crime. It is correct to reject this; I mention it only as a reference for myself when I discuss Walter Block’s theories. ロスバードがどんな犯罪にも処刑で罰できる最大限定の自衛論を責める。これを否定するのは正解だけど、拙者がウォールター・ブロックの原理を話すときのために言い及ぶだけだ。
Just one quibble regarding a defendant tried in absentia (this relates more directly to my view on punishment, the next chapter): if the defendant doesn’t agree to be bound by the judge’s verdict, then he is not. The statement by the judge is just the statement of one man’s opinion, changes no one’s rights, and does not obligate the defendant to comply with the sentence. 次章に直接に関しているが、欠席裁判について異論を述べる。被告人が裁判官の判決に承知しないと従い義理はない。裁判官の宣言は一人の意見だけで、権利を変えない。被告人を判決に応じる義務を課さない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 11: Land Monopoly, Past and Present

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In this chapter, Rothbard largely talks about land issues in under-developed countries. He also describes how, when slavery was ended, the slaves should have received compensation – specifically, they should have gotten ownership of the lands they had worked. この章ではロスバードが開発途上国の不動産問題について話す。また、奴隷廃止の際に元奴隷は損賠（具体的に、働かせた地）を受けるべきだった。
Rothbard’s statements follow from his theory of land ownership (discussed before) and his theory of punishment (discussed ahead). However, I have modest detractions from both. ロスバードの声明は以上の不動産所有の理論と以下の刑罰の理論から当然になるが、拙者はその理論と少々違う原理を主張する。
In discussing under-developed countries, he specifically mentions a “latifundio” system in Latin America. He condemns it, but hardly describes it for us: “enormous expanses of land under a single landlord.” We can infer from a later statement (that some latifunists supported the violent dispossession of natives) that there was land engrossment, dispossession of rightful owners, and likely some enslavement and/or serfdom. 途上国についてロスバードがラテンアメリカに関してラティフンディウム制度を話す。非難するが、読者のために「大土地経営」としか定義しない。後の発言（あるラティフンディウムの所有者が原住民から奪取を支援した）から不動産禁止と所有権の奪取と奴隷制か農奴制があったと推量できる。
I wonder if, somewhere amongst the colonial grants in Latin America, there might be some that actually panned out like Pennsylvania: granted by the king, but nevertheless eschewing aggressive dispossession of the natives, and employing consensual labor. Then it might strictly qualify as a latifundium, but involve no crimes, so should be held as rightful ownership. ラティフンディウム制度の中のどこかに、ペンシルベニア植民地みたいに原住民に奪取を疎んじて承諾した労働を使った件もあったか、と拙者が疑う。そんな件があれば、ラティフンディウムに達するが犯罪がなくて権利な所有権と主張するべきだ。
Furthermore, I can only describe the assertion that managing an illegitimate latifundium is a continuing aggression as accurate in a sense that Rothbard did not intend (I’ll later consider interest owed for crimes). Since ownership derives from the rights to the fruits of one’s labor, the extent of a crime is: How much rightful benefit is the criminal depriving the victim of? If the latifundist is not currently enforcing land engrossment, dispossessing rightful owners, or employing slave labor, he may still owe reparations, but his “continuing aggression” is negligible, because the rightful owner’s labor from centuries ago would, by itself, bear only negligible fruits today. また、不適正なラティフンディウムを経営すること自体がなおも犯罪行動である主張がロスバードの意図と違う意味だけで正解と認める。所有権は労働の成果への権利から由来するから、犯罪の程度は権利な成果を取り上げた程だ。不動産禁止、権利奪取、奴隷制とか犯罪をしていないのなら、賠償を払うべき事があろうとも大昔の労働だけの今の成果が極小だから今の犯罪も極小だ。