The Ethical Theory of Socialism

Socialism, as I shall define it in ethics, is different from socialism as presently advocated as a governmental system. The socialist government controls, in theory, the means of production. Under ethical socialism, in contrast, the society controls everything and everyone. The socialist government can therefore be said to be an ethical hybrid: capital goods controlled by society (equated with the government), but consumer goods controlled by individuals. 拙者の倫理での瀟䌚䞻矩ずいう思想は珟圚に瀟䌚䞻矩ずいう政府ず違う。瀟䌚䞻矩の政府が理論䞊で生産手段を制す。瀟䌚䞻矩の倫理では瀟䌚が党おのものや党おの人を制す。それゆえ瀟䌚䞻矩の政府が倫理的な雑皮でござる。瀟䌚ず等しいずされた政府が資本財を制しお、人が個々に再取材を制せる。
Let it be clear that when I speak of socialism in ethics, I mean that the society has absolute control, and the individual has none. Also, it is the global society that is the relevant scope; the formation of a hundred and some individual units means they must interact with each other under individualist rules. Therefore the only pure socialism is global socialism. 明癜にしよう。拙者の蚀う倫理での瀟䌚䞻矩では、瀟䌚には絶察的な統制をする暩力があっお、個人には䜕の暩利もない。それに、瀟䌚が地球の芏暡にあたる。癟数十の政府ず蚀う「瀟䌚」では、政府が互いに「個囜」ずしお扱うしかできない。囜が倫理的な行動者になっお、個人の倫理が䜿わざるを埗ない。だから地球芏暡の瀟䌚䞻矩だけが玔瀟䌚䞻矩になる。
Now, let us consider how socialism can be realized. If it is right that society control everything, then society must exercise its will and do so. So, first, society must have a will. But does it? We as a species lack a lucid hive mind such as one might see in science fiction. 瀟䌚䞻矩がどのように珟実化する瀟䌚が党おを統制するこずが正しいなら、意思を行䜿しお統制するべきでござる。先ずは瀟䌚に意思があるこずでござる。その意思があるのか人類にはサむ゚ンス・フィクションで読めるような明晰な集合粟神がない。
The first necessary precondition for socialism is the existence of the will of society. Unlike individual wills, which are axiomatically present, it is not self-evident that society has a will. If a group of people gather with the intention of coming to agreement on some issue or course of action, they might very well reach an impasse. That group, in regard to that topic, does not have a unanimous will. Can we therefore say that there is no “will of the group?” Since even small groups can come to a dead end in deliberations, all the more reason to say that the will of all society does not exist. 瀟䌚䞻矩の最初の必芁条件は瀟䌚の意思の実圚でござる。個人の意思ず違っお、瀟䌚の意思が自明の理のように実圚しない。個人の集団が集たっお、ある論点で話し合いが付かないずころに着ける。その集団がその論点では異議のない意志がない。ならば「集団の意思」がないず蚀える小さな集団でも䞀臎に着けなくなるのもあるから、党瀟䌚には意思がない決断しやすい。
In order to salvage the idea of society’s will, there must be a convention (or set of conventions) that overrides all impasses. In keeping with the rule that all ethical actors are equal, these conventions must regard each actor as equal. 瀟䌚の意思の䞻匵を䜿えるようにするために、熟慮でどんな行き止たりでも瀟䌚の意思に到着する慣習を䜿わなきゃならない。行動者の党員が等しいずいう原則に埓っお、その慣習が党員の行動者を差別なく扱わなきゃならない。
I will not here delve into the various conventions that could be utilized. So many rules could exist, from necessary to substantive to frivolous. The ones that work in practice are the ones that will stand the test of time. If socialism is workable, time will reveal them, eventually. The prospective feasibility of this one versus that one would be valuable in getting from where we are to that state (if that is our goal); but for now, this blog only asks, “What would the ethical characteristics of that state be?” 今ここであらゆる慣習を芋ない。必芁なのから䞊滑りのたである。瀟䌚䞻矩が䜜甚できるならば、よく䜜甚する慣習を分かるのは時間の問題でござる。目的が瀟䌚䞻矩に蟿り着くこずになるず、慣習の比范的な䜜甚の査定が倧事なんだけど、このブログが今「瀟䌚䞻矩の倫理的な特城は䜕」だけを問う。
Once we have the will of society, that will then needs to propagate down to the individuals of society. They can’t know the right thing to do if the will of society does not reach them. There must be a system of conveying orders from society to its individuals. Much like the conventions that generate the will of society from the data provided by disparate individuals, the implementation of this system of dispersing society’s will hither and yon could vary considerably, and, if socialism is workable, eventually the best methods will make themselves evident. 瀟䌚の意思を掎めたら、次は瀟䌚の人々にその意思を䌝えるこずが必芁でござる。瀟䌚の意思が届かないず個人が正しいこずを分かられない。瀟䌚から個人に䜿呜を届く制床が必芁でござる。個人の意思から瀟䌚の意思を集合する慣習のように、この制床の実行が未知で瀟䌚䞻矩が䜜甚できるならば、よく䜜甚する制床を分かるのは時間の問題でござる。
This pure socialism, therefore, requires some set of conventions to compile a great deal of data into a “will of society,” and then a system of conveying to individuals everything that they must do. Then, if they are good, they obey. よっお、この玔瀟䌚䞻矩に必芁なものは瀟䌚の意思を䜜る慣習ず個人ぞ䜿呜を届く制床でござる。達成したら、良い個人が埓う。
It should be noted that the individual has cause to worry in blind obedience. If the conventions that generate the will of society are inaccurate, their orders will be bad. Likewise, if the system that propagates orders is not fidelitous to the will of society, their orders will be bad. Obedience, under such circumstances, is wrong. だが、個人が盲目的に埓うにも危険がある。瀟䌚の意思を䜜る慣習には間違いがあれば䜿呜が悪くなる。それに、䜿呜を届く制床が瀟䌚の意思に忠実床を維持しないず、届く䜿呜が悪くなる。悪い䜿呜を埓うのも䞍正である。

Rights vis-à-vis One’s Fellow Man

Man has rights over Nature; but what rights does he have with respect to his fellow man? I will only constrain this with the requirement that all men’s rights are equal, and from there conclude that individual rights are the only viable arrangement. As I found in The Ethics Of Liberty, there are only three basic positions available: individual rights, social rights, and no rights. 人は自然より暩利を持぀が、他人に぀いお䜕の暩利を持぀「党人類の暩利が等しい」の条件だけで、個人暩利だけが䜜甚する倫理ず結論する。「自由の倫理」に曞いたように、基本的な立堎は「個人暩利」、「瀟䌚暩利」、「無暩利」の䞉぀がある。
Under the arrangement of individual rights, every individual has property rights. So, every man has some property which he rightfully controls. This property is his personal sphere of autonomy. Within that sphere, he can do no wrong. We’ll examine the exact extents of this sphere of autonomy in due time, but for now, suffice it to say that Rothbard’s theory of individual rights is mostly correct. 個人暩利の䞋では党個人が所有暩利を持぀。で、各人には正しく制埡する所有がある。その所有が人の自治の領域でござる。その領域の䞭に、正しくない行動はない。近い時期にその自治の領域の限界を芋るが、今ではロスバヌドの個人暩利の理論がほずんど正確な理論ず蚀おう。
Under the arrangement of social rights, the society controls property. Extended to the individual man, his body and his labor are society’s, to direct as it sees fit. The individual has no rights; although his society might grant him some degree of autonomy, this autonomy is a mere privilege that society can revoke. He has no right to it, and society only allows it because it assesses that its right to control him is not, in some circumstances, worth exercising. 瀟䌚暩利の䞋では瀟䌚が所有を制埡する。各人の䜓や劎力も瀟䌚の指名のものでござる。個人には暩利はないが、瀟䌚が個人に倚少の自治を蚱すかも知らないが、瀟䌚がその自治を取り消せる。個人が自治の暩利を持たず、瀟䌚が蚱すのはただ「状況によっお制埡を実践するのは間尺に合わない」の刀断の結果だけでござる。
Then there’s the arrangement of no rights. If there is no action that is rightful, then it does fulfill the criterion that all men’s rights are equal, technically speaking. Zero does equal zero, after all. This arrangement, however, is a dereliction of the purpose of ethics: to differentiate right and wrong behavior. Further, as a practical matter, adherence to this theory would lead to chaos. 無暩利のは䜕だが、正しい行動がないず蚀うず、確実に零が零ず等しいように党人類の暩利が等しいずの条件が満たされるが、倫理の目的が正しい行動ず正しくない行動を差別するこずなら、この制床が倱栌でござる。それに、実甚化するず結果が無秩序でござる。
These being the basic arrangements, there do exist other, complex arrangements, that are hybrids of the above. The state of affairs in modern politics is a hybrid of individual rights and social rights; individuals have some rights, that society cannot infringe, and society has some authority, to which the individual must accede. At least, in theory, that’s modern politics. A more cynical take on it is that the state claims an arrangement of social rights, but allows autonomy to individuals, sufficient to forestall rebellion. この基本的な立堎ず別に耇雑な、以䞊の理論の合成物の制床もある。今の米囜の政治が個人暩利ず瀟䌚暩利の合成物で、個人には瀟䌚に䟵せない暩利がありながらも、瀟䌚には個人が埓わなきゃならない暩力がある。ず、蚀う理論だが、シニカルな芖線で芋るず、政府が瀟䌚暩利を芁求するが、半玉を拒むために倚少の自治を蚱す。
We reject the system of no rights out of hand. It is useless as an ethic, since it provides no guidance to behavior, and furthermore, this would result in the proverbial dog-eat-dog situation. Although wanton death and destruction would be wrong, so too would peace and prosperity be; since death and destruction are much easier and pay off quicker, we would see virtually nothing of peace and prosperity under this system. 「無暩利」の制床を絶察的に拒絶する。行動の指導に䜿えずもので倫理ずしお倱栌に加わっお、こずわざの犬食い犬の状況でござる。死亡ず砎壊が正しくないが、平和ず繁栄も正しくない。死亡ず砎壊が比范的に早く容易に成果をもたらすから、この制床では平和も繁栄もなくなる。
This brings us to the systems of individual rights and of social rights, which we shall call individualism and socialism. These, I will analyze in later posts. ず蚀うこずで、個人暩利ず瀟䌚暩利の制床個人䞻矩ず瀟䌚䞻矩のこずでござる。埌々の曞き蟌みに解析する。

The Time Element of Criminality and Punishment

Today, LewRockwell.com published an article by David Gordan titled, “Rothbard and Double Restitution” (originally published at Mises.org). I’ve often thought about single- and double-restitution, and while my conclusion on that particular might interest the reader, for now I wish to look at an aspect of restitution that seems to have been neglected in this theory: Time. 今日のがダノィッド・ゎヌドンの元はに発行された「Rothbard and Double Restitution」ずいう蚘事を発行した。拙者がよく䞀倍ず二倍の損害賠償を考える。その点の結論が読み手に面癜いかも知らないが、今は損害賠償の忘れた局面を芋たい。それが時間でござる。
As Rothbard himself put it, “the criminal loses his rights to the extent that he deprives another of his rights.” The extent of deprivation is not merely what the victim is deprived of, but also for how long, I contend. In the business of rentals and loans, the renter/loaner agrees to be deprived of some goods for some period of time, at a certain price. Given that (and many other observations on the topic of time preference), it may be inferred that duration of deprivation is economically important. ロスバヌドの曞いたずおり、「犯眪者が他者から暩利を奪取した皋床に犯眪者も暩利をうしなう。」奪取の皋床が䜕が被害者の奪取されただけではなく奪取された時間も含む、ず拙者が䞻匵する。賃貞料ず貞借には借し手がある䟡栌である時間に金品の奪取に承知する。それず他の時間遞奜の知識で、奪取の時間も経枈孊的に倧事なものず察知する。
This matters little to the proverbial tooth-for-a-tooth, as the victim loses a tooth for the rest of his life, then the criminal loses one or two teeth for the rest of his life. But consider Rothbard’s example, quoted by Dr. Gordon, of the theft of $15,000. Following Rothbard’s formulation, the criminal must return the $15,000, plus pay another $15,000 from his own assets or through his own labor. However, this is without any regard for how long the criminal was in possession of the money; ten minutes means the same thing as ten years. Rothbard did parenthetically add in interest foregone, but the instant he picks up the cash, the criminal is saddled with an immediate criminal liability of $30,000. こずわざの「歯には歯を」に差が小さい。被害者が残りの人生に歯を倱っお、犯眪者も残りの人生に䞀個か二個の歯を倱う。だが、ゎヌドン博士が匕甚したロスバヌドの䞀䞇五千ドルの盗みの䟋を考えよう。ロスバヌドの論で、犯眪者が䞀䞇五千ドルを返されるから、たた䞀䞇五千ドルを払わされる、自分の資産からか自分の劎力からか問わず。しかし、これが犯眪者が金を持った時間に関わらず損賠でござる。十分が十幎ず同じ結末になる。ロスバヌドがひそひそ話で損した利子も含んだけど、その金を取り䞊げた瞬間から犯眪者が䞉䞇ドルの刑事責任も取り䞊げた。
This places upon him an unfortunate economic incentive: to commit fully to his criminal act. We might like him to repent and return the $15,000, but he’ll then have to pony up another $15,000 or look forward to an extended period of indentured servitude. That’s a serious deterrent to backing out. Sure, the sooner he backs out, the less “interest foregone” he’ll have to worry about, but that’s a drop in the bucket in any given hour or day (even at a punitively high 20% interest rate, $30,000 costs only $16.44 per day). これが惜しい経枈的の誘因を起こす。犯眪者が犯眪に確玄する。奪った瞬間から最善の結末が犯眪者の悔い改めで䞀䞇五千ドルの返しでござるが、それに加わっお犯眪者が䞀䞇五千ドルの資金を払わないず幎季奉公で払う。匕っ蟌みには倧きいな抑止力になる。早く匕っ蟌むほど払和される損した利子が小さくなるが、日に日にそれが九牛䞀毛でござろ。蚎䌐的に高い二十の金利で、䞉䞇ドルが日ごずに十六ドル四十四セントだけの費甚を加わる。
“But if he returns it, the victim might forgive him,” you might say. Yes, he might. But he, too, is affected by the flip side of the same economic incentive. Should the criminal comes back begging forgiveness, the victim has a very significant incentive not to forgive. Accept the $15,000, then sell the remainder to a collections agency for a 10% discount? Not many people would object to making $13,500 in a day. 「でも、返したら被害者が蚱すかも」ず蚀うこずもある。そうかも。だが被害者もその経枈的の誘因の他面の圱響を䞎えられる。犯眪者が蚱しをお願いに来おも、被害者の蚱しに反する匷い誘因がある。元の䞀䞇五千ドルを受けお、残りを䞀割でサヌビサヌに売れば、䞀日で䞀䞇䞉千五癟ドルになる。
The human race is not blindly enslaved to economic incentives. But they most certainly respond to it on the margin. The result will be less repentance, and less forgiveness. 人類が盲目的に経枈的な誘因に埓うものではないが、確かに県界効甚に反応する。結果的に、悔い改めも蚱しも枛少する。
Bear that in mind, but let us set it aside for one single question. The purpose of an ethic, after all, is not to promote virtue, but to establish justice. I should be very happy if virtue and justice were correlated (if they could be measured and therefore statistically compared), but perhaps they aren’t. 忘れずに、䞀぀の質問に眮いおおこう。結局、倫理の目的が道埳ではなく、正矩である。正矩の倫理が道埳を匷化すれば拙者が喜ぶけどそうはならないかも知らない。
Ask yourself only this: If punishment should be proportional, is it proportional that a man who deprived another of something temporarily be, in punishment, himself deprived of something of similar value permanently? これだけを自分に尋ねお。刑眰が犯眪に比䟋するべきならば、他人から䜕かを䞀時的に奪取した人が盞䌌な䜕かを氞続的に奪取されるこずが比䟋的か吊か

Ownership of Nature

Let me reiterate a point I made while reviewing The Ethics Of Liberty: That Man can own Nature, but Nature cannot own Man. 自由の倫理の総説で䞻匵したこずをもう䞀床䞻匵しよう。人が自然を所有できるが、自然が人を所有できない。
Ownership is rightful control. Man can exercise control over elements of Nature, so therefore it is possible for him to exercise rightful control, that is, to own Nature. Nature, on the other hand, cannot control Man, so cannot own Man. 所有暩が正しい制埡である。人が自然の郚分を制埡できるから、正しく制埡するのが可胜でござる。ず蚀うず、人が自然を所有できる。逆にしお、自然が人を制埡できないから、人を所有できない。
A single man cannot control all of Nature; there is a limit to how much he can control. That limit is therefore also an upper limit of what he can rightfully control, i.e., own. That is a limit imposed by the nature of the world. Further limitations come from Society, as we shall see later. 䞀人が自然の党おを制埡できない。制埡には最倧限がある。その最倧限が正しい制埡の最倧限になる。それで、所有の最倧限になる。自然の質に固めた限界でござる。それに加わっお、瀟䌚も限界を定める。埌でその限界も語ろう。

Differentiating Nature and Society

Society, in an ethic, is the set of all ethical actors. How do we decide who, or what, is and isn’t an ethical actor? A typical modern decision is, all members of mankind are ethical actors, and everything else is not. But there have been others. 倫理孊での瀟䌚が党おの倫理的行動者でござる。どうやっお誰ず䜕が倫理的行動者である者ず倫理的行動者でない者を決める人類の党員が倫理的行動者であり、他の党おが倫理的行動者でないずいうのが普段の珟代の決断でござるが、他の決断もある。
In the past, some societies have established racial or religious prerequisites for classification as ethical actors, and the lesser men that the dominant class dealt with were not their equals, but inferiors. In some cases, they outlined “subhuman rights” (so to speak) for the inferior classes, and in other cases, treated them merely as elements of Nature: Things to avoid or eradicate or control, depending on what is pragmatic. 過去には人皮か宗教が条件で倫理的行動者ずしお認める瀟䌚があった。支配者が劣等者ず等しくなかった。䟋によっお支配者が劣等者の為に劣等人暩を認めた。別の䟋に、劣等者が自然の䞀郚しかなかった物でござった。敬遠するか、死滅するか、支配するかを実甚的に決めるべきでござった。
There is also the animal rights movement, that seeks to establish for all animals the rights previously reserved only for men. それに動物暩利の運動、動物にも今たで人にしか認められなかった暩利を認めるべきず䞻匵する運動でござる。
As I build the ethic of equals, I won’t answer this question. It’s unnecessary to the construction of the ethic. So, it will be valid for any answer to the question, provided only that all ethical actors are considered equal in the ethic. 匹敵者の倫理を建築しおも、拙者がこの問題を答えない。この倫理には必芁がない。で、答えには倫理的行動者の党員が匹敵者ずしお認めおいるだけで、匹敵者の倫理が成立する。
That does mean that some arrangements cannot use the ethic of equals. Where there is established superiority and inferiority, such as in racial or religious supremacy, that means a member of the superior class is not ethically equal to a member of the inferior class, and the ethic of equals cannot be applied to that society. それで、匹敵者の倫理を䜿えない瀟䌚もある。人皮的、宗教的な支配みたいに優䜍ず劣等があるず、優䜍者ず劣等者が匹敵しない故、その瀟䌚に匹敵者の倫理が成立しない。
I say ‘man’ to indicate an ethical actor in the ethic of equals; one who is ethically the equal of all the other members of Society. My opinion is that all mankind should be ethical actors, and all things that are not members of the human species should not be ethical actors. 匹敵者の倫理では、拙者の蚀う「人」が倫理的行動者ず意味する。瀟䌚の党員ず倫理的に匹敵する物でござる。拙者の意芋は、党人類が「人」である、そしお人類以倖の党おが「人」ではない。

The Central Question of Ethics

Ethics seeks to answer the question, What is right and what is wrong? Specifically, it is the philosophical study of classifying actions as right or wrong. An action, taken in context and judged through the lens of an ethics, can be judged as right or wrong. 倫理孊が「䜕が正しいかたたは䜕が正しくないか」ず蚀う問題を答えようずする。具䜓的に、倫理孊が行動を正ず䞍正に分類する哲孊でござる。呚りの状況を芋ながら倫理で行動を正か䞍正かの刀断ができる。
‘Right,’ as an antonym to wrong, shares its etymology with ‘rights’ in the sense of human rights or property rights. A man has a right to do something when his doing it is right. We can therefore frame the question of ethics as, What rights do men possess? 英語では“”「正」が“”「䞍正」の反察語だけじゃなく、“ ”「人暩」ず“ ”「所有暩」の“”ず語源的に繋がっおいる。人にはある行動をする“”があるず、その行動をするのが“”でござる。ある行動をする“”があるず、その行動が“”でござる。ずいうこずで、倫理孊の問題は「人は䜕の暩利を持぀」ず蚀える。
Now, a man doesn’t exist in a vacuum; the rights he possesses are necessarily tied to the context he inhabits. So, his rights are what is right with regard to his environment and his fellow man, to abstract his context down to its most basic elements. ず、人は真空で存圚しない。持぀暩利が必須に状況に瞛り぀けおいる。だから環境ず人間同士に぀いお正しい行動が暩利である。状況を最䜎限の物皮たで分節するずそうなる。
Dr. Jordan Peterson talks of this context in many of his lectures; he frames them as Nature, Culture, and The Individual.   がこの状況の物皮を「自然」、「文明」、ず「個人」ずしお講矩でよく語る。
We still need to clarify our terms more, however. ‘Right’ can mean ‘correct’ or ‘just,’ and ‘wrong’ can mean ‘incorrect’ or ‘unjust.’ Ethics deals with the concepts ‘right and wrong’ in the meaning of ‘just and unjust.’ Praxeology is the branch of philosophy that helps to assess actions as correct or incorrect (that is, right or wrong) for their intended purposes. ただ明らかにする必芁がある。“”が“”「正確な」も“”「正矩の」の意味をする。“”が“”「䞍正確な」も“”「䞍正矩の」の意味をする。倫理孊の正しさが正矩ず䞍正矩の抂念でござる。行動が目的に正確か䞍正確かの問題は人間行動孊の問題でござる。
So, what rights does a man possess? He has a right to do everything that is consistent with his ethical axioms. These again relate to the man in the context of his environment, or ‘Nature,’ and his fellow men, or ‘Society.’ While we could attempt to form an ethic where these elements are lacking or fundamentally different, it is first of all irrelevant to man’s actions in the reality we actually inhabit. Furthermore, it may be that we literally cannot successfully form an ethic without these elements because our ability to understand things at all is so deeply predicated on their presence. で、人は䜕の暩利を持぀倫理の公理に矛盟しない党おの行動をする暩利でござる。これがたた、環境ず瀟䌚の状況に関わる。その物皮が無い倫理、又は物皮が基本的に違う倫理を䜜ろうずする可胜性があるが、我々人類の実際のずころに関係がないため、無意味でござる。それにしおも、物皮の存圚に深すぎに基づいおいる故、その物皮が違う珟実に倫理を䜜れない可胜性もある。
I intend to derive this conclusion: Man has the right to control all that portion of Nature that he can, and Society has no right to infringe on that control, but the other members of Society also have the right to control what they can, and he cannot infringe upon that, either. 拙者がこの結論を由来する぀もりでござる「人ができるだけ環境を制する暩利を持぀。瀟䌚にはその制を䟵害する暩利がないが、他の瀟䌚の人もできるだけ制する暩利を持っお前者もその人の制を䟵害する暩利がない。」

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 30: Toward a Theory of Strategy for Liberty

In this final chapter, Rothbard describes some principles and strategies for the political success of liberty. He helpfully summarizes the principles: “that the victory of total liberty is the highest political end; that the proper groundwork for this goal is a moral passion for justice; that the end should be pursued by the speediest and most efficacious possible means; that the end must always be kept in sight and sought as rapidly as possible; and the means taken must never contradict the goal–whether by advocating gradualism, by employing or advocating any aggression against liberty, by advocating planned programs, or by failing to seize any opportunity to reduce State power or by ever increasing it in any area” (p. 264). この最終章でロスバヌドが自由の政治的成功のための原則ず攻略を述べる。芪切に原則を詰たった。「䞀぀、政治的に完党なる自由が最倧の目的だ。䞀぀、正矩ぞの道埳的な情熱がその目的の適切な基瀎だ。䞀぀、最速で䞀番効果的な方法で目的を远求するべきだ。䞀぀、目的をい぀も芋ながらできるだけ早く求めるべきだ。䞀぀、挞進䞻矩を䞻匵するこず、自由ぞの攻勢を䞻匵するこず、蚈画的な昇進を䞻匵するこず、政府の力を枛らす機䌚を捕たないこず、又は政府の力をどんな領域でも増やすこずで目的ず矛盟する方法を遞ばないべきだ。」
Regarding strategy, Rothbard advocates liberty-focused education and a liberty movement (including specialists that make a profession of championing these ideas). From time to time, it may be valuable to ally with people with whom we disagree on some (or many) issues; provided we can find an issue that we can agree on. This provides a double benefit of improving our chance of success and of converting such temporary allies to our central cause. 攻略でロスバヌドが自由教育ず専門家を含む自由運動をお勧めする。時々に倚少違う人々ず関係぀ける䟡倀がある。同意する点があれば、ずもにその点を求めるこずで損はない。成功の可胜性を向䞊し、関係぀けた人を自由ぞ治す可胜性で二぀の利がある。
Rothbard cautions against two strategic pitfalls: what he calls opportunism and sectarianism. Opportunists pursue results at the cost of principles; they betray their principles- in word or in deed- to boost their traction with the political class or the public at large, where they assess that the principles are not welcome. Sectarians scorn the pursuit of results as being ipso facto betrayal of principle; they advocate only the perfect realization of a complete system of liberty, and judge all other systems as equally evil- ergo, efforts to change anything are entirely wasted unless those efforts are devoted to advocating immediate establishment of their system. ロスバヌドが機䌚䞻矩ずセクト䞻矩の二぀の攻略的な地雷を泚意する。機䌚䞻矩者は原則を擁護するのが政治的な䞍利ず刀断しおその原則を犠牲にしお功瞟を远求する。セクト䞻矩者は成瞟を远求するこず自䜓が原則の裏切りだず非難する。完党完璧な自由の瀟䌚制床だけを䞻匵しお、それ以倖の制床が等しく邪悪であるず刀断しお、制床を進化する努力が無駄だ、ず。
Rothbard also advises to keep an eye out for crises; when a crisis strikes a society, that society may open up to radical change. But a focused liberty movement needs to be prepared to guide society at that point; lacking that, the society could very well change radically for the worse. 危機を臚むこずこそが機䌚だ、ずロスバヌドが助蚀する。瀟䌚の危機にはその瀟䌚が抜本的な倉曎に開けるかも知らない。だが集䞭力のある自由運動が瀟䌚を導く必芁がある。そんな自由運動がないず、瀟䌚が抜本的に悪化するこずになるかも知らない。
I think Rothbard’s principles leave at least one ambiguous situation. I once read a petition that proposed reducing State power in several ways, but increased it in one way. By refusing to sign this petition, did I uphold the principles by “never increasing State power in any area,” or did I fail the principles by “failing to seize an opportunity to reduce State power?” ロスバヌドの原則には曖昧な点がある、ず拙者が思う。昔に、拙者が政府の力をいろんな点で枛らす、䞀぀の点で増やす請願を読んだ。請願を眲名しないこずで、政府の力を増やさなかったから原則を擁護したのかそれずも、政府の力を枛らす機䌚を芋逃したから原則を裏切ったのか
This dovetails with the idea I have that injustice is unmeasurable, and incomparable between individuals, much like, in economics, utility is unmeasurable, and incomparable between individuals. 経枈孊では功利が枬れないこず、それに個人間的に比范できないこずず同様に、倫理孊では正ず䞍正が枬れないこず、それに個人間的に比范できないこずずいう拙者の論に関わる。

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 29: Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State

In this chapter, Rothbard discusses Robert Nozick’s attempt, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, to justify a minimal State as a natural result of anarchy. この章でロスバヌドがロバヌト・ノヌゞックの『アナヌキヌ・囜家・ナヌトピア』で無政府から生たれる囜家を正圓化の詊みを責める。
Rothbard helpfully sums up his main points in concluding the chapter: 章の終わりにロスバヌドが圹に立぀぀もりを䞊げる
  1. No existing State has been immaculately conceived, and therefore Nozick, on his own grounds, should advocate anarchism and then wait for his State to develop.
  1. 珟状には無原眪の埡宿りの囜家が䞀䟋も存圚しない。ノヌゞックは自分の理論に埓っお無政府を支持しおからその囜家を埅぀べきだ。
  1. Even if any State had been so conceived, individual rights are inalienable and therefore no existing State could be justified.
  1. そのような囜家があっおも個人の人暩は譲れないから囜家が正圓化できない。
  1. Every step of Nozick’s invisible hand process is invalid: the process is all too conscious and visible, and the risk and compensation principles are both fallacious and passports to unlimited despotism.
  1. ノヌゞックの芋えない手の過皋が無効だ。意識的ではっきり芋える。危険ず償いの原則が誀信で無限の虐政を招く。
  1. There is no warrant, even on Nozick’s own grounds, for the dominant protective agency to outlaw procedures by independents that do not injure its own clients, and therefore it cannot arrive at an ultra-minimal state.
  1. ノヌゞックの理論にでも支配的保護䌚瀟は自分の客に害がないず私立保護䌚瀟の行動を非合法化する正圓化がない。故に、超最小限の囜家たで届けない。
  1. Nozick’s theory of “nonproductive” exchanges is invalid, so that the prohibition of risky activities and hence the ultra-minimal state falls on that account alone.
  1. ノヌゞックの無生産な亀換の論が無効で危険な行動の非合法化もできないからその点だけでも章最小限の囜家が萜ちる。
  1. Contrary to Nozick, there are no “procedural rights,” and therefore no way to get from his theory of risk and nonproductive exchange to the compulsory monopoly of the ultra-minimal state.
  1. ノヌゞックず反しお、「手続き暩利」はない故に危険ず無生産亀換の論から超最小限囜家たで行ける道もない。
  1. There is no warrant, even on Nozick’s own grounds, for the minimal state to impose taxation.
  1. ノヌゞック自身の論にでも最小限囜家の皎の正圓化はない。
  1. There is no way, in Nozick’s theory, to justify the voting or democratic procedures of any State.
  1. ノヌゞックの論では投祚ず民䞻䞻矩を正圓化する方法はない。
  1. Nozick’s minimal state would, on his own grounds, justify a maximal State as well.
  1. ノヌゞックの最小限囜家が自分の論では最倧限囜家をも正圓化する。
  1. The only “invisible hand” process, on Nozick’s own terms, would move society from his minimal State back to anarchism.
  1. 芋えない手の過皋ずいえばノヌゞックの論に埓っお最小限囜家から無政府に戻るはずだ。
(p. 252-253) 
I have one question about Nozick’s method; regarding point 6 above, Rothbard quotes Nozick’s “procedural rights” as being, “[the] right to have his guilt determined by the least dangerous of the known procedures for ascertaining guilt, that is, by the one having the lowest probability of finding an innocent party guilty.” I can’t see how that advances Nozick’s case at all. Does he assert that the “dominant agency” uses the least dangerous procedure and the “independent agencies” don’t? That would explain how Nozick characterizes the independents as “risky,” but how does he try to justify that assertion? Rothbard should have clarified that point, I think. 拙者がノヌゞックの方法に぀いお䞀぀の質問を聞きたい。䞊の第六点でロスバヌドが匕甚したノヌゞックの手続き暩利の定矩は「䞀番安党な方法具䜓的に無眪者を有眪ず刀決する䞀番䜎い確率の方法で眪の有無を決められる暩利」で、どうやっおノヌゞックが進む「支配的䌚瀟」が䞀番安党な方法を䜿っお、「私立䌚瀟」がほかの方法を䜿う䞻匵があったかもしそうならノヌゞックが私立䌚瀟を危険ずしお扱うのを説明するが、その䞻匵をどうやっお正圓化しようずしたロスバヌドが明確するべきでござった、ず拙者が思う。
Rothbard also attacks the voting and/or democratic procedures of modern States, but that is only relevant if Nozick wrote an apologia for modern States. Yet most modern States don’t even come close to qualifying as minimal; did Rothbard neglect to mention some explicit defense of democracy in Nozick’s book? たた、ロスバヌドが珟圚の囜家の投祚ず民䞻䞻矩を責めるが、ノヌゞックが珟圚の囜家の謝眪をした堎合にしか関係がない。でも珟圚の囜家が最小限的ではない。ノヌゞックの本では民䞻䞻矩の擁護があったかロスバヌドがそう蚀わなかった。
Nevertheless, as Rothbard made a multitude of points that demolish Nozick’s thesis, I agree with his conclusion. ずいうこずでも、ノヌゞックの論を砎壊するロスバヌドの耇数の議論の匷さで、拙者も結論に合意する。

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 28: F.A. Hayek and The Concept of Coercion

In this chapter, Rothbard criticizes F.A. Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty for inadequacy in upholding liberty. While “defining freedom as the absence of coercion” is a good start, Hayek doesn’t define coercion well, applies inappropriate comparators to it, and even ends up saying in effect, “Coercion is okay, as long as certain conditions hold.” Rothbard rightly calls him out for these mistakes. この章でロスバヌドがフリヌドリヒ・アりグスト・フォン・ハむ゚クの自由の条件を自由の擁護で䞍足ずしお責める。「自由は匷制の䞍圚」ず定矩するのがいい初めだが、ハむ゚クが匷制を曖昧的に定矩しお、䞍適切な比范を行っお、結局「ある条件で匷制が悪くない」ず蚀う。この間違いにロスバヌドがダメ出しする。
Hayek defines coercion as “control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another (so) that, in order to avoid greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another” (p. 219). Rothbard observes that this includes not only aggressive violence (which is proper), but also much non-aggressive action as well. ハむ゚クは匷制が「人の環境や状況を他人に操られお、より倧きい悪を防ぐために自分の蚈画ではなく他人の為に行動させる」ず定矩する。これは攻勢的な行動だけではなく攻勢でない行動も含める、ずロスバヌドが述べる。
Rothbard shortly cites an example wherein Hayek allows one such non-aggressive ‘coercion’ on the grounds that outlawing it would result in “even greater coercion,” and objects that we can’t compare instances of coercion as greater or lesser, because they are not additive. In other examples, Hayek finds, variously, the threat of a worker’s dismissal, tyrannical job management, and monopoly provision of ‘vital goods’ as all being coercive. Rothbard disagrees. 盎にロスバヌドがハむ゚クの䟋を語る。ハむ゚クが「より倧きい匷制を防ぐため」ある攻勢でない匷制を蚱す。匷制の匕合が足せなくお「より倧きい」ず刀断できない、ずロスバヌドが述べる。別の䟋で、ハむ゚クが劎働者の免職の脅迫も圧政な営業も必芁品の独占も匷制だず刀断する。ロスバヌドが盞反する。
Hayek also fails to differentiate aggressive and defensive violence, lumping them both together and then (following the above mistake of comparing coercions as if they were cardinal quantities) asserting that the goal is to minimize it all. Thus, self-defense is just as undesirable as aggression, in his system. ハむ゚クが攻勢的な暎力ず自衛的な暎力を芋分けない、䞡方を「匷制」ずしお扱っおお以䞊に曞いたように匷制を「より倧きい」ず刀断する間違いを基にしお匷制の総合を最小化する目的を䞻匵する。ずいうこずで、自衛も攻勢ず同じように奜たしからざるものだ。
Hayek asserts that the State is a system set up by society to minimize this concept of coercion. First, Rothbard points out, that’s not historically accurate of any State, ever. Second, it’s only tenable in Hayek’s framework because aggression and self-defense are treated the same, because the State relies upon aggression. Were the two differentiated (as in Rothbard’s theory), the State is obviously unjust. 政府は瀟䌚がこの匷制を最小化する為に立った制床だ、ずハむ゚クが述べる。ロスバヌドの異論は、たず、歎史䞊にその為に政府を立った䟋は䞀床もない。たた、ハむ゚クの芋分けなかった匷制の論理で政府が攻勢にしか頌らないこずが芋えない。ロスバヌドの理論のように攻勢ず自衛を分けたら、政府が䞍正であるこずが明癜だ。
Hayek continues to blunder by disqualifying some types of aggression from coercion. Calling back to his definition, if you can plan for something, it’s not coercive. So, as long as it’s general, impersonal, and predictable, you can make plans taking it into account, so the State’s subjects are not coerced. This is incorrect, and easily falls prey to a reductio ad absurdum at Rothbard’s hands. ハむ゚クがただ過ちを繰り返しお、数䟋の攻勢を匷制から倖す。定矩に響いお、蚈画ず立おれば匷制がない。䞀般的で事務的で予枬の぀くものなら蚈画で埋め合わせれるから政府が誰も匷制しない。これが䞍正解でロスバヌドにおいお簡単に背理法で萜ちる。
Rothbard’s parting shot is, “For Hayek, government – and its rule of law – creates rights, rather than ratifies or defends them” (p. 229, italics in original, citing Professor Hamowy). ロスバヌドの最埌の䞀蚀は、「ハむ゚クにずっお、政府ずその掌理が暩利を擁護するじゃなく補䜜する。」、ハモりィ教授を匕合に出す
From my perspective, Hayek seems to place emphasis on planning. It’s in his definition of coercion. A man needs to be able to plan, and as long as he is, he’s free. He later downplays taxation and conscription as something you can compensate for in planning, and therefore not coercive. It’s as though no positive law is bad, or can be bad, if it is predictable for the sake of a man’s plan-making. This would decrease regime uncertainty, to a degree of beneficial result; but as a theory of ethics I find Rothbard to be entirely correct in lambasting it. 拙者の意芋ではハむ゚クが「蚈画」に匷調を付ける。匷制の定矩にも珟れる。人が蚈画を立おれなければならない。そしおそう出来れば、人が自由でござる、ず。埌で皎ず城兵制が蚈画で埋め合わせれるから匷制じゃないず述べる。蚈画を立おるために予枬の぀く実定法が悪いだなんおありえないようでござる。政府の䞍確定性が枛るこずでいい圱響が出るが、倫理の理論ずしおロスバヌドの責めが党然正しいでござる。
Rothbard attacks Hayek at one point for treating coercion as susceptible to more-than/less-than comparison. It’s similar to the interpersonal comparison of utility concept from economics. So, we can’t say that one regime is more coercive than another? He has a point… but he has also condemned (among other examples) the Constitution as worse than the Articles of Confederation. On what ground can he assert that, if we cannot say one regime is more coercive than another? 匷制が「より倧きい」や「より小さい」ず刀断できない、ずロスバヌドがハむ゚クを責めた。経枈孊の功利みたいに個人間では比范できないようでござる。ずいうこずで、䞍正な制床も比范的に匷制的なのが刀断できないじゃない芋どころだけど、別の曞ではロスバヌドがアメリカ合衆囜憲法より連合および氞遠の連合芏玄のほうが正しかったず䞻匵した。状況の匷制を比范できないなら、その刀断がどう基づく
I think that’s right. We can’t say, “This regime is better than that regime,” but we can say, “This regime burdens fewer people, and less than, that regime.” But going from the latter to the former is utilitarianism, which we’ve already condemned. 正しいず思う。「この政府があの政府よりいい」ず蚀えない。「この政府があの政府ず違い圢で別の人を苊しめる」ず蚀える。だが、埌方から前方に着くために先に責めた功利䞻矩ずか䜿わなきゃならない。
I don’t have an answer to this conundrum yet. I will return to it another time. 拙者はこの問題に答えがただ持っおいない。埌で考えに垰る。

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 27: Isaiah Berlin on Negative Liberty

In this chapter, Rothbard criticizes Isaiah Berlin’s rival theory of liberty. Berlin advances “negative liberty” as contrasted to “positive liberty,” meaning freedom from interference from others versus freedom to do any particular action. This seems the same as Rothbard’s theory, just approaching from a different direction, but Berlin defines his terms ambiguously, leading him to diverge from Rothbard. この章でロスバヌドがアむザむア・バヌリンの自由理論を責める。バヌリンは積極的自由に反しお消極的自由を支持する。それは「出来る自由」より「他者の力からの自由」のほうだ。別の方針からロスバヌドの理論ず䌌おいるず芋えるが、バヌリンが甚語の定矩が曖昧でロスバヌドから離れる。
Berlin defines freedom as “opportunity for action,” resulting in grave confusion. So, one man’s action changing another man’s opportunities is a violation of “negative liberty.” As such, Berlin eventually attacks laissez-faire to placate his critics. In addition to historical mistakes in the examples he cites rendering his conclusions invalid, Rothbard points out that attacking laissez-faire, the system wherein personal economic freedom is at a maximum, as harmful to liberty means he is in fact defending positive liberty. バヌリンには自由が「行動の機䌚」で混乱に萜ちる。人の行動で別人の機䌚が倉わるず消極的自由の違反になる。で、結局バヌリンが批刀者を宥和するためにレッセフェヌルを責める。その䟋の歎史の間違いで結論が無効っおこずに加わっお、個人の経枈的な自由を最倧限たで増やすレッセフェヌルを自由に害するず責めれば実際に積極的自由を擁護するこずになる、ずロスバヌドが述べる。
I must say that, given what Berlin eventually defended, it’s surprising that he is considered a defender of liberty at all. The ideas of negative and positive liberty have outlived him, though, and still have some value today (when properly defined). バヌリンが最埌に擁護したこずを芋れば、自由の擁護者ず蚀われるのが驚きでござる、ず拙者が思う。だが積極的自由ず消極的自由が今も䟡倀がある、定矩が正しければ。