| Ethics of Liberty’s second chapter describes natural law in more detail. One statement he makes is, “The natural law ethic decrees that for all living things, “goodness” is the fulfillment of what is best for that type of creature; “goodness” is therefore relative to the nature of the creature concerned.” This is well stated, and perhaps a good idea; but to use it makes the ethic necessarily dependent on man’s nature. I believe it need not be so. | 自由の倫理の二章は自然法を人類の性質に由来して細かく説明する。ひとつの生命は”自然法は全生き物に”善”があの生き物に一番良いことを満たす；だから”善”はその生き物の性質に相対的だ。”よく言ったものだ、そして良い考えかも知らないが、そうすると論の全部が人類の性質に依存する。それは必要ないと、拙者が思う。 |
| For one thing, the proposition of the “New Socialist Man,” the man who would inhabit the socialist utopias, is a “man” with a significantly different nature than the “man” that Rothbard analyzes. Setting aside the apparent impossibility of changing man’s nature, if the proponents of the New Socialist Man theory are taken seriously, a new ethic must be elaborated that is based on this nature. | そうすれば、”新社会主義人”、社会主義の空想を住むといわれる人が、ロスバードの見た”人”とかなり違う”人”だ。人の性質を変える不可能性をさて置いて、この新会社主義人の提案を考えたら、それに由来して新しい倫理を作らないとならない。 |
| For another, should mankind ever find intelligent life aside from themselves, unless the newcomers should happen to possess a nature identical to man’s, then they, too, will require an ethic. | あと、もしも人類が別の知的生命を発見すれば、その生命が人類と同じ性質を持たないと、また別の倫理が必要になる。 |
| By simply presuming that there exist a number of ethical agents, each ethically equal, we can elaborate an ethic that applies to men as we know them, to the New Socialist Man, and to relations between sentient creatures of considerable variation. | 複数の匹敵するエージェントを仮定して、我々の人類の人にも、新社会主義人にも、そして様々な知的生命体にも応用する倫理を作られる。 |
| Rothbard also has a quote from John Wild: “why are such principles felt to be binding on me?” Indeed this is a good question. Why adopt this ethic, as opposed to some other? | それにロスバードがジョンワイルド（Ｊｏｈｎ Ｗｉｌｄ）の”どうしてそんな原則が私に義務的である？”を引用する。たしかに良い質問だ。何で別の倫理じゃなく、こんな倫理を採用する？ |
| Ethics guide one’s actions. When interacting with others, some ethic must guide one’s actions in relating to the others. Those actions can be inspected, and the ethic behind them deduced. Invariably, many men’s actions will indicate that they act as equals with other men, and some men’s actions will indicate that they act as unequals with other men. We will later examine some reasons for choosing one or the other of these, but for now, let us simply assert that men should interact as equals with each other. | 倫理は人の活動を導く。別の人と絡むと、なんかの倫理がその活動を導く。その活動を視れば本ずいた倫理を推理できる。必ず、ある人は別人と匹敵する活動を見せる、そしてある人は別人と匹敵しない活動を見せる。あとで決める理由を見るが、今は匹敵者として活動しなければならないだけを断言しよう。 |
| To answer the John Wild’s question, you operate under some principles anyway; we need only inspect your actions to know them. Then we can assess your principles as just ones or unjust ones, based on criteria of justice (which we will examine in later posts). | ジョンワイルドの質問を答える。どうしても何かの原則を義務として使ってるから。見れば分かる。そうしてその原則を正しいか正しくないか判断できる、あとで調べる正義の基準で。 |
Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 2: Natural Law as “Science”
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