Author: Brian Wilton

I'm a libertarian. I prefer reading articles and books to listening to podcasts, although I hear that podcasts are more popular. Call it Picard's Syndrome.
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 10: The Problem of Land Theft

  By
This is the first of two chapters dealing with real estate. Rothbard here defines land engrossment as claiming unowned land without labor investment, and finds it invalid and therefore enforcement of it is criminal. He claims that land ownership is permanent until abandonment. He attacks the common law doctrine of adverse possession, and a land practice he labels feudalism (which does not correspond exactly with the historical concept). これは不動産の二章の第一章だ。ロスバードが不動産禁制（“Ｌａｎｄ　Ｅｎｇｒｏｓｓｍｅｎｔ”）を労働投資なく不動産所有主張と定義する。無力な主張であって、その主張の強行が犯罪と判断する。不動産の所有権が捨てない限り永久なものと主張する。コモン・ローの逆所有（“Ａｄｖｅｒｓｅ　Ｐｏｓｓｅｓｓｉｏｎ”）と不動産独占（“Ｌａｎｄ　Ｍｏｎｏｐｏｌｙ”）を攻める。
The engrossment bit is good, and the attacks on feudalist land theft and adverse possession have some merit, but are still greatly flawed. The proposal of perpetual land ownership is flat-out mistaken, however. 不動産禁止の判断は正しいが、逆所有と不動産独占への攻撃には正しい点と間違えた点がある。不動産の永久所有権は全然な間違いだ。
Permanent ownership is a mistake because we acquire ownership through labor (as I described last time), and the fruits of our labor do not persist forever without maintenance. Property rights are rightful claims to the fruits of our labor, so insofar as those fruits are perishable, so are our property rights. 人は労働で所有権を得る、と前回に主張した。労働の成果は保たずに永久に続かないから永久所有権は間違いだ。
Adverse possession does accrue in my view, after a fashion. In Rothbard’s framework, suppose some speculator decides to homestead a huge swath of land, but to comply nominally with the rules, he invests one hour of (likely hired) labor in minimal land improvements per ten acres he claims. He then sits on his claim for a few decades, to let the land’s value appreciate; meanwhile, his improvements degrade to barely discernible, but his title is established, so he doesn’t need to invest in maintenance. Then a genuine settler comes along and decides to settle on some of the speculator’s land (knowingly or not). By the time the speculator takes action, the settler has been on a forty-acre parcel for three months, investing seven hundred twenty hours of his own labor in it. Rothbard would have to side with the speculator, who decades ago invested four hours of labor in that forty acres, over the new settler, who has more recently invested a hundred sixty times as much labor. Incidentally, if the settler can’t afford to take his investment with him, then the speculator gets to keep it, free. 逆所有は拙者の原理では違い方法で起こる。ロスバードの原理のもとで、投機家が巨大な領土を所有するためにある程度の（多分、雇用な）労働投資を満たす。所有権が固定した時から値上がるために数十年を待つ。その時間で投資の証拠が劣化して弁えがたくなるけど、所有権が固定だから保つことが必要ない。その点で入植者が現れ、投機家の領地の一部に納まろうとする。投機家が行動するまでは半年で、入植者は投機家の投資の数十倍を使う。ロスバードが投機家の肩を持たなきゃならない。ついでに、入植者が地から投資を引き出せない場合では投機家がただで持ち得る。
What Rothbard has done is allow land engrossment, only requiring more investment than some other systems do. 不動産禁制に達するだろう。別の原理より高い投資が必要だけだ。
I assert that the settler has a stronger claim than the speculator, and if they submitted their claims to mediation, the mediator might decide that he owes the speculator a nominal fee as compensation and thereafter owns the land. 拙者は入植者の方が投機家より所有権が強いと主張する。居中調停に頼れば、調停者が入植者から投機家に名ばかりの罰金を払えることで入植者が所有者と認める、と判断できる。
This is not how adverse possession works in common law, of course. もちろん、コモン・ローの逆所有とかなり違うだけど。
Moving on to feudalist land theft, Rothbard is again incorrect in advocating dispossession when the original victims are lost. Once again, he’s willing to punish the bad guy for the sake of punishment, not for the benefit of his victims. I again assert that where the victim cannot be found, nobody has the right to punish the bad guy. If, on the other hand, the feudal land thief with lost victims aggresses against someone else, he can be punished for that. Enforcing serfdom (of new victims) on his land, for instance, might result in his forfeiting the land to the serfs, when he is brought to justice. 不動産独占について、ロスバードがまた被害者が紛失したら悪者を被害者のためじゃなく罰するためだけに所有権を取って罰する。拙者がまた、被害者が見つけられない場合では誰にも犯罪者を罰する権利はないと主張する。だけど、犯罪者には別の違反を犯したら、その被害者が罰できる。例えば、独占した地に農奴制度を使用したら正義が農奴にその地の所有権を移転することができる。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 8, Revisited

  By
Rothbard asserts that everybody owns their own bodies, as we saw earlier. Of the available choices (ownership by ownself, or by all of society, or by some arbitrary other person), he chose self-ownership. Naturally, it extends to every man’s labor. The same choices apply, and Rothbard again picks self-ownership. Every man owns his own body, and his own labor. 前に書いたようにロスバードがみんなは自分の体を所有すると主張する。選べる選択（自分所有、共同所有、他人所有）から自分所有を選ぶ。もちろんみんなの労働にも同じ選択があって、ロスバードがまた自分所有を選ぶ。人々全員が自分の体と自分の労働を所有する。
Who owns everything else, the resources of the natural world? It starts off unowned, but Rothbard says that if a man mixes his labor with it, then he owns that part of it. This creates property in tangible resources. He then owns that property thereafter, until he abandons it or transfers it to another. では、誰が世界の自然資源を所有する？始めに所有者がないけど、ロスバードがこう主張する：人が自分の労働と自然資源を混ぜたら、その自然資源を所有する。それで所有権が現れる。そのときからあの人がその物を所有する、捨てるか他人に上げるまで。
I take a different approach. As we found that men own their own bodies, and their own labor, they also own the fruits of their labor. When they exert labor on natural resources, they can rightfully claim and control the benefits that result; this “right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labor, by having rightful control over those fruits as embodied in transformed resources” we can call “property rights.” 拙者は別の理屈を主張する。人の体のように、人の労働のように、人の労働の成果をも自分所有になる。自然資源に労働を行使すればその利を権利として制御できる。この「変えた資源を権利の制御で労働の成果を享受する権利」は「所有権」と言う。
This formulation has a couple important corollaries; one is that all property rights degrade over time. For instance, if one man builds a sandcastle on an unowned beach, he has a property right in it, and if another man comes and kicks it down, that is a criminal violation of the first man’s property rights. If, however, he leaves the sandcastle unmaintained for some time, the ocean will destroy it. Then, he owns nothing, although he used to have a property right. この理屈には大事な系がある。一つは、全所有権は時が経つと落ちる。例えば人が所有者のない海岸に砂の城を作り上げたら、その砂の城を所有する。他人が蹴り落としたらそれは所有権に犯罪だ。所有者が砂の城を保たずに放って置いてて海が破れば、所有権が持ったけどそれで何の所有権がない。
(Typically, serious labor investment is reserved for property rights much less ephemeral than this, but it applies, on some time scale, to all property rights.) （本気な労働投資は普段こんなはかない所有権に使われていないがある時間の比較で全所有権に当てはまる。）
Another corollary is that, since property rights are functionally defined rather than spatially defined, they can spatially overlap without conflict. One example is a shared road. All parties using it (and by doing so, transforming it from a natural state of plant growth to a dirt road) have a property right in it, for the functions it serves. Each can contest changes that impact functionality, such as erecting a building on the road, but they can’t contest changes that do not, such as paving the road while no other parties happen to be using it. またの系は、所有権が空間ではなく機能で定義されるから、複数の所有権は同じ空間で対立せずに重ねる。共有の道路は一例だ。複数の利用者の通りかかりで道路が自然の植物を踏みにじって道を作れ、使用者の全員がその道に所有権を持つ。道に建物を立つような機能を害する行動を論争できるが道を舗装するような機能を害しない行動を論争できない。
It can be argued that overlapping claims such as these are not all of the same strength; those that invest more labor (and other resources) have more claim on the property, such as the one who paves the road in the previous example. We might say he “owns the road,” a property right in the road, but the other users would have an easement to use it, which are also property rights in the road. こんな重ねた所有権は全て同じ力じゃないと主張できる。もっと労働と別の資源を投資したものはもっと強い所有権を持つ。上の例では舗装したものが所有権を持つと他の使用者が地役権を持つように定める。
So, this is how men come to own property in the material world. これで人が自然の資源を所有することができる。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 9: Property and Criminality

  By
Here Rothbard defines crime as an aggression against property. Rothbard laid out a system of just property definition in the last chapter, which I haven’t commented on yet. I shall return to it tomorrow. ロスバードがここで犯罪を財産に侵略することとして定義する。ロスバードが前の章で財産の定義をしたけど、いまだ拙者がそれについて書いていない。明日にその話題に戻る。
This chapter takes some time to emphasize that only just ownership can make for crime in this way, and mere possession is not ownership. Some possessor may be a criminal rather than an owner. We can determine who is the owner only by examining the data of the case. この章は公正な所有だけに犯罪が起こる。所有するだけで公正になるとは限らない。所有者は犯罪者であることもある。公正な所有者を明確するために情報を調査しなきゃならない。
Later I will speak of interlopers. These are passersby who intervene in a violent altercation. They risk defending an unjust property claim, because they do not know the case data. They take other risks as well, which I will canvas when the time comes. 拙者は後で余計者のことについて話す。これは乱暴な状況に干渉するものだ。情報が知らない限り公正でない所有を守る危険をもたらす。他の危険をももたらすが、時が来たら話そう。
Rothbard takes the time to attack utilitarians- they must defend any property title they are presented with, because they have no theory of justice. But is that really their only option? As a branch of Consequentialist Ethics, which we described last time, they just want the best outcome. Can’t we make a case that the best outcome results from upholding property titles that are justly derived, rather than some other arbitrary system of property titles? ロスバードが功利主義を攻める。「正義の原理がないゆえどんな所有権でも守らなきゃならない」と。でも本当にそれしかできないのか？前回に話した帰結主義の支部である功利主義は最善な帰結を目指す。公正な所有権を持ち上げることが最善な帰結を起こすと議論できるじゃないか？
Rothbard speaks his conviction that the impetus for many social changes (for the worse) “in [his] time [was] a moral indignation.” He lists Marxism and anarchosyndicalism. ロスバードが“私たちの人生で道徳的な憤りが”様々な（不利な）社会変更を起こした信念を言う。マルクス主義と無政府組合主義を例として引く。
The answer is to harness such moral indignation to a good cause, by securing just ownership in the seat of moral dignity. Moral indignation then denounces criminality instead of property. その道徳的な憤りを善良な効果に誘導する。公正な所有権を道徳的な尊厳として立証すれば、その憤りは所有権じゃなく犯罪に向ける。
Rothbard did not state it that way, but by directly asserting that capitalist property ownership is just. ロスバードがそういってなかったが、直接に資本主義の所有権が正しいと述べた。
Pages 56 through 60 contain Rothbard’s proposal for restoring justice to a property system. Let me highlight two mistakes; it is otherwise a good plan. ５６ページから６０ページまでがロスバードの所有権を正す提案だ。拙者が二つの間違いを攻めるがそれ以外では良い提案だ。
First, he asserts that criminal possessors should be dispossessed even if their victims cannot be found. In a few chapters, he finds that we punish criminals to get retribution for the victims; that is what justifies punishment. Yet here we dispossess criminals because “it is quite clear that […] the criminal cannot be allowed to keep the reward of his crime” (p. 58). I contest this assertion; nobody but the victim has the right to punish the criminal- nobody. If the victim is lost, it does not become some free-floating right that anybody (but the criminal) can “homestead” by punishing the criminal on their own initiative. 一つ目の間違いは被害者を見つけれなくても泥棒から盗んだ財産を取らなきゃならないとの主張だ。後の章では被害者に報いを得るために犯罪者を罰する。罰はそういうものだ。だけどこの章で“犯罪者が犯罪の利を保つことが許されないのは明白だ”（５８ページ）。拙者はこの主張を否定する。被害者以外に誰も犯罪者を罰する権利を持たない。被害者を見つけれないと犯罪者を罰する権利が犯罪者以外の誰でも引き取れる権利にならない。
This is an exception to his theory of justice that Rothbard does not justify. “It is quite clear” that it must be so? This is no justification at all! これはロスバードが申し開かない例外だ。そうするのは“明白”だと？申し開きにならない！
The exception is void. Until and unless the victim is found, the criminal can rightfully use the property. その例外は無効だ。被害者が現れない限り犯罪者が財産を公正な所有として持てる。
The second mistake is Rothbard’s finality: Once his plan finds a break in chain of title or a criminal dispossession where the victim is lost, he states that the current possessor is to be held as the just owner. 二つ目の間違いはロスバードの確定力だ。提案のついでに所有権の源を見つけれなければ現状の所有者が公正な所有権を取る。
Part of Rothbard’s purpose in presenting his plan is to give certainty to owners going forward; he doesn’t want to throw all property rights into chaos. But we cannot give certainty unless we have all of the evidence, and we cannot prove that no evidence has been missed. Presentation of theretofore unknown evidence can upset established property, and always will be able to. A degree of uncertainty, in this no less that other matters, is an eternal constant. 提案の目的の一つは全ての所有権を乱れないために確実性を作ることだ。だけど全ての証拠を持たないと確実性を上げれない。証拠の全てが手に居ることが証明できない。それまで知らなかった証拠が確立した所有権を狂わせれる。不確実度はどの話題でも永遠に続けるものだ。
With that, Rothbard claims that we now have theories of property and criminality. 章を終わらせてロスバードが所有と犯罪の原理を述べた。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 8: Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression

  By
Rothbard now considers options for the question of who should own (control) what, first specifically with regard to everybody’s physical bodies, then extending that to other physical property. Then he condemns aggression against property. 今章ではロスバードが誰が何を所有するかを考える。はじめに人たちの肉体、そして他の物理所有へ。所有への攻撃行動を非とする。
There are three absolute and universal answers to who should own our bodies. Either (a) we each own our own bodies, (b) we all collectively own all our bodies, or (c) nobody owns anyone’s bodies. There are also non-absolute answers, including the non-universal answers, such as “these people own those people’s bodies.” (A) is the most common answer of people who pose and consider this question. (B) is what we might call the socialist or communist answer, though few people who describe themselves as either would go so far. (C) is a null universe; there is no ownership, therefore nobody has the right to do anything, and therefore everybody is wrong all the time, with no exceptions. 誰が体を所有するかには絶対な普遍原理は三つだ。（Ａ）個人は自分の体を所有するか、（Ｂ）我々は共同で全ての体を所有するか、（Ｃ）誰も何も所有しないか。普遍じゃない回答も絶対じゃない回答もある、たとえば「この人たちがあの人たちの体を所有する」。こんな問題を考える人には（Ａ）が一番よくある返事だ。（Ｂ）は社会主義や共産主義の答えだと言えるが、その主義者の中ではそこまで行くものは少ないかも知らない。（Ｃ）は無の世界、所有権は誰にも無いと誰もが何の行動をしても権利を持たないから不正しか無いんだ。
Rothbard relegates (c) to a footnote, with some justification: that footnote is the only place I’ve seen it mentioned, and nowhere advocated. He also dismisses (b) for practical reasons, leaving him to argue that (a) is correct. He does not consider any compromises between (a) and (b), although this is closest to our current situation; individuals have some rights, but the collective has some rights, too. Now, this position should be rejected, but not by simply failing to mention it. ロスバードが悪くない判断で脚注に（Ｃ）を降格する。その脚注にしか見たことは無い。実地で達成できないため（Ｂ）を否定するから（Ａ）が正しいと結論する。現状の状態に一番近い（Ａ）と（Ｂ）の妥協案を考えない。今では個人には権利があるが、共同にも権利がある。否定するべき姿勢だが、この姿勢を言わずに結論するのは間違いだ。
This discussion deserves much more space than Rothbard gave to it. Why would we choose this one versus that one, and what would the consequences be? And why would we choose a compromise, and what results from that? Ethics can be decided by many paths, and they deserve some mention- here I will refer specifically to the Virtue Ethics and Consequentialist Ethics ideas. この議論はロスバードが熟考したほどより値する話題だ。どう選ぶ？選んだ原理の結果は何だ？妥協案を作る理屈は？そしてその結果は何だ？倫理は複数の道を渡って結論に着く。そのいろんな道を同列に論じるべきだ。今日は徳倫理学と帰結主義を視る。
Virtue Ethics is the idea that one should behave in congruence with certain virtues: Honesty, or Compassion, or Courage, and so on. It’s a bad fit for a legal system, because a legal system necessarily needs to be deontological. But one can construct a deontological system based on some matrix of virtues, and conversely take a deontological ethic and reconstruct the virtue or virtues it embodies. 徳倫理学は人がある徳（正直とか悲とか勇気とか）に従うべきと言う原理だ。法規が義務論的で居られなければならないから徳倫理学は法学に相性が悪いだが、徳の集で義務論を作り上げれる、そして義務論から具象した徳に分かてる。
Choosing (a) above and constructing the ethic of the free society could be said to enshrine the virtue of Respect for the Autonomy of Your Fellow Men. Choosing (b) and constructing a collectivist ethic could be said to deify Cooperating with Your Fellow Men for the Greater Good. Choosing (c) really doesn’t resonate with any virtues that I know of. 上の（Ａ）を選んで自由社会の倫理を作る上げるのは「人間同士の自律を尊敬する」徳の義務論だ。（Ｂ）を選んで集団主義の倫理を作り上げるのは「社会協力」の徳の義務論だ。（Ｃ）には拙者の知ってる徳で相当なのが無い。
Some might say that (a) embodies not a virtue, but a vice: that of selfish Greed. Others assert that (b) is simply organizing society around resentful Envy. 「（Ａ）は徳じゃなく不徳である貪欲の原理」だと言う人がある。別の人も「（Ｂ）は羨望の社会を作る」と言う。
Then there’s the idea of Consequentialist Ethics. Under this system, one judges actions as good or bad based on their results. Again a bad fit for a legal system; we would need omniscience to judge any action, due to the complexity of cause and effect, and to know whether some action or other is justified beforehand, we would need prescience as well. But, with knowledge of philosophy- particularly economics- we can paint (with broad strokes) the results of different deontological ethical systems, and then assess those results. 次に帰結主義を考えよう。この主義の下で行動は帰結に依存して善か悪になる。また、法学に相性が悪い。どの行動を考えても判断するには因果の複雑さのゆえに全知が必要だ。事前に行動を正しく選ぶには未来予知も必要になる。だが、哲学（特に経済学）の知識ではいくつかの倫理の帰結を一般的に記述すれば、その帰結を評価できる。
(A) above results in harmony and is conducive to prosperity. (B) results in impoverishment, and, if there are disagreements as to what constitutes The Greater Good, can produce strife. (C) results in nihilistic anything-goes. 上の（Ａ）は調和を起こして、繁栄に資する。（Ｂ）は貧窮化を起こす、そして一致が無いと騒乱が上がれる。（Ｃ）は虚無主義の弱肉強食を起こす。
From a consequentialist perspective, (a) is the obvious choice, if you favor peace and prosperity. 帰結主義の観点から、平和と繁栄を支持すれば（Ａ）を選ぶべき選択だ。
Now, let’s consider the question of practicality: which, if any, of these can be realized in practice? (A) is easy to implement, and in fact almost automatic. We, by nature, have autonomous individual wills. (B) has never been implemented successfully; as Rothbard observes, every single time it devolves into (if it didn’t originate as) an oligarchy ruling for their own good, but in the name of the “Greater Good.” Men simply do not possess a collective will, and in order to use it as our guiding principle, we would have to organize and operate some system of aggregating our individual wills into a “collective will,” without degradation or manipulation. This has never happened for a very good reason: it is impossible; our individual wills cannot be added together into an aggregate “collective will,” any more than gathering together a pile of stones results in them becoming one big boulder. (C) is thoroughly impossible; since it denies that anything can be right, there is no way to do it right. 今から実用性を考えよう。どれかを実用できる？（Ａ）は簡単だ。自動的に近いだ。自然で人間は個々に自律な意思を持つ。（Ｂ）は歴史上では実用されたことが無い。ロスバードが述べるように、例外なく寡頭制として生まれなかったらそうなることは時間の問題だけだ。「社会」の名の下に一部が自分のために支配する。人間は共同意志を持たない。導く原理として使うには全社会の人の個人意思を「共同意志」に落たなく操られなくまとめる体系が必要だ。不可能性だから実現したことは無い。小石を集めても大石にならないように個人意思は共同意志にまとめられない。（Ｃ）はどう考えても可能性の無いものだ。正しい権がないと正しく果たすこともない。
(A) should be the obvious choice; it upholds a noble virtue, it results in (almost) universally-desired outcomes, and it’s practical to boot. (B) does attempt to pursue a virtue, but its outcomes are generally unappealing, and it is impossible in practice. (C) really has no popular case, except perhaps to nihilists. （Ａ）が当たり前の選択だ。上品な徳を持ち上げ、多少一般に欲された帰結を起こして、実用することもある。（Ｂ）も徳を持ち上げようとするが、帰結は冴えなくて、実用することもできない。（Ｃ）は虚無主義者だけに興味をそそるものだ。
These are the absolute and universal answers. Non-universal treatments include ethics that separate men arbitrarily into groups that have different sets of rights; these are generally non-absolute as well. It has appeal, however; since it partitions men into Übermenschen and Untermenschen, those assigned a place amongst the former enjoy a privileged position, so they will often defend it. Note that above we observed that attempts at collective ownership devolve into oligarchy- this is another form of unequal ethical categories, where the oligarchs have rights that the lowly masses are denied. In accordance with the name of my blog, I reject ethics that divide men into unequal ethical categories. The Kantian Categorical Imperative also denies non-universal ethics such as these. これが絶対と普遍な解答だ。普遍じゃない解答は人を恣意的に別の団体に分かち、その団体に別の権利を上げる。典型的に絶対じゃない。とある魅力を認める。人を超人人種と劣等人種に分離して、超人に分かたれた人はその倫理を守ることはよくある。前に集団主義は寡頭制に落ちると述べた。これも匹敵しない種類だ。寡頭者は凡人に否定された権利を持つ。ブログの名のように、拙者は人を匹敵しない種類に分離する倫理を拒絶する。定言命法もこのような倫理を拒絶する。
Also deserving examination are the non-absolute answers. As observed above, when in theory (in practice, still an oligarchy) the current state of affairs is defended, it comes to a compromise between (a) and (b). “Pursuing only one virtue denies the other; we should find a happy medium. The results of both extremes have both benefits and detriments; we should choose the middle way to get the best of both worlds.” Ignoring for the moment the economical inaccuracy of claiming collectivism has any benefits, one cannot make an argument for this. One can only advance one’s opinion: “We should hold this virtue 60% of the time, and no more; the remainder should be taken by the other virtue. Here is where the benefits of both extremes are maximized and their detriments are minimized.” This will inevitably vary wildly between one man and the next. One man holds 60% is the right ratio, and the next holds it should be 50%, and yet another holds 70%. Assessing the relative value of different virtues, and the relative value of a matrix of benefits and detriments, must rely upon valuation, which is an individually subjective process. It changes not only from one person to the next but also from one point in time to another in the same person! Once allow any option but the absolutes, and nothing can be certain. We could enjoy 99% individualism one day, then 1% the next day, when men’s minds have changed. 絶対じゃない解答をも考えよう。前に述べたように、現状は理論上に正当化しようと（Ａ）と（Ｂ）の妥協案になる。「一つの徳を持ち上げて他の徳を拒絶するから、極端には利も不利もあるから、中に至摘があるはず」と。共同所有には利があるの経済学的な不明確さを置いても論法できない。できることは自分の恣意的な意見を述べることしかない。「この徳を６割に、その徳は４割に。この点に極端の利を至適し、不利を最小にする」と。必至に人々に激しく異なる。一人が６割を述べて、一人が５割を、一人は７割を。別の徳か様々な利と不利を評価することは個人的に主観的な過程だ。個人によって変わるだけじゃなく時によって同人にも変わる！絶対じゃない解答を許すと、確信するものはどこにもいない。一日に９９％な個人主義的な社会があっても、人の意見が変わって翌日は１％になれる。
Then there’s the thorny problem of reconciling all the viewpoints available at any given time into a single compromise plan. How are we to do it? Aggregate our individual wills into a collective will? Or, allow individuals the autonomy to choose for themselves? These options are the same two options, on a different level! Doing it by collectivist means (for instance, by putting it up to a vote) will mean that no individual has any rights, except so far as the collective deigns to allow it, and doing it by individualist means will mean that the collective has no rights, except so far as individuals choose to empower it. それに複数の意見を一つの妥協案に丸く収まることの問題だ。どうするか？みんなの個人意思を共同意思にまとめる？それとも人が個々に選ぶ自律を許す？これも別の階層に同じ問題になる！集団方法を使えば（たとえば票数で決めれば）個人権利は集団が許すほどしかならない。個人方法を使えば権限委譲されたほどしか集団は無力だ。
… 。。。
This blog entry could continue, but I have dwelt too long on this tangent. この書き込みは続けれるけどこの話題はもう長すぎだ。
Let me only say that Rothbard is mistaken when he describes criminals as violating the nature of their victims, and even of violating their own nature. This is an nonsensical as asserting that a rock could violate its own nature. 犯罪人は被害者の自然と自分の自然を破ると述べるロスバードが間違えた。石には自の自然を破る可能性があるほどの戯言だとしか、これで言わない。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 7: Interpersonal Relations: Voluntary Exchange

  By
In this chapter Rothbard spends a good number of words talking about economics rather than ethics. Yes, trade is beneficial to men’s prosperity. But the important point, ethically speaking, is that trade is just. この章でロスバードが哲学じゃなく経済学のことをたくさん語る。はい、交換は人の繁栄に良い影響を持つが、哲学的に語るべきことは「交換は正しい」だ。
Once having established that ownership is just (first of one’s body and labor, then of unowned natural goods transformed by one’s labor), we see that giving or exchanging ownership is also just. Also note that trading external property for labor is just, as well (that is, employment cannot be attacked as inherently unjust). 所有することが正しいで初めて、まず自分の体と労働、そして労働で無主した自然を変えたもの、所有を上げるや変わるも正しい。特に所有を労働と交換することも正しくて雇用も正しい。
Rothbard does claim that “voluntary slavery-” that is, a lifelong labor contract- is invalid. He claims that in making such a contract, the laborer is “alienating his will,” which is impossible. Before I stated that to have a right to control (ownership), one must have a means of control. It is true that one cannot acquire control over another’s will, and therefore cannot own it. Rothbard says that in a lifelong labor contract, “this would mean that his future will over his own person was being surrendered in advance.” But this proves far too much; in a five-year labor contract, does not the laborer surrender his will? Is he not denying his four-years-later self his rightful exercise of his will? If so, then the same would be true of a five-minute contract, making all labor salable only in pay-as-you-go arrangements; if not, the same would be true of a five-century contract, making the “slavery” perfectly justified. ロスバードは志願奴隷（一生労働契約）が不正と言う。そういう契約で労働者が不可な意思疎外を成立する、と。前章の話で制御する権利を持つために制御する方法が必要だと言った。他人の意思を制御する方法は無いため、所有物になれない。ロスバードは一生労働契約で「事前に未来の意志を委ねた意味をする」と言うが、証明するものは多すぎる。五年労働契約にも労働者が意思を委ねるじゃないか？四年後の自分に意思を行使する権利を否定するじゃないか？そうだったら、五分契約もそうだから、労働購買は使った分だけになる。そうでなければ、五百年契約もそうではなくて、そんな“奴隷状態”をも言い開くだろう。
The wisdom of selling oneself into slavery is questionable, but its justice can be denied only if one denies the justice of all labor contracts whatsoever. 自分を奴隷に売るのは知恵なのかは疑えるが、すべての労働契約を否定しないとその正を否定できない。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 6: A Crusoe Social Philosophy

  By
“Men act,” famously began Mises’s Human Action. As for economics, it’s a good starting point for philosophy in general. Rothbard derives a lot of the usual conclusions, using the Robinson Crusoe scenario: a man isolated on an uninhabited island. 「人は行動する」とミーゼス（Ｍｉｓｅｓ）の人間行動（Ｈｕｍａｎ　Ａｃｔｉｏｎ）が名高く始まった。経済学のように哲学にも良い始まりだ。ロスバードもそれから始まり、無人島にあったロビンソン・クルーソーの脚本を語って様々な結論につく。
I would criticize Rothbard for assuming in this scenario that man can own natural objects that he transforms. Here, in this isolation, we can abstract the entities down to “Man” and “Nature.” Why does man get to own nature; why does nature not own man? The answer is obvious to all but the most addle-brained environmentalists, but it is well to elaborate it; we may need to deal with those environmentalists later. この脚本でロスバードは人が自然のものを所有にすることができると思い込んだことに、拙者が異論したい。孤独なこの脚本であるのは「人」と「自然」だ。どうして自然が人をじゃなく、人が自然を所有にできる？脳の腐った環境活動家にしか答えが当然だけど、細かく説明するがいい。その環境活動家を取り組むことになるかも。
Ownership is the right to control. To have a right to control, one must have a means of control. Rothbard recognizes this when he disclaims Crusoe’s claim upon the whole island as “sheer empty vainglory” and instead asserts that he only owns what he has actual control over- what he applies his labor to. 所有は制御の権利だ。制御の権利を持つために制御の方法が必要だ。ロスバードもクルーソーの全島の所有権利の主張を空っぽな虚栄として否定した。自分の労働で触った制御したものしか所有しないと認めた。
Why does man get to own pieces of nature? Because he can, through labor, control those pieces of nature. Why can Nature not own man? Because Nature cannot control man. If it could, then it would (according to, again, the environmentalists) obviously exercise its control over man, to limit the harm that he does to it, and to bend man’s abilities to its service. なぜ人が自然のものを所有できる？労働でその自然のものを制御できるから。なぜ自然が人を所有できない？自然が人を制御できないから。もしそうできれば、（環境活動家に聞けば）人からの被害を制限と人からの利益を増加のために人への制御を使用しただろう。
We will have cause to speak of environmentalists more in the future, but for the topic at hand, this will suffice. 後ほども環境活動家のことを語ることになるが、この点はこれで十分としよう。
Rothbard makes another assertion that I disagree with, that maintenance of life and health is axiomatic, and therefore actions detrimental to life and health are immoral. “Men act” is an axiom; does this mean that opposition to some action by a man is immoral? If Rothbard has proven any axiom about the lives of men here, it is, “Men live,” which is considerably less robust than the claim that men should pursue life and health. ロスバードがまた拙者と違う意見を昇進する。人には生命と健康の維持が公理で、その生命と健康に害する行動は極道だと。「人は行動する」は公理だ。と言ったことで、ある人の行動に反対することも極道になるか？ロスバードが公理を示したのなら、それは「人は生命する」になる。言った公理よりよほど弱い思想だ。
Regarding that, Rothbard quite consistently supported Liberty against Power. This struggle has extended back into antiquity, as Rothbard himself has documented in his historical books and articles. Yet, in the many times when people have taken action against Power- often conscientiously in ways that they knew would be very detrimental to their wellbeing- I don’t recall Rothbard anywhere declaring that these people were immoral for acting in ways that brought harm to themselves. それについて、ロスバードは一貫していて「自由」を「権力」に対して支持した。 ロスバードの歴史的な記事で書いたように その競争は古代から延長する。だけどいくつもの時に権力と争った人達が健康にものすごく害になったことに、ロスバードが一度でもその人達の行動は自害なため極道と書いた覚えはない。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 5: The Task of Political Philosophy

  By
Rothbard doesn’t plan on elaborating all of natural law; just the ethics, or the political philosophy, of it. There is considerably more, but it is outside the scope of the book. ロスバードには自然法の全体を説明するつもりは無い。この本では倫理、政治哲学、だけで良い。全体にはもっとあるが、この本の範囲外だ。
He laments that in the twentieth century, the natural law built up to that time (as described in the last chapter, it led to radical movements, which greatly benefited humanity) was largely abandoned for other ideas. Rothbard describes the replacement of political philosophy by political science, echoing earlier references to scientistics, who rejected natural law for being religious and “unscientific.” 二十世紀では前章の抜本的な運動の基本となった自然法が捨てられたことを悲しむ。政治哲学が政治科学に入れ替わられた。第一章の言った科学万能派の思想のように自然法は科学で無い神学であると言われて否定された。
These political scientists follow a method massively unsuited to coming to an understanding of human action: they gather evidence and induce from it theories, then try to use the theories as guides for action. This does not work and cannot work. I think it is possible that no being can come to a perfect scientistic understanding of itself, much less of a society of beings like itself. But Rothbard argues instead that scientistic methods cannot work because humans possess free will, which scientists of the physical laws (whom political scientists attempt to emulate) do not have to grapple with. 政治科学者は人間行動を解明するために沐猴にして冠す方法を使う：情報を集まって、それから推測を帰納して、そして推測で行動を導く。効果は失敗だった。失敗しかできない方法だ。自分を科学的に完璧な解明ができる生き物なんてありえない、と拙者が思う。だがロスバードは自由意志を持つ人類が物理の科学の対象と違って情報集めだけで分かられない。政治科学者は物理の真似をしようとしても不可能だから失敗しかない道だ。
Regardless why the scientistic approach does not and cannot work, the philosophical approach- to use man’s reason to comprehend his nature and the nature of his environment, then to deduce laws of this nature- can and does work. 科学万能派の失敗の理由がどっちにしろ、哲学の方法‐人の理性を使って自身の性質と環境の性質を分かってその性質の法則を演繹する‐は有効だ。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 4: Natural Law and Natural Rights

  By
This chapter is an historical review of natural rights, within natural law. Notably, natural law followed a vastly mistaken path for a very long time: It asked, “What should the state do?” rather than, “What should individuals do?”- that is, its program was statist, rather than individualist. 自由の倫理の第四章は自然法の天賦人権の歴史だ。今と違って、長い時間に間違えた道を進んだ。「個人はどうすれば」じゃなく、［政府はどうすれば」と聞き、政府的な計画を立った。
Natural law was therefore impotent for much of history. John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, was among the earliest to reform natural law on individualist grounds, finally giving it teeth. それで自然法は無力な思想だった。統治二論の第二論でジョン・ロック（Ｊｏｈｎ　Ｌｏｃｋｅ）が個人的な思想として自然法を再び作り上げた先駆者の一人だった。やっと歯を持つ思想になった。
(Even so, in the previous chapter it was observed that Cumberland’s and Pufendorf’s ideas were revolting to the establishment of their times. Pufendorf’s philosophy book, De iure naturae et gentium, was published 17 years before Locke’s Treatises. “Cumberland,” whoever that is (I have not yet found him), was probably also before Locke.) （だけど前の章でカンバーランド（Ｃｕｍｂｅｒｌａｎｄ）とプーフェンドルフ（Ｐｕｆｅｎｄｏｒｆ）の思想がその時の支配階級を驚かしたと読んだ。プーフェンドルフの哲学の本、Ｄｅ　ｉｕｒｅ　ｎａｔｕｒａｅ　ｅｔ　ｇｅｎｔｉｕｍ、が統治二論の十七年先に出版された。多分カンバーランドもロックより先だったが、あのカンバーランドという人の正体は今の拙者に分からない。）
After the reformulation, natural law endorsed natural rights, those rights that men hold by virtue of their nature as men. Major liberal movements founded on these principles advanced the cause of liberty in the ensuing years. 新しい作り上がりで自然法が天賦人権、人の性質のせいで持つ権利、を支持する。この原則で後年で自由を求める運動が始まった。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 3: Natural Law versus Positive Law

  By
This is a short chapter with a lot of references. The takeaway is that natural law is the only way we can judge positive law. Positive law is that law that is posited by certain parties to be law. Typically, these are the laws of nations; the nation’s rulers position some principle as a law, therefore it is a law. 自由の倫理の第三章は複数の参考を持った短い章だ。知られるのは自然法だけが実定法を断じれる。実定法はある人が立てる法則だ。国の法則は一例だ。国の支配階級が原則を法則として立つから法則である。
In short, somebody says something is a law, and it’s a law because they say so. For being no justification at all, it’s surprisingly popular. Yet, it could happen that, by willful design of right-thinking statesmen, by pragmatic appeasement for a skeptical citizenry, or by sheer happenstance, some positive laws could be good (or at least less bad than other laws). で、あるものが［法則だ］と言って、あのものが言ったとおり法則になる。正当性がないが、よく使われる。だけども、良い政治家の務めでか、懐疑的な国民をなだめる為にか、又は偶然にかそれぞれな実定法の一部が良い法則（少なくとも別の法則より悪くない）であるかもしれない。
How do you tell if any given positive law is a good law or not? You need an external set of principles for that (internal review mechanisms are, by their nature, not up to the task): natural law. Natural law gives us a framework for assessing positive laws. Natural law has the further benefit of being consistent, fixed and unchanging, applicable at all times and at all places, subject only to our imperfect apprehension of it. Positive laws are changed all the time; if those in power will it, anything that is lawful today may be unlawful tomorrow, and vice versa. 法則を見れば、どうやっていいか悪いか決められる？外の原則（内側の検討仕組みは性質で出来ない）に頼って：自然法。自然法が実定法を判断する位置を立つ。それに、一貫な、固定した、変わりのない、いつでもどこでも応用する原則である。実定法がいつも変わっている。支配階級が欲すれば、今日の合法のことが明日の違法になる、そして逆もある。
Only natural law can give us fixity, and only it can give us a vantage from which we can judge positive law. Without it, criticisms of positive law are no better than the justification for it. 自然法だけが確定性を贈れる。その視座だけから実定法を判断できる。それが無いと実定法への批正が実定法の正当化よりよくはない。
Rothbard’s many references highlight the importance of this position. Rothbard didn’t come up with it, after all. He quotes Lord Acton (himself speaking of still earlier pioneers of natural law), who observed that the rise of natural law left the politicians of the time aghast, for they had never dealt with external judgment of this sort. Their questions for assessing the rightness of their laws boiled down to, “Can I? And, can I get away with it?” In other words, it was a question of power and expediency. Enter the fray natural law, and it is a question of neither of these, but a question of justice and injustice. ロスバードの参考が重要さを強調する。ロスバードから始めたものではないから、数百年の歴史で鋭い意見が山ほどある。自分より先の自然法の誕生が過去の政治屋の愕然を述べたアクトン卿（Ｌｏｒｄ　Ａｃｔｏｎ）をも引用する。その政治屋がそんな外の判断と合わせたことは無かった。それまで、法則の正当化の問題は「できるか・ただで済むか」。つまり、力と都合の問題だった。自然法の参上で、それじゃなく「正か・不正か」の質問になる。
They were right to be aghast. I should like for modern politicians to feel the same. 愕然したのは当然だった。現在の政治屋もその愕然を感じれば良いと、拙者が思う。
No comments

Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 2: Natural Law as “Science”

  By
Ethics of Liberty’s second chapter describes natural law in more detail. One statement he makes is, “The natural law ethic decrees that for all living things, “goodness” is the fulfillment of what is best for that type of creature; “goodness” is therefore relative to the nature of the creature concerned.” This is well stated, and perhaps a good idea; but to use it makes the ethic necessarily dependent on man’s nature. I believe it need not be so. 自由の倫理の二章は自然法を人類の性質に由来して細かく説明する。ひとつの生命は”自然法は全生き物に”善”があの生き物に一番良いことを満たす；だから”善”はその生き物の性質に相対的だ。”よく言ったものだ、そして良い考えかも知らないが、そうすると論の全部が人類の性質に依存する。それは必要ないと、拙者が思う。
For one thing, the proposition of the “New Socialist Man,” the man who would inhabit the socialist utopias, is a “man” with a significantly different nature than the “man” that Rothbard analyzes. Setting aside the apparent impossibility of changing man’s nature, if the proponents of the New Socialist Man theory are taken seriously, a new ethic must be elaborated that is based on this nature. そうすれば、”新社会主義人”、社会主義の空想を住むといわれる人が、ロスバードの見た”人”とかなり違う”人”だ。人の性質を変える不可能性をさて置いて、この新会社主義人の提案を考えたら、それに由来して新しい倫理を作らないとならない。
For another, should mankind ever find intelligent life aside from themselves, unless the newcomers should happen to possess a nature identical to man’s, then they, too, will require an ethic. あと、もしも人類が別の知的生命を発見すれば、その生命が人類と同じ性質を持たないと、また別の倫理が必要になる。
By simply presuming that there exist a number of ethical agents, each ethically equal, we can elaborate an ethic that applies to men as we know them, to the New Socialist Man, and to relations between sentient creatures of considerable variation. 複数の匹敵するエージェントを仮定して、我々の人類の人にも、新社会主義人にも、そして様々な知的生命体にも応用する倫理を作られる。
Rothbard also has a quote from John Wild: “why are such principles felt to be binding on me?” Indeed this is a good question. Why adopt this ethic, as opposed to some other? それにロスバードがジョンワイルド（Ｊｏｈｎ　Ｗｉｌｄ）の”どうしてそんな原則が私に義務的である？”を引用する。たしかに良い質問だ。何で別の倫理じゃなく、こんな倫理を採用する？
Ethics guide one’s actions. When interacting with others, some ethic must guide one’s actions in relating to the others. Those actions can be inspected, and the ethic behind them deduced. Invariably, many men’s actions will indicate that they act as equals with other men, and some men’s actions will indicate that they act as unequals with other men. We will later examine some reasons for choosing one or the other of these, but for now, let us simply assert that men should interact as equals with each other. 倫理は人の活動を導く。別の人と絡むと、なんかの倫理がその活動を導く。その活動を視れば本ずいた倫理を推理できる。必ず、ある人は別人と匹敵する活動を見せる、そしてある人は別人と匹敵しない活動を見せる。あとで決める理由を見るが、今は匹敵者として活動しなければならないだけを断言しよう。
To answer the John Wild’s question, you operate under some principles anyway; we need only inspect your actions to know them. Then we can assess your principles as just ones or unjust ones, based on criteria of justice (which we will examine in later posts). ジョンワイルドの質問を答える。どうしても何かの原則を義務として使ってるから。見れば分かる。そうしてその原則を正しいか正しくないか判断できる、あとで調べる正義の基準で。