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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 10: The Problem of Land Theft

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This is the first of two chapters dealing with real estate. Rothbard here defines land engrossment as claiming unowned land without labor investment, and finds it invalid and therefore enforcement of it is criminal. He claims that land ownership is permanent until abandonment. He attacks the common law doctrine of adverse possession, and a land practice he labels feudalism (which does not correspond exactly with the historical concept). これは䞍動産の二章の第䞀章だ。ロスバヌドが䞍動産犁制“　”を劎働投資なく䞍動産所有䞻匵ず定矩する。無力な䞻匵であっお、その䞻匵の匷行が犯眪ず刀断する。䞍動産の所有暩が捚おない限り氞久なものず䞻匵する。コモン・ロヌの逆所有“　”ず䞍動産独占“　”を攻める。
The engrossment bit is good, and the attacks on feudalist land theft and adverse possession have some merit, but are still greatly flawed. The proposal of perpetual land ownership is flat-out mistaken, however. 䞍動産犁止の刀断は正しいが、逆所有ず䞍動産独占ぞの攻撃には正しい点ず間違えた点がある。䞍動産の氞久所有暩は党然な間違いだ。
Permanent ownership is a mistake because we acquire ownership through labor (as I described last time), and the fruits of our labor do not persist forever without maintenance. Property rights are rightful claims to the fruits of our labor, so insofar as those fruits are perishable, so are our property rights. 人は劎働で所有暩を埗る、ず前回に䞻匵した。劎働の成果は保たずに氞久に続かないから氞久所有暩は間違いだ。
Adverse possession does accrue in my view, after a fashion. In Rothbard’s framework, suppose some speculator decides to homestead a huge swath of land, but to comply nominally with the rules, he invests one hour of (likely hired) labor in minimal land improvements per ten acres he claims. He then sits on his claim for a few decades, to let the land’s value appreciate; meanwhile, his improvements degrade to barely discernible, but his title is established, so he doesn’t need to invest in maintenance. Then a genuine settler comes along and decides to settle on some of the speculator’s land (knowingly or not). By the time the speculator takes action, the settler has been on a forty-acre parcel for three months, investing seven hundred twenty hours of his own labor in it. Rothbard would have to side with the speculator, who decades ago invested four hours of labor in that forty acres, over the new settler, who has more recently invested a hundred sixty times as much labor. Incidentally, if the settler can’t afford to take his investment with him, then the speculator gets to keep it, free. 逆所有は拙者の原理では違い方法で起こる。ロスバヌドの原理のもずで、投機家が巚倧な領土を所有するためにある皋床の倚分、雇甚な劎働投資を満たす。所有暩が固定した時から倀䞊がるために数十幎を埅぀。その時間で投資の蚌拠が劣化しお匁えがたくなるけど、所有暩が固定だから保぀こずが必芁ない。その点で入怍者が珟れ、投機家の領地の䞀郚に玍たろうずする。投機家が行動するたでは半幎で、入怍者は投機家の投資の数十倍を䜿う。ロスバヌドが投機家の肩を持たなきゃならない。぀いでに、入怍者が地から投資を匕き出せない堎合では投機家がただで持ち埗る。
What Rothbard has done is allow land engrossment, only requiring more investment than some other systems do. 䞍動産犁制に達するだろう。別の原理より高い投資が必芁だけだ。
I assert that the settler has a stronger claim than the speculator, and if they submitted their claims to mediation, the mediator might decide that he owes the speculator a nominal fee as compensation and thereafter owns the land. 拙者は入怍者の方が投機家より所有暩が匷いず䞻匵する。居䞭調停に頌れば、調停者が入怍者から投機家に名ばかりの眰金を払えるこずで入怍者が所有者ず認める、ず刀断できる。
This is not how adverse possession works in common law, of course. もちろん、コモン・ロヌの逆所有ずかなり違うだけど。
Moving on to feudalist land theft, Rothbard is again incorrect in advocating dispossession when the original victims are lost. Once again, he’s willing to punish the bad guy for the sake of punishment, not for the benefit of his victims. I again assert that where the victim cannot be found, nobody has the right to punish the bad guy. If, on the other hand, the feudal land thief with lost victims aggresses against someone else, he can be punished for that. Enforcing serfdom (of new victims) on his land, for instance, might result in his forfeiting the land to the serfs, when he is brought to justice. 䞍動産独占に぀いお、ロスバヌドがたた被害者が玛倱したら悪者を被害者のためじゃなく眰するためだけに所有暩を取っお眰する。拙者がたた、被害者が芋぀けられない堎合では誰にも犯眪者を眰する暩利はないず䞻匵する。だけど、犯眪者には別の違反を犯したら、その被害者が眰できる。䟋えば、独占した地に蟲奎制床を䜿甚したら正矩が蟲奎にその地の所有暩を移転するこずができる。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 8, Revisited

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Rothbard asserts that everybody owns their own bodies, as we saw earlier. Of the available choices (ownership by ownself, or by all of society, or by some arbitrary other person), he chose self-ownership. Naturally, it extends to every man’s labor. The same choices apply, and Rothbard again picks self-ownership. Every man owns his own body, and his own labor. 前に曞いたようにロスバヌドがみんなは自分の䜓を所有するず䞻匵する。遞べる遞択自分所有、共同所有、他人所有から自分所有を遞ぶ。もちろんみんなの劎働にも同じ遞択があっお、ロスバヌドがたた自分所有を遞ぶ。人々党員が自分の䜓ず自分の劎働を所有する。
Who owns everything else, the resources of the natural world? It starts off unowned, but Rothbard says that if a man mixes his labor with it, then he owns that part of it. This creates property in tangible resources. He then owns that property thereafter, until he abandons it or transfers it to another. では、誰が䞖界の自然資源を所有する始めに所有者がないけど、ロスバヌドがこう䞻匵する人が自分の劎働ず自然資源を混ぜたら、その自然資源を所有する。それで所有暩が珟れる。そのずきからあの人がその物を所有する、捚おるか他人に䞊げるたで。
I take a different approach. As we found that men own their own bodies, and their own labor, they also own the fruits of their labor. When they exert labor on natural resources, they can rightfully claim and control the benefits that result; this “right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labor, by having rightful control over those fruits as embodied in transformed resources” we can call “property rights.” 拙者は別の理屈を䞻匵する。人の䜓のように、人の劎働のように、人の劎働の成果をも自分所有になる。自然資源に劎働を行䜿すればその利を暩利ずしお制埡できる。この「倉えた資源を暩利の制埡で劎働の成果を享受する暩利」は「所有暩」ず蚀う。
This formulation has a couple important corollaries; one is that all property rights degrade over time. For instance, if one man builds a sandcastle on an unowned beach, he has a property right in it, and if another man comes and kicks it down, that is a criminal violation of the first man’s property rights. If, however, he leaves the sandcastle unmaintained for some time, the ocean will destroy it. Then, he owns nothing, although he used to have a property right. この理屈には倧事な系がある。䞀぀は、党所有暩は時が経぀ず萜ちる。䟋えば人が所有者のない海岞に砂の城を䜜り䞊げたら、その砂の城を所有する。他人が蹎り萜ずしたらそれは所有暩に犯眪だ。所有者が砂の城を保たずに攟っお眮いおお海が砎れば、所有暩が持ったけどそれで䜕の所有暩がない。
(Typically, serious labor investment is reserved for property rights much less ephemeral than this, but it applies, on some time scale, to all property rights.) 本気な劎働投資は普段こんなはかない所有暩に䜿われおいないがある時間の比范で党所有暩に圓おはたる。
Another corollary is that, since property rights are functionally defined rather than spatially defined, they can spatially overlap without conflict. One example is a shared road. All parties using it (and by doing so, transforming it from a natural state of plant growth to a dirt road) have a property right in it, for the functions it serves. Each can contest changes that impact functionality, such as erecting a building on the road, but they can’t contest changes that do not, such as paving the road while no other parties happen to be using it. たたの系は、所有暩が空間ではなく機胜で定矩されるから、耇数の所有暩は同じ空間で察立せずに重ねる。共有の道路は䞀䟋だ。耇数の利甚者の通りかかりで道路が自然の怍物を螏みにじっお道を䜜れ、䜿甚者の党員がその道に所有暩を持぀。道に建物を立぀ような機胜を害する行動を論争できるが道を舗装するような機胜を害しない行動を論争できない。
It can be argued that overlapping claims such as these are not all of the same strength; those that invest more labor (and other resources) have more claim on the property, such as the one who paves the road in the previous example. We might say he “owns the road,” a property right in the road, but the other users would have an easement to use it, which are also property rights in the road. こんな重ねた所有暩は党お同じ力じゃないず䞻匵できる。もっず劎働ず別の資源を投資したものはもっず匷い所有暩を持぀。䞊の䟋では舗装したものが所有暩を持぀ず他の䜿甚者が地圹暩を持぀ように定める。
So, this is how men come to own property in the material world. これで人が自然の資源を所有するこずができる。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 9: Property and Criminality

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Here Rothbard defines crime as an aggression against property. Rothbard laid out a system of just property definition in the last chapter, which I haven’t commented on yet. I shall return to it tomorrow. ロスバヌドがここで犯眪を財産に䟵略するこずずしお定矩する。ロスバヌドが前の章で財産の定矩をしたけど、いただ拙者がそれに぀いお曞いおいない。明日にその話題に戻る。
This chapter takes some time to emphasize that only just ownership can make for crime in this way, and mere possession is not ownership. Some possessor may be a criminal rather than an owner. We can determine who is the owner only by examining the data of the case. この章は公正な所有だけに犯眪が起こる。所有するだけで公正になるずは限らない。所有者は犯眪者であるこずもある。公正な所有者を明確するために情報を調査しなきゃならない。
Later I will speak of interlopers. These are passersby who intervene in a violent altercation. They risk defending an unjust property claim, because they do not know the case data. They take other risks as well, which I will canvas when the time comes. 拙者は埌で䜙蚈者のこずに぀いお話す。これは乱暎な状況に干枉するものだ。情報が知らない限り公正でない所有を守る危険をもたらす。他の危険をももたらすが、時が来たら話そう。
Rothbard takes the time to attack utilitarians- they must defend any property title they are presented with, because they have no theory of justice. But is that really their only option? As a branch of Consequentialist Ethics, which we described last time, they just want the best outcome. Can’t we make a case that the best outcome results from upholding property titles that are justly derived, rather than some other arbitrary system of property titles? ロスバヌドが功利䞻矩を攻める。「正矩の原理がないゆえどんな所有暩でも守らなきゃならない」ず。でも本圓にそれしかできないのか前回に話した垰結䞻矩の支郚である功利䞻矩は最善な垰結を目指す。公正な所有暩を持ち䞊げるこずが最善な垰結を起こすず議論できるじゃないか
Rothbard speaks his conviction that the impetus for many social changes (for the worse) “in [his] time [was] a moral indignation.” He lists Marxism and anarchosyndicalism. ロスバヌドが“私たちの人生で道埳的な憀りが”様々な䞍利な瀟䌚倉曎を起こした信念を蚀う。マルクス䞻矩ず無政府組合䞻矩を䟋ずしお匕く。
The answer is to harness such moral indignation to a good cause, by securing just ownership in the seat of moral dignity. Moral indignation then denounces criminality instead of property. その道埳的な憀りを善良な効果に誘導する。公正な所有暩を道埳的な尊厳ずしお立蚌すれば、その憀りは所有暩じゃなく犯眪に向ける。
Rothbard did not state it that way, but by directly asserting that capitalist property ownership is just. ロスバヌドがそういっおなかったが、盎接に資本䞻矩の所有暩が正しいず述べた。
Pages 56 through 60 contain Rothbard’s proposal for restoring justice to a property system. Let me highlight two mistakes; it is otherwise a good plan. ペヌゞからペヌゞたでがロスバヌドの所有暩を正す提案だ。拙者が二぀の間違いを攻めるがそれ以倖では良い提案だ。
First, he asserts that criminal possessors should be dispossessed even if their victims cannot be found. In a few chapters, he finds that we punish criminals to get retribution for the victims; that is what justifies punishment. Yet here we dispossess criminals because “it is quite clear that [
] the criminal cannot be allowed to keep the reward of his crime” (p. 58). I contest this assertion; nobody but the victim has the right to punish the criminal- nobody. If the victim is lost, it does not become some free-floating right that anybody (but the criminal) can “homestead” by punishing the criminal on their own initiative. 䞀぀目の間違いは被害者を芋぀けれなくおも泥棒から盗んだ財産を取らなきゃならないずの䞻匵だ。埌の章では被害者に報いを埗るために犯眪者を眰する。眰はそういうものだ。だけどこの章で“犯眪者が犯眪の利を保぀こずが蚱されないのは明癜だ”ペヌゞ。拙者はこの䞻匵を吊定する。被害者以倖に誰も犯眪者を眰する暩利を持たない。被害者を芋぀けれないず犯眪者を眰する暩利が犯眪者以倖の誰でも匕き取れる暩利にならない。
This is an exception to his theory of justice that Rothbard does not justify. “It is quite clear” that it must be so? This is no justification at all! これはロスバヌドが申し開かない䟋倖だ。そうするのは“明癜”だず申し開きにならない
The exception is void. Until and unless the victim is found, the criminal can rightfully use the property. その䟋倖は無効だ。被害者が珟れない限り犯眪者が財産を公正な所有ずしお持おる。
The second mistake is Rothbard’s finality: Once his plan finds a break in chain of title or a criminal dispossession where the victim is lost, he states that the current possessor is to be held as the just owner. 二぀目の間違いはロスバヌドの確定力だ。提案の぀いでに所有暩の源を芋぀けれなければ珟状の所有者が公正な所有暩を取る。
Part of Rothbard’s purpose in presenting his plan is to give certainty to owners going forward; he doesn’t want to throw all property rights into chaos. But we cannot give certainty unless we have all of the evidence, and we cannot prove that no evidence has been missed. Presentation of theretofore unknown evidence can upset established property, and always will be able to. A degree of uncertainty, in this no less that other matters, is an eternal constant. 提案の目的の䞀぀は党おの所有暩を乱れないために確実性を䜜るこずだ。だけど党おの蚌拠を持たないず確実性を䞊げれない。蚌拠の党おが手に居るこずが蚌明できない。それたで知らなかった蚌拠が確立した所有暩を狂わせれる。䞍確実床はどの話題でも氞遠に続けるものだ。
With that, Rothbard claims that we now have theories of property and criminality. 章を終わらせおロスバヌドが所有ず犯眪の原理を述べた。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 8: Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression

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Rothbard now considers options for the question of who should own (control) what, first specifically with regard to everybody’s physical bodies, then extending that to other physical property. Then he condemns aggression against property. 今章ではロスバヌドが誰が䜕を所有するかを考える。はじめに人たちの肉䜓、そしお他の物理所有ぞ。所有ぞの攻撃行動を非ずする。
There are three absolute and universal answers to who should own our bodies. Either (a) we each own our own bodies, (b) we all collectively own all our bodies, or (c) nobody owns anyone’s bodies. There are also non-absolute answers, including the non-universal answers, such as “these people own those people’s bodies.” (A) is the most common answer of people who pose and consider this question. (B) is what we might call the socialist or communist answer, though few people who describe themselves as either would go so far. (C) is a null universe; there is no ownership, therefore nobody has the right to do anything, and therefore everybody is wrong all the time, with no exceptions. 誰が䜓を所有するかには絶察な普遍原理は䞉぀だ。個人は自分の䜓を所有するか、我々は共同で党おの䜓を所有するか、誰も䜕も所有しないか。普遍じゃない回答も絶察じゃない回答もある、たずえば「この人たちがあの人たちの䜓を所有する」。こんな問題を考える人にはが䞀番よくある返事だ。は瀟䌚䞻矩や共産䞻矩の答えだず蚀えるが、その䞻矩者の䞭ではそこたで行くものは少ないかも知らない。は無の䞖界、所有暩は誰にも無いず誰もが䜕の行動をしおも暩利を持たないから䞍正しか無いんだ。
Rothbard relegates (c) to a footnote, with some justification: that footnote is the only place I’ve seen it mentioned, and nowhere advocated. He also dismisses (b) for practical reasons, leaving him to argue that (a) is correct. He does not consider any compromises between (a) and (b), although this is closest to our current situation; individuals have some rights, but the collective has some rights, too. Now, this position should be rejected, but not by simply failing to mention it. ロスバヌドが悪くない刀断で脚泚にを降栌する。その脚泚にしか芋たこずは無い。実地で達成できないためを吊定するからが正しいず結論する。珟状の状態に䞀番近いずの劥協案を考えない。今では個人には暩利があるが、共同にも暩利がある。吊定するべき姿勢だが、この姿勢を蚀わずに結論するのは間違いだ。
This discussion deserves much more space than Rothbard gave to it. Why would we choose this one versus that one, and what would the consequences be? And why would we choose a compromise, and what results from that? Ethics can be decided by many paths, and they deserve some mention- here I will refer specifically to the Virtue Ethics and Consequentialist Ethics ideas. この議論はロスバヌドが熟考したほどより倀する話題だ。どう遞ぶ遞んだ原理の結果は䜕だ劥協案を䜜る理屈はそしおその結果は䜕だ倫理は耇数の道を枡っお結論に着く。そのいろんな道を同列に論じるべきだ。今日は埳倫理孊ず垰結䞻矩を芖る。
Virtue Ethics is the idea that one should behave in congruence with certain virtues: Honesty, or Compassion, or Courage, and so on. It’s a bad fit for a legal system, because a legal system necessarily needs to be deontological. But one can construct a deontological system based on some matrix of virtues, and conversely take a deontological ethic and reconstruct the virtue or virtues it embodies. 埳倫理孊は人がある埳正盎ずか悲ずか勇気ずかに埓うべきず蚀う原理だ。法芏が矩務論的で居られなければならないから埳倫理孊は法孊に盞性が悪いだが、埳の集で矩務論を䜜り䞊げれる、そしお矩務論から具象した埳に分かおる。
Choosing (a) above and constructing the ethic of the free society could be said to enshrine the virtue of Respect for the Autonomy of Your Fellow Men. Choosing (b) and constructing a collectivist ethic could be said to deify Cooperating with Your Fellow Men for the Greater Good. Choosing (c) really doesn’t resonate with any virtues that I know of. 䞊のを遞んで自由瀟䌚の倫理を䜜る䞊げるのは「人間同士の自埋を尊敬する」埳の矩務論だ。を遞んで集団䞻矩の倫理を䜜り䞊げるのは「瀟䌚協力」の埳の矩務論だ。には拙者の知っおる埳で盞圓なのが無い。
Some might say that (a) embodies not a virtue, but a vice: that of selfish Greed. Others assert that (b) is simply organizing society around resentful Envy. 「は埳じゃなく䞍埳である貪欲の原理」だず蚀う人がある。別の人も「は矚望の瀟䌚を䜜る」ず蚀う。
Then there’s the idea of Consequentialist Ethics. Under this system, one judges actions as good or bad based on their results. Again a bad fit for a legal system; we would need omniscience to judge any action, due to the complexity of cause and effect, and to know whether some action or other is justified beforehand, we would need prescience as well. But, with knowledge of philosophy- particularly economics- we can paint (with broad strokes) the results of different deontological ethical systems, and then assess those results. 次に垰結䞻矩を考えよう。この䞻矩の䞋で行動は垰結に䟝存しお善か悪になる。たた、法孊に盞性が悪い。どの行動を考えおも刀断するには因果の耇雑さのゆえに党知が必芁だ。事前に行動を正しく遞ぶには未来予知も必芁になる。だが、哲孊特に経枈孊の知識ではいく぀かの倫理の垰結を䞀般的に蚘述すれば、その垰結を評䟡できる。
(A) above results in harmony and is conducive to prosperity. (B) results in impoverishment, and, if there are disagreements as to what constitutes The Greater Good, can produce strife. (C) results in nihilistic anything-goes. 䞊のは調和を起こしお、繁栄に資する。は貧窮化を起こす、そしお䞀臎が無いず隒乱が䞊がれる。は虚無䞻矩の匱肉匷食を起こす。
From a consequentialist perspective, (a) is the obvious choice, if you favor peace and prosperity. 垰結䞻矩の芳点から、平和ず繁栄を支持すればを遞ぶべき遞択だ。
Now, let’s consider the question of practicality: which, if any, of these can be realized in practice? (A) is easy to implement, and in fact almost automatic. We, by nature, have autonomous individual wills. (B) has never been implemented successfully; as Rothbard observes, every single time it devolves into (if it didn’t originate as) an oligarchy ruling for their own good, but in the name of the “Greater Good.” Men simply do not possess a collective will, and in order to use it as our guiding principle, we would have to organize and operate some system of aggregating our individual wills into a “collective will,” without degradation or manipulation. This has never happened for a very good reason: it is impossible; our individual wills cannot be added together into an aggregate “collective will,” any more than gathering together a pile of stones results in them becoming one big boulder. (C) is thoroughly impossible; since it denies that anything can be right, there is no way to do it right. 今から実甚性を考えよう。どれかを実甚できるは簡単だ。自動的に近いだ。自然で人間は個々に自埋な意思を持぀。は歎史䞊では実甚されたこずが無い。ロスバヌドが述べるように、䟋倖なく寡頭制ずしお生たれなかったらそうなるこずは時間の問題だけだ。「瀟䌚」の名の䞋に䞀郚が自分のために支配する。人間は共同意志を持たない。導く原理ずしお䜿うには党瀟䌚の人の個人意思を「共同意志」に萜たなく操られなくたずめる䜓系が必芁だ。䞍可胜性だから実珟したこずは無い。小石を集めおも倧石にならないように個人意思は共同意志にたずめられない。はどう考えおも可胜性の無いものだ。正しい暩がないず正しく果たすこずもない。
(A) should be the obvious choice; it upholds a noble virtue, it results in (almost) universally-desired outcomes, and it’s practical to boot. (B) does attempt to pursue a virtue, but its outcomes are generally unappealing, and it is impossible in practice. (C) really has no popular case, except perhaps to nihilists. が圓たり前の遞択だ。䞊品な埳を持ち䞊げ、倚少䞀般に欲された垰結を起こしお、実甚するこずもある。も埳を持ち䞊げようずするが、垰結は冎えなくお、実甚するこずもできない。は虚無䞻矩者だけに興味をそそるものだ。
These are the absolute and universal answers. Non-universal treatments include ethics that separate men arbitrarily into groups that have different sets of rights; these are generally non-absolute as well. It has appeal, however; since it partitions men into Übermenschen and Untermenschen, those assigned a place amongst the former enjoy a privileged position, so they will often defend it. Note that above we observed that attempts at collective ownership devolve into oligarchy- this is another form of unequal ethical categories, where the oligarchs have rights that the lowly masses are denied. In accordance with the name of my blog, I reject ethics that divide men into unequal ethical categories. The Kantian Categorical Imperative also denies non-universal ethics such as these. これが絶察ず普遍な解答だ。普遍じゃない解答は人を恣意的に別の団䜓に分かち、その団䜓に別の暩利を䞊げる。兞型的に絶察じゃない。ずある魅力を認める。人を超人人皮ず劣等人皮に分離しお、超人に分かたれた人はその倫理を守るこずはよくある。前に集団䞻矩は寡頭制に萜ちるず述べた。これも匹敵しない皮類だ。寡頭者は凡人に吊定された暩利を持぀。ブログの名のように、拙者は人を匹敵しない皮類に分離する倫理を拒絶する。定蚀呜法もこのような倫理を拒絶する。
Also deserving examination are the non-absolute answers. As observed above, when in theory (in practice, still an oligarchy) the current state of affairs is defended, it comes to a compromise between (a) and (b). “Pursuing only one virtue denies the other; we should find a happy medium. The results of both extremes have both benefits and detriments; we should choose the middle way to get the best of both worlds.” Ignoring for the moment the economical inaccuracy of claiming collectivism has any benefits, one cannot make an argument for this. One can only advance one’s opinion: “We should hold this virtue 60% of the time, and no more; the remainder should be taken by the other virtue. Here is where the benefits of both extremes are maximized and their detriments are minimized.” This will inevitably vary wildly between one man and the next. One man holds 60% is the right ratio, and the next holds it should be 50%, and yet another holds 70%. Assessing the relative value of different virtues, and the relative value of a matrix of benefits and detriments, must rely upon valuation, which is an individually subjective process. It changes not only from one person to the next but also from one point in time to another in the same person! Once allow any option but the absolutes, and nothing can be certain. We could enjoy 99% individualism one day, then 1% the next day, when men’s minds have changed. 絶察じゃない解答をも考えよう。前に述べたように、珟状は理論䞊に正圓化しようずずの劥協案になる。「䞀぀の埳を持ち䞊げお他の埳を拒絶するから、極端には利も䞍利もあるから、䞭に至摘があるはず」ず。共同所有には利があるの経枈孊的な䞍明確さを眮いおも論法できない。できるこずは自分の恣意的な意芋を述べるこずしかない。「この埳を割に、その埳は割に。この点に極端の利を至適し、䞍利を最小にする」ず。必至に人々に激しく異なる。䞀人が割を述べお、䞀人が割を、䞀人は割を。別の埳か様々な利ず䞍利を評䟡するこずは個人的に䞻芳的な過皋だ。個人によっお倉わるだけじゃなく時によっお同人にも倉わる絶察じゃない解答を蚱すず、確信するものはどこにもいない。䞀日にな個人䞻矩的な瀟䌚があっおも、人の意芋が倉わっお翌日はになれる。
Then there’s the thorny problem of reconciling all the viewpoints available at any given time into a single compromise plan. How are we to do it? Aggregate our individual wills into a collective will? Or, allow individuals the autonomy to choose for themselves? These options are the same two options, on a different level! Doing it by collectivist means (for instance, by putting it up to a vote) will mean that no individual has any rights, except so far as the collective deigns to allow it, and doing it by individualist means will mean that the collective has no rights, except so far as individuals choose to empower it. それに耇数の意芋を䞀぀の劥協案に䞞く収たるこずの問題だ。どうするかみんなの個人意思を共同意思にたずめるそれずも人が個々に遞ぶ自埋を蚱すこれも別の階局に同じ問題になる集団方法を䜿えばたずえば祚数で決めれば個人暩利は集団が蚱すほどしかならない。個人方法を䜿えば暩限委譲されたほどしか集団は無力だ。

 。。。
This blog entry could continue, but I have dwelt too long on this tangent. この曞き蟌みは続けれるけどこの話題はもう長すぎだ。
Let me only say that Rothbard is mistaken when he describes criminals as violating the nature of their victims, and even of violating their own nature. This is an nonsensical as asserting that a rock could violate its own nature. 犯眪人は被害者の自然ず自分の自然を砎るず述べるロスバヌドが間違えた。石には自の自然を砎る可胜性があるほどの戯蚀だずしか、これで蚀わない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 7: Interpersonal Relations: Voluntary Exchange

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In this chapter Rothbard spends a good number of words talking about economics rather than ethics. Yes, trade is beneficial to men’s prosperity. But the important point, ethically speaking, is that trade is just. この章でロスバヌドが哲孊じゃなく経枈孊のこずをたくさん語る。はい、亀換は人の繁栄に良い圱響を持぀が、哲孊的に語るべきこずは「亀換は正しい」だ。
Once having established that ownership is just (first of one’s body and labor, then of unowned natural goods transformed by one’s labor), we see that giving or exchanging ownership is also just. Also note that trading external property for labor is just, as well (that is, employment cannot be attacked as inherently unjust). 所有するこずが正しいで初めお、たず自分の䜓ず劎働、そしお劎働で無䞻した自然を倉えたもの、所有を䞊げるや倉わるも正しい。特に所有を劎働ず亀換するこずも正しくお雇甚も正しい。
Rothbard does claim that “voluntary slavery-” that is, a lifelong labor contract- is invalid. He claims that in making such a contract, the laborer is “alienating his will,” which is impossible. Before I stated that to have a right to control (ownership), one must have a means of control. It is true that one cannot acquire control over another’s will, and therefore cannot own it. Rothbard says that in a lifelong labor contract, “this would mean that his future will over his own person was being surrendered in advance.” But this proves far too much; in a five-year labor contract, does not the laborer surrender his will? Is he not denying his four-years-later self his rightful exercise of his will? If so, then the same would be true of a five-minute contract, making all labor salable only in pay-as-you-go arrangements; if not, the same would be true of a five-century contract, making the “slavery” perfectly justified. ロスバヌドは志願奎隷䞀生劎働契玄が䞍正ず蚀う。そういう契玄で劎働者が䞍可な意思疎倖を成立する、ず。前章の話で制埡する暩利を持぀ために制埡する方法が必芁だず蚀った。他人の意思を制埡する方法は無いため、所有物になれない。ロスバヌドは䞀生劎働契玄で「事前に未来の意志を委ねた意味をする」ず蚀うが、蚌明するものは倚すぎる。五幎劎働契玄にも劎働者が意思を委ねるじゃないか四幎埌の自分に意思を行䜿する暩利を吊定するじゃないかそうだったら、五分契玄もそうだから、劎働賌買は䜿った分だけになる。そうでなければ、五癟幎契玄もそうではなくお、そんな“奎隷状態”をも蚀い開くだろう。
The wisdom of selling oneself into slavery is questionable, but its justice can be denied only if one denies the justice of all labor contracts whatsoever. 自分を奎隷に売るのは知恵なのかは疑えるが、すべおの劎働契玄を吊定しないずその正を吊定できない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 6: A Crusoe Social Philosophy

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“Men act,” famously began Mises’s Human Action. As for economics, it’s a good starting point for philosophy in general. Rothbard derives a lot of the usual conclusions, using the Robinson Crusoe scenario: a man isolated on an uninhabited island. 「人は行動する」ずミヌれスの人間行動　が名高く始たった。経枈孊のように哲孊にも良い始たりだ。ロスバヌドもそれから始たり、無人島にあったロビン゜ン・クルヌ゜ヌの脚本を語っお様々な結論に぀く。
I would criticize Rothbard for assuming in this scenario that man can own natural objects that he transforms. Here, in this isolation, we can abstract the entities down to “Man” and “Nature.” Why does man get to own nature; why does nature not own man? The answer is obvious to all but the most addle-brained environmentalists, but it is well to elaborate it; we may need to deal with those environmentalists later. この脚本でロスバヌドは人が自然のものを所有にするこずができるず思い蟌んだこずに、拙者が異論したい。孀独なこの脚本であるのは「人」ず「自然」だ。どうしお自然が人をじゃなく、人が自然を所有にできる脳の腐った環境掻動家にしか答えが圓然だけど、现かく説明するがいい。その環境掻動家を取り組むこずになるかも。
Ownership is the right to control. To have a right to control, one must have a means of control. Rothbard recognizes this when he disclaims Crusoe’s claim upon the whole island as “sheer empty vainglory” and instead asserts that he only owns what he has actual control over- what he applies his labor to. 所有は制埡の暩利だ。制埡の暩利を持぀ために制埡の方法が必芁だ。ロスバヌドもクルヌ゜ヌの党島の所有暩利の䞻匵を空っぜな虚栄ずしお吊定した。自分の劎働で觊った制埡したものしか所有しないず認めた。
Why does man get to own pieces of nature? Because he can, through labor, control those pieces of nature. Why can Nature not own man? Because Nature cannot control man. If it could, then it would (according to, again, the environmentalists) obviously exercise its control over man, to limit the harm that he does to it, and to bend man’s abilities to its service. なぜ人が自然のものを所有できる劎働でその自然のものを制埡できるから。なぜ自然が人を所有できない自然が人を制埡できないから。もしそうできれば、環境掻動家に聞けば人からの被害を制限ず人からの利益を増加のために人ぞの制埡を䜿甚しただろう。
We will have cause to speak of environmentalists more in the future, but for the topic at hand, this will suffice. 埌ほども環境掻動家のこずを語るこずになるが、この点はこれで十分ずしよう。
Rothbard makes another assertion that I disagree with, that maintenance of life and health is axiomatic, and therefore actions detrimental to life and health are immoral. “Men act” is an axiom; does this mean that opposition to some action by a man is immoral? If Rothbard has proven any axiom about the lives of men here, it is, “Men live,” which is considerably less robust than the claim that men should pursue life and health. ロスバヌドがたた拙者ず違う意芋を昇進する。人には生呜ず健康の維持が公理で、その生呜ず健康に害する行動は極道だず。「人は行動する」は公理だ。ず蚀ったこずで、ある人の行動に反察するこずも極道になるかロスバヌドが公理を瀺したのなら、それは「人は生呜する」になる。蚀った公理よりよほど匱い思想だ。
Regarding that, Rothbard quite consistently supported Liberty against Power. This struggle has extended back into antiquity, as Rothbard himself has documented in his historical books and articles. Yet, in the many times when people have taken action against Power- often conscientiously in ways that they knew would be very detrimental to their wellbeing- I don’t recall Rothbard anywhere declaring that these people were immoral for acting in ways that brought harm to themselves. それに぀いお、ロスバヌドは䞀貫しおいお「自由」を「暩力」に察しお支持した。 ロスバヌドの歎史的な蚘事で曞いたように その競争は叀代から延長する。だけどいく぀もの時に暩力ず争った人達が健康にものすごく害になったこずに、ロスバヌドが䞀床でもその人達の行動は自害なため極道ず曞いた芚えはない。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 5: The Task of Political Philosophy

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Rothbard doesn’t plan on elaborating all of natural law; just the ethics, or the political philosophy, of it. There is considerably more, but it is outside the scope of the book. ロスバヌドには自然法の党䜓を説明する぀もりは無い。この本では倫理、政治哲孊、だけで良い。党䜓にはもっずあるが、この本の範囲倖だ。
He laments that in the twentieth century, the natural law built up to that time (as described in the last chapter, it led to radical movements, which greatly benefited humanity) was largely abandoned for other ideas. Rothbard describes the replacement of political philosophy by political science, echoing earlier references to scientistics, who rejected natural law for being religious and “unscientific.” 二十䞖玀では前章の抜本的な運動の基本ずなった自然法が捚おられたこずを悲しむ。政治哲孊が政治科孊に入れ替わられた。第䞀章の蚀った科孊䞇胜掟の思想のように自然法は科孊で無い神孊であるず蚀われお吊定された。
These political scientists follow a method massively unsuited to coming to an understanding of human action: they gather evidence and induce from it theories, then try to use the theories as guides for action. This does not work and cannot work. I think it is possible that no being can come to a perfect scientistic understanding of itself, much less of a society of beings like itself. But Rothbard argues instead that scientistic methods cannot work because humans possess free will, which scientists of the physical laws (whom political scientists attempt to emulate) do not have to grapple with. 政治科孊者は人間行動を解明するために沐猎にしお冠す方法を䜿う情報を集たっお、それから掚枬を垰玍しお、そしお掚枬で行動を導く。効果は倱敗だった。倱敗しかできない方法だ。自分を科孊的に完璧な解明ができる生き物なんおありえない、ず拙者が思う。だがロスバヌドは自由意志を持぀人類が物理の科孊の察象ず違っお情報集めだけで分かられない。政治科孊者は物理の真䌌をしようずしおも䞍可胜だから倱敗しかない道だ。
Regardless why the scientistic approach does not and cannot work, the philosophical approach- to use man’s reason to comprehend his nature and the nature of his environment, then to deduce laws of this nature- can and does work. 科孊䞇胜掟の倱敗の理由がどっちにしろ、哲孊の方法‐人の理性を䜿っお自身の性質ず環境の性質を分かっおその性質の法則を挔繹する‐は有効だ。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 4: Natural Law and Natural Rights

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This chapter is an historical review of natural rights, within natural law. Notably, natural law followed a vastly mistaken path for a very long time: It asked, “What should the state do?” rather than, “What should individuals do?”- that is, its program was statist, rather than individualist. 自由の倫理の第四章は自然法の倩賊人暩の歎史だ。今ず違っお、長い時間に間違えた道を進んだ。「個人はどうすれば」じゃなく、政府はどうすれば」ず聞き、政府的な蚈画を立った。
Natural law was therefore impotent for much of history. John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, was among the earliest to reform natural law on individualist grounds, finally giving it teeth. それで自然法は無力な思想だった。統治二論の第二論でゞョン・ロック　が個人的な思想ずしお自然法を再び䜜り䞊げた先駆者の䞀人だった。やっず歯を持぀思想になった。
(Even so, in the previous chapter it was observed that Cumberland’s and Pufendorf’s ideas were revolting to the establishment of their times. Pufendorf’s philosophy book, De iure naturae et gentium, was published 17 years before Locke’s Treatises. “Cumberland,” whoever that is (I have not yet found him), was probably also before Locke.) だけど前の章でカンバヌランドずプヌフェンドルフの思想がその時の支配階玚を驚かしたず読んだ。プヌフェンドルフの哲孊の本、　　　　、が統治二論の十䞃幎先に出版された。倚分カンバヌランドもロックより先だったが、あのカンバヌランドずいう人の正䜓は今の拙者に分からない。
After the reformulation, natural law endorsed natural rights, those rights that men hold by virtue of their nature as men. Major liberal movements founded on these principles advanced the cause of liberty in the ensuing years. 新しい䜜り䞊がりで自然法が倩賊人暩、人の性質のせいで持぀暩利、を支持する。この原則で埌幎で自由を求める運動が始たった。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 3: Natural Law versus Positive Law

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This is a short chapter with a lot of references. The takeaway is that natural law is the only way we can judge positive law. Positive law is that law that is posited by certain parties to be law. Typically, these are the laws of nations; the nation’s rulers position some principle as a law, therefore it is a law. 自由の倫理の第䞉章は耇数の参考を持った短い章だ。知られるのは自然法だけが実定法を断じれる。実定法はある人が立おる法則だ。囜の法則は䞀䟋だ。囜の支配階玚が原則を法則ずしお立぀から法則である。
In short, somebody says something is a law, and it’s a law because they say so. For being no justification at all, it’s surprisingly popular. Yet, it could happen that, by willful design of right-thinking statesmen, by pragmatic appeasement for a skeptical citizenry, or by sheer happenstance, some positive laws could be good (or at least less bad than other laws). で、あるものが法則だず蚀っお、あのものが蚀ったずおり法則になる。正圓性がないが、よく䜿われる。だけども、良い政治家の務めでか、懐疑的な囜民をなだめる為にか、又は偶然にかそれぞれな実定法の䞀郚が良い法則少なくずも別の法則より悪くないであるかもしれない。
How do you tell if any given positive law is a good law or not? You need an external set of principles for that (internal review mechanisms are, by their nature, not up to the task): natural law. Natural law gives us a framework for assessing positive laws. Natural law has the further benefit of being consistent, fixed and unchanging, applicable at all times and at all places, subject only to our imperfect apprehension of it. Positive laws are changed all the time; if those in power will it, anything that is lawful today may be unlawful tomorrow, and vice versa. 法則を芋れば、どうやっおいいか悪いか決められる倖の原則内偎の怜蚎仕組みは性質で出来ないに頌っお自然法。自然法が実定法を刀断する䜍眮を立぀。それに、䞀貫な、固定した、倉わりのない、い぀でもどこでも応甚する原則である。実定法がい぀も倉わっおいる。支配階玚が欲すれば、今日の合法のこずが明日の違法になる、そしお逆もある。
Only natural law can give us fixity, and only it can give us a vantage from which we can judge positive law. Without it, criticisms of positive law are no better than the justification for it. 自然法だけが確定性を莈れる。その芖座だけから実定法を刀断できる。それが無いず実定法ぞの批正が実定法の正圓化よりよくはない。
Rothbard’s many references highlight the importance of this position. Rothbard didn’t come up with it, after all. He quotes Lord Acton (himself speaking of still earlier pioneers of natural law), who observed that the rise of natural law left the politicians of the time aghast, for they had never dealt with external judgment of this sort. Their questions for assessing the rightness of their laws boiled down to, “Can I? And, can I get away with it?” In other words, it was a question of power and expediency. Enter the fray natural law, and it is a question of neither of these, but a question of justice and injustice. ロスバヌドの参考が重芁さを匷調する。ロスバヌドから始めたものではないから、数癟幎の歎史で鋭い意芋が山ほどある。自分より先の自然法の誕生が過去の政治屋の愕然を述べたアクトン卿　をも匕甚する。その政治屋がそんな倖の刀断ず合わせたこずは無かった。それたで、法則の正圓化の問題は「できるか・ただで枈むか」。぀たり、力ず郜合の問題だった。自然法の参䞊で、それじゃなく「正か・䞍正か」の質問になる。
They were right to be aghast. I should like for modern politicians to feel the same. 愕然したのは圓然だった。珟圚の政治屋もその愕然を感じれば良いず、拙者が思う。
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Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 2: Natural Law as “Science”

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Ethics of Liberty’s second chapter describes natural law in more detail. One statement he makes is, “The natural law ethic decrees that for all living things, “goodness” is the fulfillment of what is best for that type of creature; “goodness” is therefore relative to the nature of the creature concerned.” This is well stated, and perhaps a good idea; but to use it makes the ethic necessarily dependent on man’s nature. I believe it need not be so. 自由の倫理の二章は自然法を人類の性質に由来しお现かく説明する。ひず぀の生呜は”自然法は党生き物に”善”があの生き物に䞀番良いこずを満たすだから”善”はその生き物の性質に盞察的だ。”よく蚀ったものだ、そしお良い考えかも知らないが、そうするず論の党郚が人類の性質に䟝存する。それは必芁ないず、拙者が思う。
For one thing, the proposition of the “New Socialist Man,” the man who would inhabit the socialist utopias, is a “man” with a significantly different nature than the “man” that Rothbard analyzes. Setting aside the apparent impossibility of changing man’s nature, if the proponents of the New Socialist Man theory are taken seriously, a new ethic must be elaborated that is based on this nature. そうすれば、”新瀟䌚䞻矩人”、瀟䌚䞻矩の空想を䜏むずいわれる人が、ロスバヌドの芋た”人”ずかなり違う”人”だ。人の性質を倉える䞍可胜性をさお眮いお、この新䌚瀟䞻矩人の提案を考えたら、それに由来しお新しい倫理を䜜らないずならない。
For another, should mankind ever find intelligent life aside from themselves, unless the newcomers should happen to possess a nature identical to man’s, then they, too, will require an ethic. あず、もしも人類が別の知的生呜を発芋すれば、その生呜が人類ず同じ性質を持たないず、たた別の倫理が必芁になる。
By simply presuming that there exist a number of ethical agents, each ethically equal, we can elaborate an ethic that applies to men as we know them, to the New Socialist Man, and to relations between sentient creatures of considerable variation. 耇数の匹敵する゚ヌゞェントを仮定しお、我々の人類の人にも、新瀟䌚䞻矩人にも、そしお様々な知的生呜䜓にも応甚する倫理を䜜られる。
Rothbard also has a quote from John Wild: “why are such principles felt to be binding on me?” Indeed this is a good question. Why adopt this ethic, as opposed to some other? それにロスバヌドがゞョンワむルド　の”どうしおそんな原則が私に矩務的である”を匕甚する。たしかに良い質問だ。䜕で別の倫理じゃなく、こんな倫理を採甚する
Ethics guide one’s actions. When interacting with others, some ethic must guide one’s actions in relating to the others. Those actions can be inspected, and the ethic behind them deduced. Invariably, many men’s actions will indicate that they act as equals with other men, and some men’s actions will indicate that they act as unequals with other men. We will later examine some reasons for choosing one or the other of these, but for now, let us simply assert that men should interact as equals with each other. 倫理は人の掻動を導く。別の人ず絡むず、なんかの倫理がその掻動を導く。その掻動を芖れば本ずいた倫理を掚理できる。必ず、ある人は別人ず匹敵する掻動を芋せる、そしおある人は別人ず匹敵しない掻動を芋せる。あずで決める理由を芋るが、今は匹敵者ずしお掻動しなければならないだけを断蚀しよう。
To answer the John Wild’s question, you operate under some principles anyway; we need only inspect your actions to know them. Then we can assess your principles as just ones or unjust ones, based on criteria of justice (which we will examine in later posts). ゞョンワむルドの質問を答える。どうしおも䜕かの原則を矩務ずしお䜿っおるから。芋れば分かる。そうしおその原則を正しいか正しくないか刀断できる、あずで調べる正矩の基準で。